Kyrgyzstan Elections: Parliament Full of Oligarchs in the Eye of the Storm
(votes: 1, rating: 5) |
(1 vote) |
Political Scientist, Coordinator of Kyrgyzstan Analytical Club
The results of Kyrgyz parliamentary elections held on October 4 have legitimized a previously unseen national political landscape. The new arrangement is far from balanced but is the only one possible within the existing political culture of Kyrgyzstan. The question is whether the de jure parliamentary system, which is de facto held together by the president and on brink of chaos, will remain intact after the 2017 presidential election despite the snowballing economic crisis.
The results of Kyrgyz parliamentary elections held on October 4 have legitimized a previously unseen national political landscape through by a multi-party race that has brought together interregional political coalitions supported by individual patrons, clans and communities striving to tighten their grip on national resources.
The new arrangement is far from balanced but is the only one possible within the existing political culture of Kyrgyzstan. The question is whether the de jure parliamentary system, which is de facto held together by the president and on brink of chaos, will remain intact after the 2017 presidential election despite the snowballing economic crisis.
The contest for 120 seats in the single-chamber Jogorku Kengesh attracted participation from 14 parties. Six of them gained enough seats to enter the sixth national parliament, as international observers from the CIS, PACE and SCO found the elections generally “open, transparent and conforming to the national law and universally recognized international norms.”
OSCE observers made several critiques related to the use of voter biometric data but also qualified the elections as "sufficiently successful.” On October 15, the Chairman of the Central Election Committee reported the final figures.
The success of the competitors was to a large extent defined by the party leaders' degree of precision in following the written and unwritten rules of the latest elections.
Turnout was 1.63 million or 59 percent of voters, with the results as unpredictable and surprising as those from the previous elections, both for the electorate and runners.
The ruling Social Democratic Party (SDPK) received 432,846 votes or 27.5 percent of the total (38 seats); Respublika-Ata-Jurt got 20.2 percent and 28 seats; the Kyrgyzstan Party obtained 13 percent and 18 seats (although it emerged on the political arena only two months before the polls and managed to engage 20 deputies from the previous parliament).
Electoral rolls were rather orderly thanks to the universal biometric registration of 2.751 million citizens.
In fourth is the Onuguu-Progress party with 9.3 percent and 13 seats. Bir Bol, the party of oligarchs and heavyweight officials, got 8.5 percent and 12 seats. Ata-Meken, the oldest party founded on December 16, 1992 by its eternal leader Omurbek Tekebayev, the author of the effective Constitution who ruined four parliamentary coalitions in the fifth parliament, can boast 7.8 percent of the vote and 11 seats.
Pre-Election Mathematics
The success of the competitors was to a large extent defined by the party leaders' degree of precision in following the written and unwritten rules of the latest elections.
First, in order to make it into the legislature within the proportional setting, parties had to obtain at least seven percent of the total vote and at least 0.7 percent of votes in each of the seven regions, as well as in the cities of Bishkek and Osh. With a 59-percent turnout, one had to win a minimum of 114,101 votes on the republican scale and from several hundred to three thousand in the regions.
The new rule made party leaders expand their party lists to unprecedented geographical dimensions and dynamically engage regional elites. Success was enjoyed by the SDPK which won five out of seven regions, as well as by the Kyrgyzstan Party and Onuguu-Progress, which attracted ample funds and balanced their party lists to attract many regional bosses that were guaranteed seats in their party lists.
Voters for the first time were allowed to vote at their place of residence rather than at their place of registration.
Second, electoral rolls were rather orderly thanks to the universal biometric registration of 2.751 million citizens. In fact, voters, as in citizens above 18 years of age, comprise 3.740 million people, with the one-million difference attributed to them not being in the country or a reluctance to get biometrically registered. To ensure transparency, stations were equipped with transparent boxes that excluded the bulk insertion of ballots. In addition, the authorities prohibited early voting to prevent the participation of dead souls.
The president was insistent and worked fast to gather the biometric data in order to create a transparent election mechanism and prevent falsifications used by the parties of ex-presidents Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev to obtain the legislative majorities. He also worked to prevent accusations of non-transparency from international observers and the opposition, which had often triggered unrest.
The key intrigue was the distribution of seats through the party lists.
Officially, the biggest pre-election spenders were the Onuguu-Progress (USD 1,590 million) and Respublika-Ata-Jurt (USD 1,544 million), while the lowest figures belong to the Meken Yntymagy (USD 113,235) and the Azattyk (USD 126,470).
Third, voters for the first time were allowed to vote at their place of residence rather than at their place of registration, which enabled the participation of hundreds of thousands of internal migrants who had been deprived of the right for many years, with about 350,000 of such persons just in Bishkek.
The new rule also provided an opening for oligarchs like Akylbek Zhaparov and Askar Salymbekov, who are rich but lack an electoral base because of a detachment from their clan or its small size and an absence of publicity. In some regions the price for one vote soared to USD 100, and taking into account unofficial expenses, the winning parties must have paid an average of USD 10 million.
Value Deputy by His Input
The key intrigue that became the main political scandal after the announcement of the results was the distribution of seats through the party lists. In order to determine the vote allocation, each candidate was given a district. And most candidates organized a re-registering of their electorate, i.e. relatives, friends, employees and hired voters, in the target districts for reporting to party sponsors and leaders. As of October 20, 136 candidates were excluded from party lists.
Mostly, these were candidates used to attract other nationalities (15 percent of nationalities other than Kyrgyz), ensure gender representation (not more than 70 percent of one sex), and fill the youth quota (at least 15 percent of persons under 35 years of age). Some of them failed to fulfill obligations before party leaders, which de facto stimulated the revival of single-mandate districts such as communities, organized groups and villages where a candidate enjoyed clout.
Some of them failed to fulfill obligations before party leaders, which de facto stimulated the revival of single-mandate districts such as communities, organized groups and villages where a candidate enjoyed clout.
Bearing in mind that on June 31, 2015, President Almazbek Atambayev signed a ban on a deputy staying separate from a faction and remaining an independent, as well as to unite into groups beyond factions, the party leaders and party donors strengthened their hand. But the South-North confrontation, which had plagued all previous elections, vanished. The new situation brought together such sworn friends as Omurbek Babanov and Kamchybek Tashiyev. They formed a party tandem in the Respublika-Ata-Jurt, which came in second place after the ruling SDPK in practically all regions and even won the race in southern Jalal-Abad and northern Talas.
Pro-Eurasian Centrist Millionaires
Most parties fervently supported the presidential drive towards pro-Eurasian development. According to a research by the Kyrgyz Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society, the parliamentary parties also professed a desire for receiving aid from the United States.
All parties except for the SDPK see a threat in growing Chinese investments.
Only the Kyrgyzstan Party protested against the stronger economic, political and cultural presence of Turkey. The winners also believe that close ties with Russia should prevail over relations with other countries. All parties except for the SDPK see a threat in growing Chinese investments. In addition, opposition deputies Ravshan Dzhenbekov and Omurbek Abdrakhmanov, the only ones who voted against joining the Eurasian Economic Union, this time stayed outside the legislature, although they became members of the Ar-Namys Party of Felix Kulov, who has been positioning himself as the most ardent pro-Russian politician over the past several election cycles.
Vote for a Parliament to Elect President
After adopting the new Constitution in 2010, Kyrgyzstan became a parliamentary-presidential republic with pro rata representation in parliament. The body was then formed by five parties, among them Ata-Jurt (28 seats), Ar-Namys (25 seats), Ata-Meken (18 seats), Respublika (23 seats), and SDPK (26 seats).
In those days, no strong and stable national parties could be found on the Kyrgyz political landscape. And the first election under the new rules has proven that the party system is evolving on a bed of patronage networks permeated with business interests and regional identities.
Besides, the party leaders of the Fifth Parliament used to building their strength and finances through controversial appointments, which often resulted in scandals like the one of Iskender Kadyrkulov, a trained livestock expert, becoming Director General of the Severelektro Company.
In contrast to neighboring countries, Kyrgyzstan is formally a parliamentary republic, where party leaders shape the government and other state bodies and finally participate in the distribution of financial, information and administrative flows between their networks. However, this is a de facto parliamentary-presidential republic, where Mr. Atambayev won the presidential elections in 2011 and will keep the office until 2017.
The transparent and highly competitive elections have distinctly set the intra-elite balance of forces.
As a matter of fact, by 2015 he garnered the support of his parliamentary SDPK party (26 seats), as well as financial, media and security assets and managed (most likely, he was compelled to do so) to impose his informal control over the judicial and security bodies. For example, over the past five years, charges have been brought against eight legislators of the Ata-Jurt, the main opposition party based in southern Kyrgyzstan, but only one of them, Mamat Orozbayev, was honored with a fraud case that later collapsed because the statute of limitation had expired.
Regular criminal cases resulting in the withdrawal of parliamentary immunity from prominent MPs have emasculated the legislature’s absolute power.
Aware of the looming loss of clout after the elections, political elites and oligarchic groups close to the president chose to prop up their representation in parliament, the best scenario lying in a coalition-based majority between the SDPK and Kyrgyzstan Party.
Costly by local standards, the elections were won only by political entities structured along the patronage lines of partially or fully criminal capital, which jeopardizes the formation of a professional government needed for the country to change the socio-economic model.
Now they have 56 seats, which substantially strengthens the parliamentary system supported by the presidential majority, but prevents overall control. At the same time, the setup is sufficient for making the government by attracting one or two parties with a behind-the-scenes agreement on dividing financial and political influence.
An Effective Government Born by a Sensible Coalition
Since no party obtained a clear majority, the factions will have to build a coalition of more than 60 MPs for nominating the prime minister. They will form a government that will face complicated challenges generated by the mounting socio-economic crisis caused by weaker currencies of the EEU countries, declining import and export operations (respectively by three and 22 percent), and reduced remittances from labor migrants. According to the National Statistics Committee, every third Kyrgyz citizen lives below the poverty line. The National Bank reports that over 80 percent of money transfers come from Russia, while over the past year that amount dropped by three billion som (US 43 billion), and during eight months of this year it was only 34 billion som (USD 486 billion).
With all marginal assets like national minorities, youths and relatively poor contenders removed from the party lists, the composition of the new Parliament combined with campaign pledges prompts the following conclusions:
The transparent and highly competitive elections have distinctly set the intra-elite balance of forces, with the Parliament made up of only influential politicians ready to play according to the presidential rules and join the vertical of power characterized by the diminishing influx of resources.
Accession to the EEU appears to be an attempt by Kyrgyz elites to balance the national economy after the failure of the socio-economic model based on the re-export of Chinese and Turkish goods to the EEU and on remittances of labor migrants.
Costly by local standards, the elections were won only by political entities structured along the patronage lines of partially or fully criminal capital, which jeopardizes the formation of a professional government needed for the country to change the socio-economic model.
The parties are essentially orientated to the defense of their interests and the extraction of financial rents from political posts. Possessing powerful parliamentary support, the pro-Eurasian President Atambayev can easily launch the operation Successor and roll out a loyal leader for the 2017 presidential race.
The operation would employ the advertising of a future prime minister to provide the successor with recognition and government experience. The effective coalition built under presidential patronage should strengthen the prime minister whose jacket may be tried on either by the incumbent or his protégé.
Accession to the EEU appears to be an attempt by Kyrgyz elites to balance the national economy after the failure of the socio-economic model based on the re-export of Chinese and Turkish goods to the EEU and on remittances of labor migrants. Bishkek needs closer military-political cooperation with Moscow to counter ISIS and regional turmoil. Hence, with the Russian crisis aggravating and the Kyrgyz parliament shaped anew, the two countries should step up bilateral cooperation.
The key threat seems to lie in the formation of an incompetent and corrupt government that may worsen living standards.
Kyrgyzstan will maintain its current relationship with the United States (a constructive dialogue with resistance against political interference), Turkey (stronger economic cooperation based on personal ties between the two presidents), and China (the receipt of grants with attempts to preserve resources from Chinese control).
The key threat seems to lie in the formation of an incompetent and corrupt government that may worsen living standards. Based on popular discontent, within two years the inter-clan fight for resources may result in lower presidential ratings and an intra-elite schism, only to create an ideal environment for an illegitimate regime change through the interference of interested countries, corporations and terrorist groups.
(votes: 1, rating: 5) |
(1 vote) |
