Russia and Norway in the Arctic

Russia and Norway are direct neighbours in the Arctic and, therefore, have many overlapping interests and goals. There are tensions and disagreements particularly on the issue of Svalbard and the neighbouring areas. In view of the Russian-Norwegian Treaty on maritime delimitation and cooperation in the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean there is reason to believe that the good relations will continue. However, this does not completely rule out the possibility of a new cause for rivalry and competition.

Russia and Norway are direct neighbours in the Arctic and, therefore, have many overlapping interests and goals. Each side relies primarily upon national interests in their relations in this region, but seeks to practically implement them taking into account the approaches of each other’s neighbour, avoiding open confrontation in order to maintain good neighbourly relations. Nevertheless, there are tensions and disagreements particularly on the issue of Svalbard and the neighbouring areas. In view of the Russian-Norwegian Treaty on maritime delimitation and cooperation in the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean and Norway’s approval of the new Arctic strategy, there is every reason to believe that the good relations will continue.

However, this does not completely rule out the possibility of a new cause for rivalry and competition.

Norway’s arctic strategy

Russia has identified the most important parameters of its policy in the North by adopting a document entitled “Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic up to 2020 and Beyond” in September 2008. Norway adopted theirs a little earlier in 2006. In 2009, some additions and clarifications were made to the Policy adopted. In November 2011, the Norwegian government approved a new strategic document in the form of a report to the parliament entitled “The High North - Visions and strategies”. In the coming years, this document will serve as Norway’s “guide to action” in the Arctic.

Norway’s current government has identified the Far North and Arctic as its main priorities. The updated strategy identifies the following elements of the Norwegian policy in the Arctic:

• deepening and renewal of cooperation with Russia, since its relations with its eastern neighbour is one of the mainstays of Norway’s High North policy;
• development of resources, increased shipping activities, use of additional transport routes and new opportunities related to climate change;
• integrated management of marine resources, through which the state of the main fish stocks in the Barents Sea has improved over the last decade;
• creating contours of a new oil and gas province based on the estimates indicating that large reserves of hydrocarbons are to be found in the Barents Sea, and the prospects offered by the Treaty on maritime delimitation and cooperation in the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean;
• recognition of the principles of international maritime law, which allowed settling almost all outstanding issues with other countries concerning maritime delimitation;
• establishing a cooperation network with Arctic and Nordic countries both on a bilateral basis and within multilateral institutions – the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), the Arctic Council (AC), the Nordic Council of Ministers, and the Northern Dimension.

Sebastian Gerland © Norsk Polarinstitutt
Norwegian ship Lance

The following are included in the strategy as Norway’s key policy objectives in the North and the Arctic: to safeguard peace and stability and provide predictability; to ensure an integrated, ecosystem-based management regime that safeguards biodiversity; to strengthen international cooperation and the international legal order; to promote economic development through regional and national measures.

Mechanisms for achieving these goals do not differ by their up-to-dateness. Among the mechanisms are preparation of new plans and programs and implementation of already existing ones to promote economic development in the northern regions of the country, strengthening the country’s sovereignty and authority in national marine and continental regions, promoting its positions in international organizations (AC, BEAC, the International Maritime Organization, the Nordic Council of Ministers), and active cooperation with neighbouring countries.

It should be emphasized that Norway considers maximum cooperation with Russia and northern regions of Russia as a central instrument for achieving its goals in almost all areas of its North and Arctic policy. This approach, of course, creates a favourable political background for the further deepening of mutually beneficial cooperation on a wide range of issues, be it the economy, environment, social welfare, health or interests of the indigenous peoples of the North.

However, it should be noted that, according to the strategy, Norway still finds it necessary to increase NATO’s attention to the Arctic – including Arctic issues in the sphere of interests of the alliance. This approach contrasts with Russia’s point of view that there is no need to involve other international organizations, especially those of military and political nature, into Arctic affairs. Russia’s principal position – there is no problem in the Arctic that requires a military solution.

We can assume that this issue in Norway is dominated by not so much a sober assessment of the current military and political situation in the Arctic as the desire to communicate with the “Russian bear” while at the same time secretly craving for NATO’s support – a practice that has become traditional for it for many years of the “cold war”.

Russian-Norwegian Treaty on maritime delimitation and cooperation in the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean: “for” and “against”

The signing of the Treaty on maritime delimitation and cooperation in the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean by Russia and Norway on September 15, 2010 (entered into force on July 7, 2011) was certainly a significant, if not a historic event in relations between the two countries in the Arctic region.

The Treaty has an important international dimension. It removed the latent problem of delimitation of maritime spaces, and put an end to the 40 years of negotiations on this issue.

This opens up opportunities for exploration and use of natural resources, especially hydrocarbons, in previously “frozen” area in the so-called “gray zone”. It can be assumed that addressing the issue of delimitation will have a positive value during consideration of Russia’s renewed application at the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.

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Nuclear-powered icebreaker "Russia"

In addition, the Treaty has become an evidence of the ability of the Arctic states to constructively solve their problems through negotiations based on the existing norms of international law (notably the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982), thereby repudiating the forecasts and concerns about possible conflicts in connection with establishment of outer limits of continental shelf and exploitation of natural resources in the Arctic.

However, it should be noted that the Treaty has caused scepticism expressed before and during the debate on its ratification at the State Duma. The main argument of critics: Russia stands to lose more than it will gain, firstly from the perspective of marine areas and fishing.

One can hardly agree with such statements. A much more reasonable position is that of K. I. Kosachev, the then chairman of the State Duma Committee on Foreign Affairs who believes that one can only lose what one has. Russia has never owned those regions, which regarded as controversial.

With regard to fishing, in assessing the prevailing situation following the signing of the Treaty, probably one should not proceed from hypothetical damage, which the representatives of unions and associations of fishermen, particularly the Board of Fishery workers of Russia, attempted to assess, but from the provisions of the Treaty itself. Specific commitments were stated in the Treaty (Article 4 and Annex I): the fishing opportunities of either Party shall not be adversely affected by the conclusion of the present Treaty; to this end, the Parties shall pursue close cooperation in the sphere of fisheries, with a view to maintain their existing respective shares of total allowable catch volumes and to ensure relative stability of their fishing activities for each of the stocks concerned; agreements on cooperation and on mutual relations in the field of fisheries of 1975 and 1976 shall remain in force for fifteen years after the present Treaty enters into force. After the expiry of this term, these agreements shall remain in force for successive six-year terms, unless either Party notifies the other party of its termination. (These agreements provide for the admission of fishing vessels in areas under the jurisdiction of the parties).

The Svalbard factor

Svalbard archipelago and adjoining areas are an important and often disturbing element of the Russian-Norwegian relations in the Arctic. The Svalbard Treaty of 1920, which established a legal regime that was unique in world practice, defines the status of the archipelago: on one hand, it recognizes the Norwegian sovereignty over the archipelago, while on the other hand, it imposes many restrictions on its implementation. Currently, there are more than 40 signatory nations to this Treaty, but Russia (ratified the Treaty in 1935) and Norway have been engaged in economic activities there.

The Norwegian position is the main irritant in Russian-Norwegian relations in and around Svalbard. Norway is persistently carrying out policies aimed at strengthening its sovereignty in this area through the adoption of regulations on environmental protection measures, which Russia regards as a restriction on freedom of economic activities and other activities at the archipelago, in violation of the provisions of the Treaty of 1920.

The issue concerning the so-called 200-mile “Fisheries Protection Zone” around Svalbard, which was established by Norway in 1977, unilaterally may become the most acute in the light of the Treaty on maritime delimitation. Russia (USSR) did not recognize this zone.

Flickr / Rune Gilberg Jensen
Svalbard archipelago

It is possible that the Norwegian side will try to use the provisions of the Treaty on maritime delimitation to strengthen its jurisdiction in the area. But one can hardly agree with the conclusion of participants of a round table organized by the Communist Party faction in the State Duma on February 15, 2011 on the issue of the agreement with Norway, that Russia will no longer have any reason to oppose the 200-mile zone around Svalbard. It seems the view of some Russian experts is more than justified – the Treaty on maritime delimitation does not prevent Russia to continue exercising jurisdiction, in accordance with international law, over vessels flying their flag to the west of the demarcation line. That is, each party can continue justifying its position on the so-called “Fisheries Protection Zone”. This means that the Treaty did not in any way change Russia’s position not to recognize the legality under which the zone was established.

Prospects of cooperation in the Arctic

Issues on the development of hydrocarbon reserves on the shelf and the wider commercial use of transportation routes, primarily, the Northern Sea Route, should be brought to the forefront among the possibilities for cooperation between Russia and Norway in the Arctic.

As leading energy suppliers in Europe, Russia and Norway have a good foundation for a strategic partnership in the field of exploration and production of oil and gas. The first step in this direction was made in 2008, when Gazprom, the Norwegian company Statoil, and the French company Total, signed an agreement establishing the company Shtokman Development AG for the development of the Shtokman gas-condensate field. Unfortunately, the final investment decision on this project has been postponed, apparently, to 2013.

The signing of an agreement on May 5, 2012 between Rosneft and Statoil on cooperation in joint development of parts of the Russian shelf of the Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk can also be regarded as the promising developments in Russian-Norwegian economic relations in the Arctic. Of particular importance seems to be the fact that the agreement opens up the possibility of Rosneft participating in the development of the Norwegian continental shelf areas of the Barents Sea and shows the intention of the Norwegian side to place orders with Russian shipyards for the construction of ice-class vessels and drilling platforms. This agreement may be regarded as a confirmation of Russia’s economic benefits of resolving the issue of maritime delimitation with Norway.

As a major supplier of mineral raw materials especially in the Asia-Pacific region, Norway is objectively interested in expanding the possibilities of such exports through cheaper routes. This creates prerequisites for cooperation in the area of maritime transport and in using the Northern Sea Route as the shortest water route between Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. However, this may lead to the emergence of elements of competition, since Norway is equally interested in having to enclose in its ports traffic flows in the North, which volume is expected to grow.

Conclusions

Despite the differences in national interests, differences on the issue of Svalbard and other issues, Russian-Norwegian relations in the Arctic are still dominated by a constructive spirit and a desire to find middle ground. In view of the Treaty on maritime delimitation and cooperation in the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean, the potential of turning the two countries into strategic partners in the Arctic is becoming more significant than the prospects of emergence of new divisions and conflicts, which, however, is not completely excluded. In this regard, it is important that potential rivalry and competition are based on international legal basis and will be fundamentally of business and commercial nature. Moreover the decisions should be made based on mutual benefit, not on political ambitions and attitudes.