... the calendar, too.
As of now, the one and most important milestone (no, it’s not the Formula One) in the peace process is perhaps June 16, which marks the 12-month deadline envisaged by the European Court of Human Rights in Chiragov and Others v Armenia and Sargsyan v Azerbaijan cases in Grand Chamber. To refresh, these are two cases before the Grand Chamber
dealing with the aftermath of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and, among important legal aspects (there is a lot of rhetoric of what actually these cases are about!), raising the question of Armenian and Azerbaijani
refugee rights and just compensation
. The Strasbourg Court invited the ...
... in the wake of the April incidents cannot be neutralized by one or several meetings, even at the highest level. “The four-day war” radicalized society, which cannot but influence the behaviour of the political elites. Calls are voiced in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh “not to give away an inch of land to the enemy” and to regain the ground lost during the April fighting. These calls often go hand-in-hand with criticism of the authorities for not being prepared for the April spike in tensions,...
... configuration of external and internal diplomatic and military-political factors that have not yet encouraged optimism.
1
. With Russia acting as a mediator, a ceasefire agreement was signed by the respective defense ministers of the three warring parties (Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic) and confirmed by subsequent agreements in 1994-1995. See more:
http://www.vn.kazimirov.ru/docs.htm
Tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh are far from over, and that places Russia in a very uncomfortable situation: trying to maintain friendly relations with two strategic allies while getting them both to the negotiating table.
By Pavel Koshkin
The frozen conflict in ...
... “immediate cessation of armed hostilities and hostile acts” and “unilateral withdrawal” in one single line, thus keeping the issues of withdrawal and security of civilians equally significant to the lasting settlement. While Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh responded positively on Res. 884 and assured commitment to abide, Azerbaijan never officially agreed to adhere, and continued hostilities up until the trilateral ceasefire agreement was mediated under the umbrella of OSCE Minsk Process....
... Yerevan’s position.
Despite its undisguised pro-Turkish leanings, Azerbaijan most likely will be reluctant to openly support Turkey in the latter’s confrontation with Russia, Azerbaijan seems unlikely to resume large-scale hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh today.
Thus, Armenia appeared to be virtually the only CSTO country to publicly support the position of Russia against Turkey. This notwithstanding, Yerevan is not at all interested in a further escalation of the conflict between Moscow and Ankara. Any open confrontation ...
... of Armenian armed forces (AF) and the demilitarization of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as for the introduction of a special regime for the Lachin and Kelbajar districts, including the creation of a transport corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh, and the holding of a referendum to determine the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh. The practical implementation of these principles envisaged the introduction of peacekeepers into the conflict zone, international efforts to promote ...
... things, due to band-aid-like solutions designed to revive the positive imagine of Russia among Armenian society (e.g. the dynamics of military-technical cooperation between Russia and Azerbaijan and Moscow's role in maintaining the ceasefire regime in Nagorno-Karabakh).
REUTERS/Hrant Khachatryan
Sergei Markedonov:
Russia – Learning from Armenia
Electric Maydan per se was not a coordinated anti-Russian action, but spontaneously highlighted many problems reflecting perceptions of and dissatisfaction with the policies of Russia.
Economic cooperation has traditionally been one of the areas ...
... parliamentary elections, Sargsyan has a real chance of “staying despite having gone”, for example, by becoming prime minister or parliament speaker or head of the ruling Republican Party instead of president
[27]
.
For Russia, destabilization in Armenia is fraught with upsetting the status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh, and attempts to minimize the Russian influence in Transcaucasia as a whole.
Political Lessons for Armenia, Russia and Armenia–Russia Cooperation (recommendations)
In the current situation, it is imperative for Russian and Armenian ...
... high level, if not mounting.
REUTERS/David Mdzinarishvili/Pixstream
Alexander Krylov:
Azerbaijan–Armenia: heat is getting stronger
At the same time, it is indicative that the armed stand-off is taking place not only along the contact line around Nagorno-Karabakh, but on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan too. As a result, the village of Choratan of Armenia’s Tavush province was shelled twice on April 6, 2015, and on April 5, 2015, Armenian forces fired from the village of Paravakar in the same province at Azerbaijani positions ...
