Future Maps of Syrian Transport Corridors
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Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia
Syria has always played an important role in the development of Middle East transport corridors, and the country has long held a particularly special place in the transit of energy resources. Due to the mass protests that began in Syria in March 2011, and escalated into civil war, the country no longer occupies the position of a regional transportation center. This has a negative impact on trade in the region and the development of the oil and gas sector. Nevertheless, even after the military conflict started, Syria has attempted to reinforce its importance as a transport hub of energy resources.
Syria has always played an important role in the development of Middle East transport corridors, and the country has long held a particularly special place in the transit of energy resources.
Due to the mass protests that began in Syria in March 2011, and escalated into civil war, the country no longer occupies the position of a regional transportation center. This has a negative impact on trade in the region and the development of the oil and gas sector. Nevertheless, even after the military conflict started, Syria has attempted to reinforce its importance as a transport hub of energy resources.
Syria and the Development of a Regional Transport System
Occupying a central position in the Middle East, Syria plays a strategic role. To the south-west the country borders Lebanon and Israel, to the south –Jordan, to the east – Iraq, and to the north – Turkey. Meeting the Mediterranean Sea in the west, Syria has three main ports: Tartus, Latakia, and Baniyas. The country’s geopolitical importance is further enhanced by its proximity to Egypt. The Euphrates – the longest river in Western Asia – flows through the country’s east, while in the north-east the Tigris acts as a natural border between Syria and Turkey for 44 kilometers.
Since ancient times, Syria has served as a major crossroads for international trade, and Syrian merchants traditionally prospered from the east-west and north-south movement of goods and people. Syria has long played an important historical role in the development of transport networks in the region. Back in the days of the Ottoman Empire, a railway was built connecting Damascus and Beirut (1895). Railway networks spread further. The Hejaz Railway from Damascus to Medina opened in 1908, and in 1912, Aleppo and Baghdad were connected by a railway line.
In the 20th century Syria’s importance as an international trading center seriously declined. Splitting Lebanon off from Greater Syria in 1926 deprived the country of its main port: Beirut. The French annexation of Syria's northwest corner, with its subsequent transfer to Turkey stripped the country of its other port, Iskenderun (then known as Alexandretta), as well as key stretches of railroad and highway. By the time it gained independence (April 17, 1946), the country lacked a port and working links between Damascus, Homs, and Aleppo. Gradually, Syria lost its role of an international transit center.
After independence, the state embarked on the development of a national transportation system. In the mid-1980s, more than 95 percent of the north-south fright and passenger traffic was carried by trucks and buses along the borders with Turkey and Jordan. The roads from Damascus to the east (the first road to Baghdad), from Homs to Tadmur, and from Aleppo to Baghdad were the country’s key transport arteries [1].
By the mid-1970s, the sea ports of Tartus and Latakia had been linked by a railway line to Al-Akkari and Aleppo, which significantly promoted cargo shipping. In 1992, an 80-km line connected the port cities of Tartus and Latakia. Railroad tracks provided links with Turkey, Jordan and Iraq, and you could reach Syria’s Aleppo from Turkey’s Gaziantep and Mersin.
In early 2012, the hostilities in Syria resulted in the halt of rail freight with Turkey. The termination of freight traffic since March 5, 2012 delivered a very heavy blow not only to Syria, but also to Turkey, severely hurting Turkish exporters and logistics companies, by denying them access to one of their major markets: Iraq [2]. Eighty-one kilometers of railway tracks, a key freight route, to Iraq passes through Syria. From January to April 2012, transit via Syria trickled to a mere 954 trucks, down from a high of over 6,000 trucks. During the same period, Turkish exports to the country fell by 88 percent. Turkey's exports to Jordan – where Syria also played a vital transit role – were slashed in half in May 2012, dropping from $90 million to $44 million.
Railway passenger and freight traffic between Jordan and Syria, which had existed since 1908, was interrupted in 2006. After track renovation work in 2010, the service was restored. However, in 2011, growing instability discontinued first passenger transportation and then freight traffic too. Before the hostilities, Iraq and Syria were linked by a railway line connecting Mosul in northern Iraq with Qamishli in Syria. After the 2003 war in Iraq, Syria became a major transit corridor. In March 2012 there an agreement was signed on building a link between Dayr az Zawr in Syria and an Iraqi town Al’Qa’im, which would give Syria access to Iraqi ports in the Persian Gulf, providing a cargo traffic route between the south of Europe and the Gulf countries. The project is scheduled for completion by the end of 2014. The strategic plan for the period through 2025 envisages creating a connection with the railway in Jordan, in order to gain access to the port of Aqaba [3]. Today, construction of the railway line appears unlikely.
Syria as Oil and Gas Thoroughfare
As of January 1, 2013, Syria’s share in the global oil and gas reserve market was estimated at 2.5 billion barrels, just 0.2 percent of global resources (Crude Oil Proved Reserves. 2012. International Energy Statistics. EIA). Before the beginning of the military conflict, Syrian oil production amounted to 0.4 percent of the global total. In 2012, this figure fell to 0.25 percent (calculated by the author on the basis of BP Statistical Review of World Energy. June 2013. p. 8). The country’s ability to become an oil and gas transit center is strategically important for the development of its energy sector – before the armed clashes, Syria had already been a transit area for energy transportation.
Since March 2011, the Syrian oil and gas sector has suffered severe damage. The destruction of oil and natural gas pipelines, combined with the impact of Western-led sanctions has hindered the exploration, development, production, and transport of the country's energy resources. Direct and indirect losses to the oil and gas industry are estimated at $12 billion, out of overall losses of $20 billion experienced by the Syrian economy [4].
The development of the regional energy transportation system began in 1952, when construction of a crude oil pipeline from the Kirkuk oil field in Iraq to the Syrian port of Baniyas was completed. The pipeline is around 800 kilometers long and has a capacity of 300,000 barrels per day. The pipeline was destroyed by the Syrian army in retaliation for the British and French capture of the Suez Canal in 1956, but it was later rebuilt.
In 1972, following the nationalization of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), assets in Syria and subsequent tough negotiations on increasing tariffs for the transportation of Iraqi oil via the Syrian part of the pipeline, Iraq decided to build a new pipeline, bypassing Syria. In 1975, the pipeline was built, connecting Kirkuk with the Arabian Peninsula.
In 2003, American air strikes destroyed the pipeline. A decision was taken later to rebuild it. In 2007-2009, negotiations with Stroytransgaz on rebuilding the pipeline yielded no results, and in February 2011, the governments of Syria and Iraq resumed negotiations on the possibility of reconstructing the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline.
The Arab Gas Pipeline (AGP) represents a unique model for strategic Arab energy cooperation involving Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, and as such is of particular significance for the Syrian energy sector. The pipeline project was initiated within the framework of bilateral dialogue between Egypt and Jordan in 2001. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) later included Syria and Lebanon. Israel, Turkey and Iraq also signed deals to cooperate in this trans-regional pipeline project. As planned, the pipeline was to be of economic importance not only for the Arab region, but for Europe, Asia and Africa too. It was intended to extend to the Syrian-Turkish border and join the gas pipeline system in Turkey. From Turkey, the AGP would then be connected to the Nabucco pipeline.
The 1,200 km-long Arab Gas Pipeline transports Egyptian gas to Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Israel. The construction of the first AGP section, which stretches 265 km from the El Arish natural gas field in Egypt to Aqaba in Jordan, was completed in 2003 and cost $200 million. The pipeline has a diameter of is 36 inches and a capacity of 10.3 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year.
The second section, 390 km long, extended the pipeline in Jordan from Aqaba port through Amman to El Rehab (30 km from the Jordan-Syria border) and was commissioned in 2005. The second phase cost about USD 300 million in investment. The line from El Rihab to Homs, running through El Deir and Damascus, was completed in 2008. This section is 330 km long. In 2009, the pipeline was extended from Homs to Baniyas in Syria and Tripoli in Lebanon [5].
In 2008, the Arish-Ashkelon (Israel) pipeline was commissioned. Formally, this segment is not considered part of the Arab Gas Pipeline.
Despite the instability in Syria, the Arab Gas Pipeline’s strategic importance in the region is gaining momentum. Jordan is set to sign two agreements with the Jordanian-Egyptian Fajr Company for Natural Gas. The agreements involve connecting the Aqaba Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Terminal to the Arab Gas Pipeline and allowing gas imported from global markets – after being processed at the Aqaba terminal – to pass through the pipeline, along with Egyptian gas [6].
It is important to note that almost half the length of the Arab Gas Pipeline is in Syria. From 2010 to 2011, Egyptian gas imports fell by more than 60 percent and ceased altogether in 2012 [7].
There is little doubt that the military conflict within Syria has a negative impact on both domestic and regional energy markets. Although before the military confrontation Syria’s plans were very ambitious, the country had already ceased to play the role of a regional transport hub.
Syria’s Transit Future
Back in 2009 Bashar al-Assad announced Syria's energy strategy and began taking steps to realize the country’s transit-center potential. Under this strategy, Syria was to become a regional hub for hydrocarbon transportation between the Persian Gulf and the Black, Caspian and Mediterranean seas.
In September 2010, the governments of Syria and Iraq signed a memorandum of understanding for the construction of two oil pipelines and one gas pipeline to carry gas and oil from Iraq’s Akkas and Kirkuk fields, respectively.
In July 2011, Syria, Iraq and Iran signed a tripartite MoU to build a pipeline that would transport gas from Iran’s South Pars gas field, the world’s biggest, through Iraq to the Syrian coast of the Mediterranean with a possible line to Lebanon. The commissioning of the pipeline with a design capacity of 110 million cubic meters per day and a cost of $10 billion was scheduled for 2016 [8].
Today's environment makes the implementation of such projects essentially impossible. First, against the background of the international isolation that the Syrian government now faces, finding foreign investors or contractors to implement the projects seems highly unlikely. However, at the end of 2013, Russia’s Soyuzneftegaz signed an agreement with Damascus on the development of an offshore field located some 70 km away between Tartus and Banyias. The volume of investment is about $90 million [9].
Second, fighting in the country has to be stopped and security issues – resolved. Third, the government needs to regulate relations with neighboring countries. Diplomatic relations between Syria and Iraq were broken off in 1979 and only restored in 2006. In 2009, Iraq accused Damascus of being behind the powerful explosions in Baghdad in August that year. In 2011, Turkey strongly denounced Bashar al-Assad’s actions, and threatened to sever all bilateral agreements.
To cap it all, regardless of Syria’s geographically central position, Turkey and Iraq bypass Syria in their oil and gas transit strategy. The Kirkuk–Ceyhan Oil Pipeline, built in 1980, is Iraq’s largest oil pipeline, and exports oil from the northern fields to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. In addition to improving relations with the government of Kurdistan, Turkey is interested in strengthening cooperation in the energy sector with Baghdad. There are plans to build an oil pipeline linking Turkey to Iraq’s southern fields. The length of Basra-Ceyhan pipeline is tentatively estimated at 1,200 km [10].
The implementation of Syria’s energy projects and restoration of its regional transit hub status depend on the political situation in the country, geopolitical interests of the leading countries in the world, and also on the energy interests of the neighboring countries, primarily Turkey, Iraq and Iran.
Implementing the planned pipeline infrastructure development would have a range of different impacts on the world's leading countries. Construction of the Iran-Iraq-Syria pipeline poses a potential threat to Russia, as it would serve an alternative source of gas delivery to European markets and could undermine Gazprom's monopoly position. Today, a number of European countries are totally dependent on Russian gas supplies. These are chiefly Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, and Latvia. Slovenia, Greece, Slovakia, and Germany are dependent on Russian gas imports to a lesser, although still significanct, extent (60-37 percent). Europe's desire to reduce its dependence on Russian gas by 2020 via energy savings, the development of alternative energy resources and supply diversification could see the volume of Russian gas imports fall by 45 billion cubic meters per year (neftegaz.ru/news/view/122417). Qatar, the United States and Canada are also mentioned as possible alternative suppliers, ahead of any others. Under such conditions, pushing Russia out of the European markets would be quite problematic. However, if the above pipeline is built and commissioned, Russia's position in the global gas market and in Europe in particular would be more vulnerable. So Europe is clearly interested in the emergence of new transport arteries that would allow it to achieve energy security.
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Irina Ahmed Zain Aidrous:
Armed Conflict in Syria and its Implications for
the World Oil and Gas Market
The United States is chiefly pursuing its geopolitical interests in Syria, ones that go far beyond the control of or participation in energy transportation routes from Syria and the neighboring countries. The same could be said of Iran, which maintains strategic cooperation with Syria.
The transport and energy development of Turkey, which shares its longest common border with Syria, depends on the political situation in the country. The stabilization of the situation in Syria would enable Turkey to implement its energy strategy, a key direction of which is becoming a major energy transit hub. Turkey’s transit potential is based on its location at the crossroads of different energy basins, energy-rich countries, and energy-dependent regions.
Turkey needs Syria to implement its plans to connect the Arab Gas Pipeline with its national gas system and is interested in the use of the Syrian transport infrastructure. On the other hand, the aim of Syria's energy strategy is to gain a strategic position in regional oil and gas transit, which along with the Iraqi-Syrian and Iranian-Iraqi-Syrian plans for building new transport routes could potentially reduce Turkey’s importance as an energy hub.
Countries that consider Syria a region of their economic and energy interests are not yet able to champion them due to ongoing hostilities and uncertainty over the country’s political future. Until the three-year-long conflict is brought to an end, we can only guess as to whether Syria would be able to regain its position in the region, and what Syria’s map of energy transport arteries would look like.
1. Syria: transportation, telecommunications, and construction http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-13540.html
2. No Turkish trains arrive in Syria, Iraq for months// Hurriyet Daily News. September 27, 2012 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/no-turkish-trains-arrive-in-syria-iraq-for-months.aspx?pageID=238&nID=31058&NewsCatID=344
3. Syrian National Railway plans. March 25, 2014 // Railways Africa. http://www.railwaysafrica.com/blog/2014/03/25/syrian-national-railway-plans/
4. Syria. February 2014 //U.S. Energy Information Administration http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=sy
5. Arab Gas Pipeline. Strategic Projects. Ministry of Petroleum of Egypt // http://www.petroleum.gov.eg/en/ProjectsandActivities/StrategicProjects/
Pages/GasPipeline.aspx6. AbeerNuman. Planned deals to allow flow of imported gas through Arab pipeline// The Jordan Times. February 11, 2014 http://jordantimes.com/planned-deals-to-allow-flow-of-imported-gas-through-arab-pipeline
7. http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=sy
8. Amrit Naresh. Syria's transit futute: all pipelines leads to Damascus?//OpenOil, March 28, 2012. http://openoil.net/2012/03/28/syrias-transit-future-all-pipelines-lead-to-damascus/
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