RIAC Experts on the Outlook for Russian-Canadian Cooperation in the Arctic Given the Current International Situation

On April 15, 2014 Canada said it would boycott an upcoming meeting of the Arctic Council in Moscow. Minister Leona Aglukkaq said the decision was part of the sanctions imposed by Canada on Russia because of the events in Ukraine. RIAC experts Alexander Vylegzhanin (MGIMO), Alexander Sergunin (St Petersburg State University), Valeriy Konyshev (St Petersburg State University) and Pavel Gudev (IMEMO RAS) comment on Canada’s decision and on how the Ukrainian crisis might affect the Arctic Council’s effectiveness and the degree of cooperation in the Arctic region.

On April 15, 2014 Canada said it would boycott an upcoming meeting of the Arctic Council in Moscow. Minister Leona Aglukkaq said the decision was part of the sanctions imposed by Canada on Russia because of the events in Ukraine. RIAC experts Alexander Vylegzhanin (MGIMO), Alexander Sergunin (St Petersburg State University), Valeriy Konyshev (St Petersburg State University) and Pavel Gudev (IMEMO RAS) comment on Canada’s decision and on how the Ukrainian crisis might affect the Arctic Council’s effectiveness and the degree of cooperation in the Arctic region.

Alexander Vylegzhanin

J.D., Head of the International Law Department, MGIMO-University

I would like to remind readers that the Arctic Council – an international regional forum of the Arctic states – was established in 1996, when Russia was going through a transitional period and the Russian leadership was demonstrating unprecedented willingness to cooperate internationally on the Arctic. In the years since, the Arctic Council has been extremely successful, particularly in terms of progressive development of the international law applicable to the Arctic and the entire body of regional contractual and statutory rules known as “Arctic Law” in Western international law doctrine.

The withdrawal of Canada, with its second-longest Arctic shoreline after Russia, from a traditionally active and constructive role in the Arctic Council is clearly not in Canada’s national interests.

On the contrary, the weakening of Canada’s voice in the regional format of the Arctic’s governance objectively plays into the hands of non-regional countries amid the existing international competition and their desire to move closer to the “helm” of such governance.

Alexander Vylegzhanin

We can only express regret over the opportunistic and politicized decision by the Canadian Minister or the entire Canadian government not to participate in the work of the Arctic Council. If this is a political and legal reality, then going forward this decision will not serve the interests of the people and government of Canada – Russia’s northern neighbour and good partner, linked to us by important bilateral agreements on cooperation in the Arctic.

“Nature abhors a vacuum”, as the saying goes. Many countries are known to aspire to join the Arctic Council or cooperate with this organization as observers.

The mistake committed by the Canadian ministers should not be exploited by finding a replacement for Canada on the Arctic Council in its absence or by making its positions worse at the Council’s future events. As legal experts are well aware, Canada’s absence from the Arctic Council creates a lot of procedural opportunities for reducing its role there.

Yet ministers come and go, while national interests remain. I mean coincident national interests, above all those of Russia, Canada, Denmark, the United States and Norway, whose continental shelves completely cover the bottom of the Arctic Ocean, the world’s smallest, and whose 200-mile exclusive economic zones constitute its increasingly developed portion. The “Arctic Five” is doomed to constructive cooperation. They are the core of the “Arctic Eight” – all the region’s countries whose territories extend beyond the Arctic Circle.

None of the above has anything to do with political biases or choices. It does not depend on whether Canadian ministers or Canadian citizens believe that constitutionally elected President Yanukovych should be Ukraine’s head of state today or that A. Turchynov, who came to power by unconstitutional means, is so; on whether they believe that the authorities in Kiev currently express the interests of Ukraine’s people; or that people’s leaders in Donetsk, Kharkov and Luhansk do so… This kind of choice is up to Ukraine’s people to make, to the Ukrainians and Russians who live there, rather than to Canadian ministers.

This choice has nothing to do with the status of the Arctic or with the need for the Arctic states to cooperate to resolve the region’s many urgent problems.

Alexander Sergunin

Alexander Sergunin

Prof., DSc., Theory and History of International Relations Department, St Petersburg State University

Prof.Valeriy Konyshev

Prof., DSc., Theory and History of International Relations Department, St Petersburg State University

On Tuesday, April 15, 2014, Environment Minister Leona Aglukkaq, Canada’s representative on the Arctic Council, said that Canada had decided to boycott the meeting of the Arctic Council’s task force on black carbon and methane that took place in Moscow last week. In a statement, Ms Aglukkaq cited “Russia’s illegal occupation of Ukraine and its continued provocative actions in Crimea and elsewhere”

Of course, the importance of the Canadian demarche should not be blown out of all proportion: after all, Canada withdrew from one of a myriad working-group level meetings rather than a ministerial AC meeting. That said, this seemingly insignificant incident makes us consider more important things.

It is worth noting that the Canadian Minister’s statement surprised many experts, Russian and international alike, because Canada is the AC Chairman and has a greater interest than others in its productive proceedings. Apparently well aware of her uncomfortable position, the Minister was quick to remark that Canada would continue to support the important work of the Arctic Council.

Valeriy Konyshev

Russian-Canadian cooperation on the Arctic has been developing quite productively so far in virtually every area, as is acknowledged even by Canadian experts not particularly friendly towards Moscow. For instance, Rob Huebert, Associate Director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, a well-known hard-liner on Russia, literally two weeks ahead of the AC Chairwoman’s statement pointed out the success of the 25-27 March Yellowknife SAO meeting and expressed confidence that the current deterioration in West-Russia relations would not affect circumpolar co-operation.

Cooperation has involved areas such as economic development of the Arctic, studying the Arctic’s nature, protecting bio resources and the natural environment, studying the ocean bottom, and joint programmes for development of the indigenous peoples of the North. On security, Canada has effectively played into Russia’s hands by opposing new NATO action in the Arctic region. Russia and Canada have no acute border disputes. Both countries’ claims to the Lomonosov Ridge to expand their Arctic shelf can be fully resolved by drawing a compromise demarcation line. Both Canada’s and Russia’s military build-ups in the region are aimed not at achieving military superiority in the Arctic but at ensuring reliable control over uninhabited areas in the extreme North and protection of national economic interests within the confines of international law.

So why such a sharp turnaround in Canada’s policy towards Russia?

First of all, the statement on the boycott of the Moscow meeting was an integral part of the general Western anti-Russian campaign launched in the context of the events in Ukraine. Besides the visa bans and financial and economic sanctions against Russia, Prime Minister Stephen Harper has declared a halt to all bilateral contacts between the Canadian and Russian military in the Arctic and suspended the work of the bilateral Intergovernmental Economic Commission, which handles a substantial portion of the Arctic cooperation between Ottawa and Moscow.

The United States is known to be spearheading the sanctions against Russia. Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton led the way there by indicating that “Russian expansionist approaches could include also the far north”. And, without waiting for those hypothetical actions and groundless claims to materialize, she immediately argued that Canada and the USA should forge a united front against Russia in the region. Debate has also been reignited in both Finland and Sweden regarding full membership of NATO, something in which the United States is rather interested in order to strengthen its weakening grip on European policy.

Having failed to secure substantial support in Europe for sanctions against Russia, the US is doing its best to pull Canada into the sanctions regime. In this regard, Washington has received a helping hand from Stephen Harper, whose political position had always been far from friendly towards Russia and favors closer military and political union with the US. It was he who tried to build up assault forces and means in the Arctic (including through massive purchases of F-35 fighters from the US) but failed to secure parliamentary approval. In our view, Canada’s political leadership, which has suspended cooperation with Russia on the Arctic, has largely become a hostage to an ideologically biased assessment of Russia’s policy imposed on it by the US.

The Ukrainian diaspora, which maintains close ties with Western Ukraine and nationalist organizations there, has played a certain role in shaping Ottawa’s tougher policy towards Moscow. This community has considerable clout in Canada’s western provinces. Given that Canada is entering an election cycle (the next parliamentary elections are scheduled for October 2015), support from the Ukrainian community is important for the ruling Conservative Party, which has seen its positions eroded somewhat recently. Stephen Harper has traditionally tried to maintain close ties with the Ukrainian community and, in 2011, the Ukrainian Canadian Congress even awarded him a medal for “the outstanding contribution he has made towards the development of the Ukrainian Canadian community”.

Most of Canada’s Ukrainian organizations take a hard line towards Russia and are unhappy about Ottawa’s too “soft” sanctions against Moscow. Stephen Harper’s government could not cancel the Yellowknife SAO meeting, which would have been interpreted as reluctance to work within the Arctic Council. On the other hand, the low-level working-group meeting in Moscow could be sacrificed for the sake of the anti-Russian Ukrainian lobby.

Finally, it should be noted that linking the events in Ukraine with Arctic policy is totally farfetched and without any serious basis in reality. The negative trend initiated by Stephen Harper’s government will most likely be only temporary, because it does not serve the long-term interests of Canada in the Arctic, including a potential increase in NATO’s influence in the region. Canadian experts are well aware that Russia will perceive Sweden’s and Finland’s accession to NATO as an attempt by the alliance to encircle it.

Pavel Gudev

The path of cooperation with Russia, something that Russia has not rejected, is much more attractive and productive. The policy of sanctions as a result of the failure of Western policy towards Ukraine will pass as the situation settles down. The April 17 Geneva meeting has created a certain basis for that, setting a dilemma for the West: either to continue meaningless attempts to “punish” Russia, including in areas that have nothing to do with the Ukrainian question, or to try to resolve bilateral problems through negotiations and compromise.

Pavel Gudev

PhD in History, Senior Research Fellow at IMEMO RAS

Canada is a long-time ally of the US and not only in NATO, so it is hardly surprising that the Canadian leadership shares the commitment to a “tough rhetoric” towards Russia. This involves obtaining some kind of “political dividends” in their relations with the US.

Canada’s Prime Minister Stephen Harper is considered a populist politician even at home. A substantial portion of his “stern” statements, as well as the actions of his Cabinet, are for domestic consumption only. As in the US, an election campaign drives many of the actions, including the support for sanctions. Furthermore, taking into account Canada’s sizeable Ukrainian community, it is clear what the audience for such statements really is.

Canada’s position regarding the upcoming Arctic Council meeting is a demonstration rather than a meaningful step; it has been stated that nobody is going to abandon cooperation. Apparently, the Canadian side is well aware that it will always need Russia’s support in the Arctic, including in defence of the legal status of the Northwest Passage. Given that Russia and Canada share the longest shoreline in the Arctic, cooperation between them in a variety of areas (the environment, shipping, fishing) appears inevitable.