Russian-Georgian Relations – Continued Stagnation or Positive Progress?

As of late, Georgia, which used to be one of the closest Soviet republics to Russia, has become Moscow’s most problematic partner of all the Transcaucasian states. And this has happened despite a common two-century history and Orthodox faith as well as the cultural influence that has shaped the development of the two countries.

As of late, Georgia, which used to be one of the closest Soviet republics to Russia, has become Moscow’s most problematic partner of all the Transcaucasian states. And this has happened despite a common two-century history and Orthodox faith as well as the cultural influence that has shaped the development of the two countries.

The history of the Russian-Georgian relations covers several centuries, but the question of what lessons have been learned from the two states’ coexistence still remains open.

The starting point of bilateral relations dates back to the Treaty initiated by Kartli-Kakheti (Eastern Georgia) King Irakli II and signed with Catherine the Great of Russia on July 24 (August 4), 1783 in Georgievsk (North Caucasus), which made the Georgian provinces of Kartli and Kakhet protectorates of Russia. In this regard, it is important to remember not only the position of both countries at that time, but also the general background of the signing of this document.

In those days, Georgia was a small country and surrounded by the two great Muslim empires in the region, Turkey and Persia. Their constant raids put numerous Georgian kingdoms and principalities (they were united only in 1089-1125 and 1184-1212 during the reigns of David the Builder and Queen Tamar respectively) [1] on the brink of extinction. The country faced an acute problem of preserving its statehood and territorial integrity.

The favorable geopolitical position of Georgia attracted the attention of not only neighboring countries, but Europe too. It was not an accident that Irakli II pinned hopes for the country’s prosperity on arousing European interest in the prospect of developing trade routes to India through Georgia and Iran. However, just as nowadays, Europe was not interested in playing a major geopolitical game in the Caucasus. At that time, France supported the rebels in the British colonies in North America, noticeably weakening the position of England, which was waging a war against Spain and Holland. In addition, the King of Georgia realized that attempts to create an independent Georgian state that relied on Europe were doomed only to failure. As a result, Tbilisi turned to its northern neighbor Russia, which was becoming a huge and powerful empire.

wikipedia.org
The King of Kartli and Kakheti Heraclius II

With signing the Treaty of Georgievsk, the Russian Empire established its protectorate over Eastern Georgia and guaranteed its internal sovereignty, the integrity of Irakli II’s possessions and protection in case of war, thereby eliminating the political and economic fragmentation of Georgia and tightening cultural links between the two nations.

By signing the Treaty of Georgievsk, Russia consolidated its position in the South Caucasus, gained access to the passage through the Caucasus Mountains, as well as an opportunity to promote trade routes to the East (the Caucasus, Central Asia, and India). Thus, the Treaty of Georgievsk laid the foundation for the realization of Russia’s imperial ambitions in the Caucasus.

On September 12, 1801, the abolition of the Kartli-Kakheti Kingdom was confirmed by the Decree of Emperor Alexander I, who a year later signed the regulation on the administration of Georgia. The policy of the Russian Empire aimed at abolishing Georgian statehood stirred up discontent among Georgians. They understood that the fate of Eastern Georgia awaited Western Georgia too. Several of Georgia's previously lost territories (although now part of its territory) were attached to Russia following the Russia-Persia (1804-1813, 1826-1828) and Russia-Turkey wars (1806-1812, 1828-1829). The kingdom of Imereti was incorporated into the Russian Empire in 1810; the principality of Guria – in 1828; the region of Svaneti – in 1854; and the province of Samegrelo – in 1857.

Dissatisfaction with Russian imperial policies that abolished Georgian statehood led to the rise of the national liberation movement in 1860-1880. Despite its strength, the movement did not imply the organization of a national uprising against Russia. The main reason lied not in the Georgians’ awareness that an armed uprising against one of the most powerful states at that time, into which Georgia was then incorporated, was doomed to failure. The issue of sovereignty was central for Georgia at all times, but the problem of territorial integrity has been and remains the matter of “life or death.” Russia, in a way, solved this problem by integrating Georgia into its imperial project. Besides, the Georgians realized pretty well that they would fail to maintain the country’s territorial integrity single-handedly, mainly because of their inability to ensure the political stability and cohesion of the nation. The Georgian example illustrates how important it is for a small country to have a strong and powerful partner, able to guarantee its territorial integrity. As the nation-state forms, develops and strengthens, the need in such a partner recedes into the background.

Georgia's integration into the imperial project made the country an outpost of the Russian Empire in the Greater Caucasus, helping Russia to increase its activities in the Caucasian War (1817-1864), suppress the Abkhazian rebellion (1866), and successfully fight against Persia (1804-1813, 1826-1828) and the Ottoman Empire (1806-1812, 1828-1829, 1853-1856, 1877-1878). It should be emphasized that due to common religious and cultural ties, Georgia was always considered the most loyal ally of the Russian Empire, and was assigned a key role in the South Caucasus.

Working Paper on Russian-Georgian Relations

Georgia's integration into the imperial project reflected Russia's desire to extend its vast cultural and educational potential to all subjects of the Empire.

After the October Revolution, Georgia received its independence, but in 1921, its territory was occupied by the 11th Bolshevik Army that installed the Soviet regime. On February 25, 1921 the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic was established. Beginning in March 1922, it became part of the Transcaucasian Federation, and from December 1936 – a Union Republic of the USSR.

A major misconception of the Soviet national policy was redrawing the territorial borders in accordance with the imperial principle of “divide and rule.” After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was precisely this problem that became “one big headache” of practically all post-Soviet states. Georgia offers a striking example of that. On the one hand, its border regions were included in neighboring Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation, and on the other hand – its territory incorporated Abkhazia and Ajara Autonomous Republics, as well as the South Ossetian Autonomous Region, which had been formed on the principle of ethnic and religious peculiarities. Characteristically, these regions have always been oriented towards Moscow, receiving strong support on the part of the central government.

All this has exacerbated the problem of maintaining its territorial integrity for Georgia, given its small size and the territorial system, which includes more than 25 ethnographic and sub-ethnic groups, [2] and made it a micro-level replica of Russia.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, all of the former Soviet republics received independence and started to build their new statehoods and make the transition to a market economy.

As the successor to the USSR, Russia was among the first set of countries aspiring to extend their influence over the post-Soviet space.

In the 1990s, Russia’s relations with neighboring countries, including Georgia, moved into the background. The weakening of Russian positions in Georgia is due to the lack of a clear foreign policy strategy, inconsistent priorities and extreme passivity of the policies pursued. In contrast, the U.S. intensified its unprecedented activity to strengthen Washington’s position in the Caucasus in general and Georgia in particular. Against this background, Russia's inability to perform the role of Georgia’s security guarantor has greatly contributed to the country’s Western orientation as the new vector of development.

Thus, the problem of preserving Georgia’s territorial integrity continues to be the key issue for Tbilisi and runs through the entire period of the establishment and development of Russian-Georgian relations. The future of relations between the two countries largely depends on how effectively Russia can solve this problem. Success in this undertaking will strengthen Russia's positions in Georgia.

1. V.E. Romanovski Ocherki iz istorii Gruzii. Moscow, 2011. P. 99

2. R.A. Topchishvili Jetnografija/jetnologija Gruzii: Kratkij lekcionnyj kurs. Tbilisi, Universal Publishers, 2006. P. 57.