... reforms, to restore its authority, to enhance its effectiveness and to regain its central role in international affairs.
China and Russia, either as a member of the global South or as its partner, should work together with the Global South in the international ... ... mechanism, but it is possible to form a grid-like form of cooperation that is multilevel, multidisciplinary and multiformat.
The SCO and BRICS are originally platforms for political, economic, security and humanistic cooperation among their participants, but as they ...
RIAC, Institute of China and Contemporary Asia of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Institute of International Studies at Fudan University Report #87 / 2023
RIAC, Institute of ... ... analyzes Russia–China relations from the second and fourth quarters of 2022 to the first quarter of 2023. During this period, Moscow–Beijing relations were significantly affected by the external environment; namely, state tendencies towards escalating ...
... Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO).
The first two institutions are new in the sense that they have no connection with the power potential of the participants. The EAEU and the CSTO are in a more difficult position, since at their centre is Russia, which is far superior to its allies economically and militarily.
Therefore, for comparison with the institutions of the past international order, BRICS and the SCO, of course, deserve more attention. Their assessment allows us to highlight what can make such organisations more promising and useful for global and regional security, i.e. realising the main goal of states is their survival.
Based on an analysis ...
... brewing US-China conflict. It is in their common interests to resist the emerging bipolarity and, where possible, to mitigate its negative repercussions, with an emphasis on promoting multilateral mechanisms of international cooperation.
For example, Russia, India and China are members of the BRICS and the SCO. Moscow and New Delhi should make additional efforts to ensure that these institutions are not going to evolve into “the leagues of extraordinary gentlemen”, but instead will become effective tools in the search for a common denominator in even ...
... efforts. They are open and inclusive, have a variable geometry and a huge potential for further development, coming from life. The SCO, BRICS and EAEU are vivid embodiments of this trend. They oppose the cumbersome military-political alliances inherited from the ... ... line with the proverbial “Thucydides' trap”. In particular, we are talking about the double containment of the U.S./West - Russia and China - through the creation of the Ukrainian crisis and the problem of Taiwan.
With regard to Russia, the current ...
... away with the “flexible geometry” in relations with Africa and to match different interaction formats as well as to link the involvement of African states to their own vision of the present and future.
In a multipolar and multilateral world, the SCO and BRICS will have to be expanded, but it is important to understand what principles Russia should be guided by in doing so. Moscow and its allies have other institutional mechanisms in their arsenal: this includes the CSTO peacekeeping and military-political potential, the EAEU dialogue possibilities and subregional organizations of ...
... take a side within each undermines its credibility and reliability within them, which she fears ultimately risks isolating it. The last paragraph concisely encapsulates her concerns.
Gleb Toropchin:
Taking (Another) Turn to the East: Making Sense of Russia’s Stance in the Asia-Pacific
Dr. Rajagopalan writes that “India is the odd man out in all of these groups, whether it is in the Quad, BRICS or the SCO. In each, other key members have closer ties with each other than any of them do with India. This is potentially problematic because a friend to all will possibly not have any friends to depend upon when in danger.” With all due respect to this ...
... lose a lot if they have to take sides in this forthcoming US-China rivalry. On the contrary, it is in their best interests to confront this bipolarity and to mitigate it to the extent possible with a new emphasis on multilateralism.
India, China and Russia are all members of BRICS and of SCO; Moscow could work harder making these institutions more efficient in reaching common denominators for even highly sensitive security and development issues. There is also a separate mechanism of the Russia-India-China trilateral consultations, which ...
... global split into opposing blocs but also to reduce the risk of the PRC implementing a hegemonic policy. China’s might will be tamed as it gets enveloped in multilateral formats and regimes similarly to the way German might is tamed by EU institutions.
BRICS and the SCO are a graphic embodiment of Russian and Indian equidistant partnerships with other non-Western power centres, which is fundamental for the two countries’ positioning as independent great powers refraining from joining the US-China confrontation as junior partners of either superpower....
... changing international environment. Hence, the priority goal for both nations’ leaders is to ensure trust between Russia and India via personal contacts at the highest political level such as annual summits and within the multilateral fora such as G20, BRICS, and SCO.
Another instrument to address the risk of growing political gap between Russia and India is to reinvigorate economic ties between the two countries and make both economies more interconnected. It is high time decision makers in both countries re-focused their attention from stand-alone multi-billion strategic projects, which ...
