... the region, as these special relations have been severed, so now any future relations will be priced on the basis of a deficit market. The question remains open, is the trade-off worth it?
Energy Weaponry Myth:
Pathological fear does exist, that Gazprom may in some way use its power to influence Europe as a dominant supplier. However, in reality, if we look retrospectively there are no real precedents to Gazprom applying its power, there were some threats issued, but not real actions. Also, it ...
... torn between its long-standing Western ties and its Neo-Ottoman future. The tension between pragmatic ties with the West and the Kremlin’s determination to preserve Russian’s “sphere of privileged interests” in the Caucasus and Central Asia are palpable. In the South and East of its vast country, Moscow acts more like a neo-imperial power. Like Beijing and (to a much lesser extent) Ankara, it operates a tributary system with smaller neighbours, providing “security” ...
... ¼ of Russia’s oil and gas proven reserves, but these regions are extremely underdeveloped making casing, extraction and transport difficult. Key gas fields, like Kovykta, are isolated by taiga or encircled by canyons – these are not Gazprom friendly areas due to a lack of piping expertise. Besides technical issues, political factors have also strained development. Like the 10 year dispute amid TNK-BP, Interros, Gazprom and other stakeholders, but a light at the end of the tunnel ...
... Jinping visit did not generate outright deals, and it appeared that the mass media was right to dampen expectations towards only possible conclusions around the end of 2013 (See: FoxBusiness). The most recent negotiations have lasted since 2004, when Gazprom signed a cooperation deal with its Chinese counterpart for up to 68 bcm of gas (See: Bloomberg). This was a sizeable figure for China, as it is an emerging player in regards to this fuel type; although it currently adds up to a small portion of ...