Moldova Local Elections Reveal Opportunities for Russia’s Engagement

On 14th June 2015, Moldovans casted their vote in local elections that saw pro-European parties arrive ahead of those advocating rapprochement with Russia. The political and social dynamics suggest that although the incumbent government is pivoting to the West, there are opportunities to exploit in Moscow’s bilateral relations with Chisinau.

On 14th June 2015, Moldovans casted their vote in local elections that saw pro-European parties arrive ahead of those advocating rapprochement with Russia. Political forces favouring European integration successfully mobilised the support of 51 percent of the country’s population. They now control 25 municipalities, leaving pro-Russian parties in charge of the remaining 7 municipalities with 36 percent of votes. The two camps came very tight in Chisinau mayoral race and are preparing for a runoff round, while Balti and Orhei elected Russia-oriented politicians.

The evident lack of national agreement on Moldova’s geopolitical course is inevitably reflected by the results of the recent local as well as last year parliamentary elections. Although then the three pro-European parties scored overall higher than pro-Russian political forces, they failed to build a three-party coalition and settled for a minority government. In fact, the Europe-oriented bloc has been going through a succession of political and institutional crises. For instance, just prior to the local elections, the government assembled in February after months of political confusion was forced to resign over allegations that Prime Minister Chiril Gaburici forged his school documents.

In fact, the political turmoil is, to a considerable extent, a product of unconsolidated and constantly shifting public sentiments. A recent opinion poll conducted by the Institute for Public Policy, a Moldovan pollster, demonstrates that 50 percent of respondents support the integration into the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) whilst only around 32 percent back the accession to the European Union. Comparatively, in 2007 the same polling organisation showed that 78 percent claimed they would vote for joining the EU compared to only 40 percent this year. Additionally, the opinion polls illustrate that Moldovans are most concerned with poverty, economic development and living standards.

Hence, the political and social dynamics suggest that although the incumbent government is pivoting to the West, there are opportunities to exploit in Moscow’s bilateral relations with Chisinau. Firstly, pro-Russian parties enjoy wide support in Moldova. Indeed, the Socialist Party with its slogan “Together with Russia” came first in the 2014 general elections. Secondly, Russia is Moldova’s second most important trading partner after the EU, absorbing 28 percent of the country’s export and supplying around 8 percent of Moldova’s consumer goods. Additionally, Russia accounts for almost 70 percent of remittances to the country and practically all of its energy supply.

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The economies of the two ex-Soviet Republics are thus still closely tied. This trade interdependence should be carefully nurtured to pursue Russia’s long-term strategic security and economic considerations. Amid Moldova’s signing of the EU Association Agreement in July 2014, Moscow tightened immigration policy and imposed a trade embargo on Moldovan wine, meat and vegetables. These measures could be explained by the threat of European goods penetrating the Russian market as a result of the EU free-trade clause and were largely provoked by the EU’s propensity to compel countries to choose between their existing economic ties with Russia and appealing prospects with Europe. In fact, the Moldovan NGO Expert-Grup estimated that a systematic implementation of the immigration restrictions could result in a 10 percent loss in Moldova’s GDP. Although punitive regulations could work effectively to make Chisinau weight the cost of turning its back on Moscow, retaliatory measures are counterproductive. It could not only affect Russia’s exports to Moldova but eventually result in Chisinau withdrawing from the CIS free-trade agreement. Recently, the Moldovan side has expressed its willingness to renegotiate the embargo and it would be perceptive if Russia welcomes this opportunity.

As division in Moldovan domestic politics is largely caused by the geopolitical orientation of parties, Moscow should enhance its political liaison with Russia-oriented parties to give them an edge in national elections. Indeed, the pro-Russian Socialist Party and Communist Party mainly appeal to a large Russophone segment of the Moldovan population. By endorsing their programme to re-establish close cooperation with Russia, Moscow could help boost their popularity among supporters of the EEU integration within the country. Although the correlation between the two has yet to be established, the last general elections saw the Socialist Party surprisingly come out on top after an extensive engagement on side of Russia between September and November 2014.

This June’s local elections have exposed compelling opportunities that Russia could leverage. In order to secure its strategic interests in Moldova, Moscow should prioritise political and economic engagement with Chisinau.