There is a very interesting debate on whether new weapons of warfare are really that new. What are those weapons? How effective are they? And do they change the nature and definition of war so skillfully described by the military theorist Clausewitz? In an exclusive interview for the Russian International Affairs Council, Commodore Steven Jermy, a naval aviator and career naval officer, shares his views on new warfare and new weapons of war.
Foreign opinion
Interviewee: Commodore Steven Jermy, Professor of Strategy & Leadership at University of Plymouth, UK
Interviewer: Maria Prosviryakova
There is a very interesting debate on whether new weapons of warfare are really that new. What are those weapons? How effective are they? And do they change the nature and definition of war so skillfully described by the military theorist Clausewitz? In an exclusive interview for the Russian International Affairs Council, Commodore Steven Jermy, a naval aviator and career naval officer, shares his views on new warfare and new weapons of war.
According to Clausewitz "war is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will". In general, the purpose of traditional weapons of warfare was to enable this. Do new weapons of warfare change Clausewitz’s doctrine?
I do not think the Clausewitz doctrine has changed. In fact, the idea of war as an “act of force to compel enemy to do our will” is still the same. The important question is on the modern application of force and the use of new weapons. If such weapons are used as an application of force, in pursuit of political objectives, then there is no change to the doctrine. What has changed, of course, is the nature of these new weapons, the way in which they allow force to be applied.
Is the concept of traditional war - "war as the continuation of politics by other means" (Clausewitz) - changing?
People talk about new wars and old wars, but they misunderstand the Clausewitzian view, which sees war as the use of force for political purposes. And the new weapons are generally used for political purposes. So in this sense they still are “Clausewitzian weapons”, but simply weapons of a different nature.
For example, it is interesting how counterinsurgencies and terrorism have developed. People tend to think of these both as new forms of war. But indeed, what do the terrorist use their weapons for, be they planes filled with innocent people or IEDs (improvised explosive device)? They are still used for political purposes. The political purposes of Al Qaida are clear – they want the West out of the Saudi Arabia peninsula. They may be using different means to achieve this objective, but they are still using force for political purpose, thus satisfying the criteria of Clausewitzian war.
What are the new types of weapons?
There are 2-3 types of new weapons. The easy new weapons are UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles). The way in which they have been used in Afghanistan and Pakistan is a good example. The force has been applied from people who are based in America and flying missions over Afghanistan. But in terms of what they achieve it is, in reality, long range bombardment. It is just done from 5000 miles away guided by drone pilots, rather than or even 10,000 metres up, guided by bomb aimers in bombers aircraft. I don’t think the weapon has changed hugely - it is still a bomb - it is just how it is aimed and from where it has deployed.
A more interesting question is on cyber weapons. Here we can start to get into some very complex areas about whether the cyber attack is an attack using force. You can argue that if a cyber attack results in damage and destruction, then it is a use of force. But if it results in something else, for example a change in leadership attitude, then that is something a bit more curious – and difficult to say whether we would call such an attack Clausewitzian. For example, the information technology damage that was done to Iran and its nuclear capacity does appear to be an attack, but whether it was an act of war, or an act of force, or a bit of both, is an open question. I think cyber war is the area that may well be different from Clausewitzian war, on occasion, but it is rather too early to reach a definitive judgment.
Cyber attack is different in that it doesn't entail any physical damage.
This is a complex area, because war as an act of force usually results in physical damage or the threat of physical damage. And cyber war may not deliver physical damage. The consequence of physical damage is usually the loss of, or as a minimum a risk to, life or significant damage of capital assets. But the use of a cyber weapon might not result in such an outcome and thus is more difficult to classify.
Could it be said that the new weapons are aimed at reducing the bloodshed in contrast to the old ones?
Yes, you could definitely say that. There is no doubt that the new types of weapons are more precise, indeed this is one of their design characteristics. But I would say they are designed to reduce the risk of collateral damage, to in turn make sure that the war force is more focused. But they are certainly not designed to reduce bloodshed at the target. Even though they are more focused, they are still an act of force – either producing death or wounding or some other side effect to an opponent to compel him or her to follow our will.
How effective is the implementation of these new types of weapons?
I think the best modern cast studies would be Libya and Afghanistan. In Libya, we saw the NATO mission that was conducted mainly from the air, in as much as the precision weapons were targeted based on relayed information from the ground to achieve an effect. I think this is the only modern time when we have seen NATO on the strategic offensive.
And there is an interesting comparison with Afghanistan, where NATO has been on the strategic defensive. in Afghanistan, we are seeing older weapons of war being used by the Taliban but with very important effects – one of these older weapons of war is the suicide bomber, a weapon that has proved to be very effective, and is having a distinct political impact on the NATO Allies and International Community.
Is the effectiveness of these new weapons justified by their cost?
It depends on what you are trying to achieve. If you are engaged in the sorts of wars like in Afghanistan – then you can justify some of the cost. You can say they are expensive but a drone flying over Afghanistan is probably cheaper than a manned aircraft in the long run. One of the most expensive things in the manned aircraft is the man and in this sense the drone is cheaper, and this, in turn, is leading to a reduced long-term war role for manned aircraft. Drones may not always be as effective as manned aircraft, but they are catching up quickly, whilst also bring advantages that are impossible to replicate in a manned vehicle.
What advantages and disadvantages do you see in the increasing use of these new weapons of warfare?
Of the advantages, the most important is probably precision – we see now less collateral damage than we used to. For example, if you think about the bombing of Hamburg by the Allied Forces in the 1940-s – the collateral damage was huge.
As for disadvantages, the subtle one is the depersonalization of war – and the associated risk that, if is less bloody and up-front, then politicians may be more likely to use the weapon of war.
Furthermore, I am not sure that NATO forces using UAVs against the Taliban and others are necessarily winning the political war. Tactically, they may be successful in “taking out” individuals but politically this may not necessarily be a good thing. What The Taliban often say is that “the West do not have the courage to stand up against them mano-a-mano”. And strategically, this may well give them political advantage. So when you get back to politics, the modern means may not always be as effective as we think.
What about the advantages and disadvantages of cyber war?
I think it is very difficult to say, because we are so early in this. Let’s take the case of Iran for example. The advantage may be that you could achieve political effect without the destruction of capital or people. The disadvantage may be that you open up a new environment where you may be vulnerable yourself, through counterattacks and not just from your opponent. In the cyber warfare environment, states clearly have great capacity. But so, too, do individuals, as we have seen in, for example, the attacks against banks by hackers. So, cyber warfare opens up a new territory that is almost impossible to police, but also a territory that is not the sole province of the state and, rather, open to anyone with a good knowledge of internet.
What does the appearance of new types of weapons mean for the future of the conventional troops, navy?
There are at least two sub-issues to address in this question, both centered on the question of the future strategic context.
First, can you imagine the West undertaking more operations like Afghanistan? I hope the answer is “no”. It has been expensive and in the long run not successful. So I think the use of large armies by the West in conventional operations like Afghanistan is going to be less likely in the future, so conventional troops will, I suspect, be used less in the near term. The issue that could, though, change this is economics, and I do worry that the current economic crisis in Europe could lead to the loss of stability in countries, particularly those on the northern shores of the Mediterranean. Such crisis may not lead to war, but a breakdown of public order, leading to a deepening national insecurity, is surely a possibility.
Second, what is more difficult to foresee is whether there will be state-on-state wars. I worry about future resource wars, in circumstances where some countries are short of resources and others are not. And, if such resource shortages eventually lead to risks to national security, then I could imagine such circumstances providing triggers for state-on-state wars in the future, I’m afraid to say.
Ultimately, though, I do not think that the development or possession of new weapons will bear significantly on the future of war. What matters much more is politics, and the key underlying societal drivers, most obviously economics, energy and the environment. I hope, in particular, that we learn to manage our resources better, so as to reduce the risk of war therein, but do not, I a afraid, see much sign of better management in our early future – we may get better at this in a distant future, but this looks unlikely in our near future, and we may thus have to accept the risks of greater insecurity and even war in the early decades ahead.
What is the future of new weapons?
I think the most interesting areas is the cyber area and, perhaps, space, and it is in these two domains that the most uncertainty lies. But as for new weapons in the land, sea and air environments, my prediction is more of the same, weapons improvements, yes, more precise, cheaper, and so on. But used very much according to the traditional Clausewitzian doctrine.
