The fate of the START Treaty and nuclear arms control, in general, has become clearer
Now when the U.S. presidential elections are over the fate of the START Treaty and nuclear arms control, in general, has become clearer.
The New START treaty is set to expire on February 5, 2021, and only a few months ago there was little doubt that it would be the end of it. The Trump administration had no desire to extend it unless Russia agreed to “freeze” its nuclear holdings which in fact meant declaration and verification of Russian non-strategic nuclear arsenal. Even a very modest proposal, made by President Putin, to extend START for one year without preconditions and ...
... such ideas is clear – Moscow does not need transparency for the sake of transparency and verification for the sake of verification. They should be closely tied to commitments as regards limitations.
What are the main obstacles to an extension of the START treaty?
The ongoing discussions about the Treaty in the Trump administration are fairly negative. There are two prevailing views. One is that current START should be replaced by the new treaty, which is to be signed between United States, Russia and China, and covering all their nuclear systems. The other view is that START in its current form should be abandoned and the new agreement with Russian Federation should be negotiated with Russia to include all new Russian nuclear weapons systems ...
... violating the treaty. With the current presidential administration in power in Washington, the INF Treaty may well be denounced in the foreseeable future. Another manifestation of the crisis in nuclear arms control is that it has been six years since Russia and the United States last held talks on the next START Treaty. This is the longest pause in the 47-year history of these negotiations. The current START expires in 2021, after which a vacuum will form in the field of strategic arms control. Time is running out for the signing of a new treaty, given ...
... the necessary composition of its deployed nuclear forces"
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. This can be interpreted as a possible response, on the one hand, to an accelerated modernization of China's nuclear arms, and on the other hand – to a potential withdrawal of Russia from the new START Treaty.
The recent partially unclassified paper of the U.S. Department of Defense states that: "The U.S. nuclear force structure has been designed to account for any possible adjustments in the Russian strategic force configurations that may ...
