... including Mohammad Reza Zahedi, one of the top military commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. On July 30, senior Hezbollah operative Fuad Shukr was killed in a Beirut suburb, and on July 31, Hamas political chief Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated ... ... Tayyip Erdogan does in Syria and Libya. But repeating the experience of the Iran–Iraq War of the 1980s, with hundreds of thousands killed and millions wounded, is now a no-go: Middle Eastern societies have changed too much over the past 40 years, and ...
... is difficult to give an unbiased assessment of the situation in Israel and Palestine as a whole. In terms of security, while there are outbreaks of violence in the area of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, this is certainly not the case inside Jerusalem. At the same time, there is a very tense information background in Israel as it conducts two parallel military operations: in the south, in the Gaza Strip, and on the northern border with Lebanon, the scene of a military confrontation with Hezbollah. As for Ramallah, there are no major clashes there. Yet, the Israeli army conducts regular raids in the Palestinian territories after it receives information about the presence of radical elements supporting Hamas in some areas of the West Bank....
... in the world.
Russia’s presence in Syria can thus be explained by the fact that it is difficult to involve Syria, Iran and Hezbollah in the following:
Direct military contact with Turkey, the United States and Israel.
The management of negotiations ... ... settlements and national dialogue conferences such as the Syrian National Dialogue Congress held in Sochi and the hundreds or even thousands of meetings with political and armed opposition actors seeking reconciliation and settlement.
Establishing “parallel ...
... destruction of the State of Israel, which is a threat to its existential security. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) feels that deterrence is the best strategy to discourage states (such as Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, etc.) and substate actors (such as Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic State [Da’esh], Jabhat Fatah al-Sham [al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra], etc.) from attacking its country. The IDF will not change its deterrence strategy for state and substate actors. This is because ...
