Among the key events of 20th century European political history that have been the subject of heated debate for a number of decades among academics and the layman alike is the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed on August 23, 1939, as well as its secret protocol and the foreign policy implications it had for the whole of Europe.
On the Events of August 1939 and their Political Assessment by the Yakovlev Commission [1]
Among the key events of 20th century European political history that have been the subject of heated debate for a number of decades among academics and the layman alike is the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed on August 23, 1939, as well as its secret protocol and the foreign policy implications it had for the whole of Europe. There were a number of stages that led to the signing of the treaty. However, until 1989 the prevailing opinion on the matter remained very close to the one expressed in 1939 by Vyacheslav Molotov in his pamphlet “On the Ratification of the Soviet–German Treaty of Non-Aggression”: “The Soviet–German Treaty of Non-Aggression is a turning point in European development, signifying improved relations between the continent’s largest countries. Not only does the agreement safeguard us from war with Germany, it also reduces the possibility of military conflicts breaking out in Europe and is thus a driver of peace in the world…” [2] This is essentially how the treaty was seen up until 1989. The official standpoint of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, as expressed in the two-volume The History of Soviet Foreign Policy (which saw six editions), was based on this interpretation of the treaty’s significance as recently as 1986 [3].
The political situation in the USSR, and not just the Baltic states, made it impossible to smoothly manage the issue
On December 24, 1989, the Second Congress of People’s Deputies of the Soviet Union adopted a Resolution “On the Political and Legal Assessment of the 1939 Soviet–German Treaty of Non-Aggression”, which was based on the conclusions drawn by the commission headed by A. Yakovlev. Paragraph 7 of the Resolution states: “The Congress of People’s Deputies of the Soviet Union condemns the signing of the ‘secret additional protocol’ of August 23, 1939, and the other secret agreements with Germany. The Congress recognizes the secret protocols as illegal and invalid right from the moment of their signing. The protocols did not create a new legal base for the Soviet Union’s relations with third countries. Nevertheless, Stalin and his associates used them to set forth ultimatums and put pressure on other states, in violation of their legal obligations before them.”
In the 27 years since, the decisions of the Congress and the Commission have been criticized by radical nationalists in the republics, as well as by the governments of the Baltic states and, finally, Russian politicians and historians. The radical nationalists believed that power could de facto and de jure still be taken in 1990.
Many Russian historians and politicians, meanwhile, argued that adopting the decision created a legal basis for the Baltic states to secede from the USSR. To what extent is this theory justified?
To answer this question, it is worth quoting an excerpt from the resolution “On the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact,” which was passed by the First Congress of the Popular Front of Estonia: “It was confirmed at the conference that the signing of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact was not a necessary step for the USSR, and it was not based on state defence needs. The signing of the agreement signified a break from traditional geopolitical cooperation with Great Britain and France and gave no respite, as is often claimed even to this day, to the country. Instead, it gave Germany free rein to commence military operations in Europe, bringing about the Second World War” [4].
In 1990, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic set up a commission to perform a legal and historical assessment of events in Estonia in 1940. The Commission drew the following conclusions: “The foreign policy and military actions taken by Stalin’s government in the Republic of Estonia in 1940 constitute aggression against, and military occupation and annexation of, the Republic of Estonia” [5]. Estonia and Latvia would later use this document as a basis for declaring the “concept of occupation” and stripping hundreds of thousands of people of their citizenship.
The decisions of the highest legislative body in 1989 do not allow for the conclusion that the USSR acknowledged, directly or indirectly, military occupation of Estonia.
Another matter entirely is the fact that the political assessment of the events of 1939 in the Baltic states has long been formed by immigrant associations outside the region, including the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies in the United States. The first anti-Soviet demonstrations were held in Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius on August 23, 1987 using slogans developed by these foreign associations: “aggression, annexation, occupation”. However, the move failed to gain traction among the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian people, much less among the Russian-speaking population in these countries. This is why the struggle for independence came to be spearheaded by the local elites, who had long since been integrated into the Soviet system of politics and economics.
In 1989, a group of parliamentary deputies from the Baltic states succeeded in getting the following wording included in an explanatory note to the Congress of People’s Deputies of the Soviet Union: “In the eyes of a large proportion of the populations of the Baltic states, the 1939 Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was the starting point for evaluating the events of 1940, which led to Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia becoming part of the Soviet Union.”
It is not clear, however, which states are being referred to. In 1989, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were not states. And if a “large proportion of the populations of the Baltic states” is referring to 1939, then we are actually talking about the events of 1940 (the accession of the Baltic states to the USSR), rather than those of 1939. What is more, the Baltic people reacted calmly to the official talks between Germany and the USSR, as they had no knowledge of the secret protocol that would later be so roundly condemned. Professor Lavrov recalled that it was not only the members of the Inter-Regional Deputies’ Group who insisted upon the inclusion of this patently wrong and ambiguous wording. Tellingly, a number of Baltic deputies also supported it, including Viktor Palm, Vytautas Landsbergis and Yury Afanasyev. It is worth noting that group of deputies from the Baltics that actively supported the decision of the Congress included people whose relatives would later have their Estonian and Latvian citizenship revoked. Professor Lavrov noted that E. Lippmaa initially wanted to include the wording in the text of the Commission’s decision, that is, he wanted the assessment to be given official status. But it was vigorously opposed by representatives of the “Union” group of deputies (whose political position is clear from the name).
Most of the people’s deputies of the USSR from the Baltic republics sought the restoration of statehood, but they were not prepared for the appearance of radical national regimes, which is why they were absent from the political scenes in Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius. Employees from municipal authorities emerged from behind the backs of the democrats – graduates from the parties’ own schools who had based their political careers on confrontation with Moscow [6]. Former Commission member Edgar Savisaar would late write: “Despite the brilliance with which we restored independence, it will be difficult for us now to take further steps and prove that we are capable of much more” [7]. The reason is obvious: Baltic politicians have become hostages of the month of August. Having removed the period of August 23, 1939 to August 23, 1991 from their history, politicians from the Baltic states have fallen into a trap from which there is no escape and thus no path to prosperity and real independence. The Soviet science fiction writer Sergei Snegov described this kind of situation as a “ring of reversed time”. Whatever you do and wherever you go, time in the Baltics flows from August to August.
1. The author of the present paper worked as an assistant to People’s Deputy of the USSR and member of the Yakovlev Commission, Professor Sergei Lavrov, from 1989 to 1991. In 1991, he took part in negotiations with the Republic of Estonia as an expert within the Soviet delegation. From 1992 to 1997, he served as an expert on Russian state and departmental delegations in negotiations with the Republic of Estonia.
2. Molotov, V. M. On the Ratification of the Soviet–German Treaty of Non-Aggression. Moscow: Voengis, 1939, p. 6.
3. The History of Soviet Foreign Policy. Volume 1. Moscow, 1986.
4. People’s Congress. Collection of Materials from the Congress of the Popular Front of Estonia. October 1–2, 1988. Tallinn, p. 217.
5. The Restoration of Independence in Estonia. Selection of Legislative Acts (1988–1991). Tallinn, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Estonia, 1991, p. 17.
6. With the sole exception of Vytautas Landsbergis.
7. Edgar Savisaar. The Truth about Estonia. Tallinn, 2012, p. 13.
