... critical of major Russian infrastructure projects in the past. The original Nord Stream came under strong criticism, and a 2014 visit of U.S. senators to Bulgaria was soon followed by the refusal of the authorities in that country to go ahead with the Gazprom project to build South Stream on its territory. Even earlier, the U.S. Department of State created the post of United States Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy (in the Caspian region), originally occupied by Clayland Boyden Gray (2008–2009), ...
... to take part (supply equipment and technologies) in the following kinds of projects:
deep water (over 152 meters) oil field development,
Arctic shelf field development,
scavenger oil field development, including shale oil and gas.
Viktor Katona:
Gazprom Gaining Ground in Europe
Technological sanctions were a formal cause for some projects to freeze.
This wave of sanctions affected the Russian energy sector companies, though to a less extent than had been projected by the American government....
Gazprom seems to be serious in its intention to smooth out differences with the European Commission. After breakdown of the «South Stream» pipeline project, «North Stream-1» multi-year obstructionism, and numerous attempts by Brussels ...
... encouraging other actors to join US-led organizational frameworks. Despite controlling 175000 km of pipelines and being present in more than 50 international and 20 domestic projects, Russia’s current position is shaky. Governmental favoritism of Gazprom, who has a privileged position with regards to controlling export routes, striped other companies such as Novatek and Rosneft of support in LNG projects that could take relevant place in South-East Asia in order to help Russia decrease its dependency ...
... gas that are currently imported from Russia through Trans-Balkan line, could be diverted to Turkish Stream with the construction of first line. The second line could be used to export Russian gas to Southeast Europe. Nevertheless, due to the fact that Gazprom is conducting talks with European Commission (EC) to construct Nord Stream – 2, one could assert that the pipe game is far from over. Taking financial difficulties into account, Gazprom might also intent to use Turkish Stream as a leverage ...
... months later the outlines of Nord Stream 2 are already clear and precise. The stakeholders intend to
build and put into operation
two new lines with a capacity of 55 billion cubic metres under the Baltic Sea by 2019: this is when the contract between Gazprom and Naftogaz for the transit of natural gas through Ukraine expires. With the support of several leading European energy firms including Royal Dutch Shell, E.On and Engie, Gazprom is steadily moving forward through the project’s first stages....
....” Thus, the legitimacy and relevance of the matter is currently framed by the international community (i.e. is mostly top-town), however in future it is likely to depend on the relationship established between the State, oil and gas industry, and Gazprom.
Environmental risk management platform of Equatorial Principles calls for international banks to finance only those projects that have well-established CSR and concern for environment. There is only one Russian bank, Otkritie, who joined it ...
... encompass the entire value-chain of the natural gas sector. The pinnacle of recent collaboration has been the initiation of the Nord Stream-2 project, which has the potential to completely substitute Ukrainian transit routes. On top of that, in 2015 Gazprom has delivered to Germany a record quantity of 45.3 bcm of natural gas. What’s more intriguing is the 19% increase in gas deliveries to Germany for the first quarter of 2016, when compared to 2015 Q1 delivered quantities. The implications ...
... “directly”, since most of the supplied reverse gas was produced in Russia).
The report calls on the Ukrainian authorities to “facilitate orderly transit” of Russian gas through the Ukrainian territory against the backdrop of Gazprom’s declared intention to put an end to this practice by 2019. The seriousness of this goal is supported by the fact that even during the crisis years of 2014-2015,
after the share of Ukraine in the Russian natural gas transit had dropped ...
... hub for Europe will be located at the border of Turkey and Greece. Being a strategically important transit point for Russian gas going to Europe and bypassing Ukraine, Turkey tries to increase its bargaining power and engages into price arbitrage with Gazprom: 10.25% discount offered by Gazprom is deemed insufficient and Turkey does not want to receive anything less than15%. Under the tightened atmosphere of the Syrian military theatre, Turkey threatens to cut off imports should her conditions be not ...