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Evgeny Soroko

PhD in Physics and Mathematics, Senior Research Associate, Institute of Demography at the Higher School of Economics

The world’s population will continue to grow throughout the 21st century, potentially increasing from the current seven billion to ten billion, although this rise should vary across regions and countries. This will inevitably lead to exacerbation of such problems as the shortage of food and drinking water, ethnic and religious conflicts, pollution and the depletion of natural resources. New types of manmade disasters, epidemics, wars and climate change also lie in store. In a hundred years’ time the world population is likely to have stabilized at 10 billion after which it will gradually reduce. Russia's population will continue to decline, falling to about 100 million.

The world’s population will continue to grow throughout the 21st century, potentially increasing from the current seven billion to ten billion, although this rise should vary across regions and countries. This will inevitably lead to exacerbation of such problems as the shortage of food and drinking water, ethnic and religious conflicts, pollution and the depletion of natural resources. New types of manmade disasters, epidemics, wars and climate change also lie in store. In a hundred years’ time the world population is likely to have stabilized at 10 billion after which it will gradually reduce. Russia's population will continue to decline, falling to about 100 million.

Is the Demographic Explosion Over?

Not quite, if by demographic explosion we understand high birthrate and high natural increase. This latter is in slow but observable decline, although it remains at a relative high of 1.2 percent a year. Almost half of countries in the world have a total fertility rate of up to two children born over a female's lifetime. Does this mean that the world's population has stopped growing? Not really. Even if every country in the world faces a decline in fertility to the level guaranteeing simple reproduction (statistically just over two children per female), the population will continue to grow for a relatively long period of time: about two generations (50-55 years). The main reason is that demographic processes are highly inert, due to the age structure of the population. Therefore, we can say that in 50 years’ time the current world population of seven billion people is likely to increase to 10 billion.

In line with these demographic transition long-term, the global population will begin to decrease.

According to prevailing global population projections, this maximum will be reached by virtue of demographic transition patterns, according to which all countries worldwide experience stages of lower birth and death rates. Thus, in France, crude death rate dropped from 40 per thousand a year in the mid-18th century to nine in late 20th century, while crude birth rate for the same period dropped from 40 to 13 per 1,000 people per annum. In France, the total fertility rate in the 20th century fell from three to 1.9 children per female. The speed of this transition, and its timing, are peculiar to each country, but it is something every country is expected to experience. Therefore, in line with these demographic transition patterns (a decline in fertility follows a reduction in mortality), long-term, the global population will begin to decrease.

How Will Population Growth Differ Country from Country?

Downward trend in mortality gives rise to problems such as population ageing, increased demographic pressure on people of working-age, the exacerbation of social conflict and can even lead to a crisis in the pension system.

And what about depopulation? Those are likely to be the questions at the forefront of the minds of all those who have read the frequent publications on population decline in Russia, Germany, Japan and elsewhere. However, it is not possible to take a particular country or group of countries as the basis for predicting the trajectory of global population trends. Local trends do not necessarily coincide with continental or global tendencies. Contemporary demographic characteristics of different countries vary greatly. For example, an average female in Africa gives birth to five children (in Angola – this figure is higher than six), while in Bulgaria – to only 1.5. But non-uniformity, heterogeneity, and disproportion are not particular to fertility, but are features of many other indicators. Thus, in Central Africa life expectancy is 50 years, in North America – 80, and in Japan – 83 years. Age structure also varies significantly: in Nigeria just three percent of the population is aged 65 or over, while for Europe this is 16 percent and for Indonesia – six percent.

The territorial distribution of the world's population is very uneven. So, while there may be an average population density of 50 people per square kilometer, in Bangladesh this figure is higher than 1,000, in Italy – 200, in Kazakhstan – six, and in Mongolia – only two people per square kilometer.

Photo: thechinatourism.com
The Great Wall of China

What conditions will ensure that the world's population continues to grow? It should be noted that different countries’ demographics are not directly related to the availability of vacant land, resources such as water and food, or the level of socio-economic development. On the contrary, the highest population growth is observed in poverty-stricken regions, especially in the least developed countries of Asia and Africa, despite their economic development level, public health conditions, and resource wealth. So it is fairly safe to say that, in the next 50-60 years, the current problems will only aggravate. These include shortage of potable water and food, ethnic and religious conflicts, environmental pollution, climate change, natural resource depletion, desertification, and deforestation. We can expect some improvement only in the final third of the 21st century, when this growth in world population is likely to stop.

Life Expectancy and Health

Civilizational development delivers a significant and lasting reduction in mortality and increased life expectancy. However, this process is irregular across different regions of the world. This may be caused by differences other than economic development, for example in religious norms; national customs and traditions; habits like smoking and alcohol drinking; ethnic features (for example, in sexual relations); as well as the particular natural environment and climate. At the same time, the generally favorable downward trend in mortality gives rise to problems such as population ageing, increased demographic pressure on people of working-age, the exacerbation of social conflict and can even lead to a crisis in the pension system. Unfortunately, not all development factors contribute positively to life expectancy trends. Mankind may face new threats, such as obesity, unbalanced nutrition, genetically modified foods, hypodynamia, a heightened tempo of living, increased stress, and the use of new chemicals and medicines. In addition, growth in population density and the intensification of traffic flows may change the rate and geographical distribution of old (influenza, tuberculosis, and hepatitis) and new (HIV-AIDS) epidemics.

What Will Happen to Migration?

Photo: amazonaws.com
Indian station

In the next hundred years, the global trend of increased migration flows from economically and socially disadvantaged countries to better developed ones will gain momentum, involving millions more people. This seems inevitable due to the growing distinction between countries in terms of income level, job opportunities and education, not to mention access to social benefits and natural resources.

With, as expected, population growth already underway in less developed regions, migration pressure on developed countries will only increase. It would be naive to assume that countries of origin and host countries share common interests. Therefore we should expect new restrictions on population movement. Increasing numbers of host countries will pass new laws relating to deportation, registration, naturalization, visas and quotas for work and residence. This could generate an additional source of tension in international relations. For example, in 1970, France adopted measures to restrict the influx of migrants, developed a procedure for their repatriation, and in 1980 started to deport them. At the end of the century the country revised the procedure for obtaining citizenship. In Germany restrictions exist on citizenship for non-Germans.

What Lies in Store for Marriage and the Family?

The shift from a unipolar to a multipolar world will be determined not only by the military strength of the new centers of power, their economic resources and infrastructure, but by their population size as well. Over time, this will inevitably lead to a drift in the population centers of gravity.

The evolution of marriage as a social institution over the centuries suggests that it is likely to continue to change. Social norms and the concept of marriage are locked in a cycle of permanent change as the spectrum of socially acceptable types of marriage broadens, giving individuals greater freedom of choice over the form of marriage (church, civil, registered, unregistered, same-sex, heterosexual, trial or temporary, etc.). It seems unlikely that, in a hundred years’ time, the socially acceptable form of marriage will become more rigid and increasingly regulated. A reduction in registered marriages, the increase in divorce and cohabitation, the rise in the average marriage age (in developed countries: 30 or older), a significantly greater share of children born out of wedlock (in Russia in 2010 – every fourth child and every second in some countries) all combine to indicate the opposite. In demography these processes are called the second demographic transition. In many ways they result from the major expansion of marital, sexual and reproductive behavioral autonomy in modern society.

What Will Happen to Fertility?

Photo: blog.gmfus.org
Migrants, Port of Lampedusa

The global trend in this area is one of decline. The reasons for this are objective and numerous. In short, the problem can be formulated in terms of the “time budget.” Development means an individual has less time for family, birth and parenting, as they spend more time on their education, work, career, tourism, travel, sports, movies, the Internet, and, in general, life and leisure. The expansion of citizens’ reproductive rights and medical advances provide more opportunities for family planning.

In terms of country-to-country differentiation, at least two categories can be discerned, i.e. developed countries and the rest. In the first group, the birth rate stands at an average of 1.2-2 children per female. In the coming decade these countries may face a further decline in fertility, though insignificant, since the birthrate there seems to have reached an all-time low, and most UN population projections predict growth in this indicator. Hopefully, constantly expanding new reproductive technologies (in vitro conception, sperm banks, etc.), medical advances in supporting maternal-and-infant life and health (especially in pregnancies involving twins, triplets etc.), and an expansion of surrogate and professional maternity will provide additional opportunities. In group two, where the demographic transition is not yet complete, the global trend of fertility decline will continue. Quite possibly, some countries will take up the Chinese one family – one child policy.

How Can Demography Affect International Relations?

The age structure, shaped by a substantial reduction in the birth rate in the 1990s, threatens to exacerbate demographic problems over the next 10-20 years. Without migration, the population will decline, because of its significant loss due to natural causes.

In the next 50-80 years, international relations will be at risk of further deterioration. The reasons go beyond uneven economic development, religious diversity and the struggle for food and natural resources. The shift from a unipolar to a multipolar world will be determined not only by the military strength of the new centers of power, their economic resources and infrastructure, but by their population size as well. Over time, this will inevitably lead to a drift in the population centers of gravity. In recent years, we have seen signs of this phenomenon in the continued growth of international influence and prestige of China, India and Brazil. More countries are expected to join this list. Therefore, the emergence of a stable world multipolar structure is not probable for the time being.

What Lies Ahead for Russia in 100 Years’ Time?

Photo: REUTERS / Stringer Russia
Migrants in Russia. Kurban Ait near Moscow
Cathedral mosque

Russia will continue to lose its status in the “List of Countries by Population.” However, many demographic problems common to most developed countries, i.e. population ageing, low birthrate, and migration, are exacerbated in Russia by lower life expectancy and higher mortality rate among working-age men. Thus, life expectancy for men in Russia is 15 years lower than it is in Japan. For Russia, depopulation carries an additional threat: that its population will be too small for its vast territory. Since the late 20th century this indicator has been declining faster than in many neighboring countries. The age structure, shaped by a substantial reduction in the birth rate in the 1990s, threatens to exacerbate demographic problems over the next 10-20 years. Without migration, the population will decline, because of its significant loss due to natural causes.

Simple demographic calculations show that even if every woman in Russia gives birth to twice as many children as now (1.6 children on average), the problem of a working-age population that is falling at a rate of about a million people a year would not be solved by the mid-21st century. This explains why, without a substantial influx of migrants, Russia’s future seems uncertain. Since the migration potential of the former Soviet Union is fast becoming depleted, increased migrant flows from other countries – such as China, Indonesia, Vietnam and even Nigeria – are more than likely. Incidentally, Nigeria recently surpassed Russia in terms of population size.

Of course, this is not to say that migration will be completely open, spontaneous, unregulated or illegal. To ensure its demographic future, the country must develop a sober, balanced and prudent migration policy. At the same time, given the existing tolerance levels and migrant assimilation processes, Russia can not support more than a million immigrants a year. Since the annual migrant flow in 2008-2010 numbered about 200,000 people, it seems reasonable to assume that half a million people a year is a relatively realistic maximum. Under this scenario, in a hundred years’ time Russia will see a population decline, however this decline will not see it fall below 100 million people. That said, about half the population will consist of immigrants and their descendants.

Conclusions

In the next 100 years, the patterns and trends in global demographic development that were peculiar to the early 21st century, i.e. declining birth rate, increased life expectancy, population ageing, greater migration flows, will still be present and will lead to the further growth of the world's population. The uneven economic and demographic development of regions and countries that we see today will continue and intensify. This will aggravate threats and challenges including in the realm of international relations. However, there is good reason to expect the global population to stabilize at 10 billion by the end of the 21st century, and then even to start a gradual decline.

According to most demographic projections, Russia's population will continue to fall. Russia could even become a second tier country in the List of Countries by Population. Without migration, in a hundred years’ time, its population size could drop to 50-60 million people, but migration could support it at about 100 million.

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