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Andrey Kazantsev

Doctor of Political Science, Senior Researcher at the Analytical Centre of Institute of International Studies, MGIMO University

Russia’s influence in Turkmenistan was to a considerable extent lost after Turkmenistan gained independence. Do independent Turkmenistan and Russia need each other today? Will the partnership go beyond the issues of gas? One thing is evident: the way back to Ashgabat is not closed to Russia.

Russia’s influence in Turkmenistan was to a considerable extent lost after Turkmenistan gained independence. Do independent Turkmenistan and Russia need each other today? Will the partnership go beyond the issues of gas? One thing is evident: the way back to Ashgabat is not closed to Russia.

Forced out of the USSR

The political system of Turkmenistan at the time of perestroika displayed sufficiently strong inertia even in comparison with the political systems of the neighboring states of Central Asia. The republic had in fact no desire to drop out of the Federal State. It did not mean, however, that there was no smoldering discontent with the Federal Centre which was associated with Russia.

Nevertheless, immediately after the signing of the Bialoweiza Agreements on the dissolution of the USSR, the leaders of the Central Asian Republics got together -- in Ashgabat—and  proposed to set up an integration structure for the post-Soviet space. As a result on December 20, 1991 the Agreement on the Formation of the CIS was signed in Alma-Ata.

 In the first years of independence the leadership of Turkmenistan tried to show maximum loyalty to Russia as successor of the Federal Centre in the military-strategic sphere. In the early 1990s Russia played a key role in ensuring security of the southernmost republic of the former USSR. Turkmenistan--due to the priority of bilateral relations-did not sign the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty, but in the early 1990s it actively cooperated with Russia in the military and border protection spheres. Many Russian military men served as officers in the Turkmen armed forces; the Chief of the Task Force of the Military Department of Russia at the Ministry of Defense of Turkmenistan who was a member of the Council of Defense and National Security of Turkmenistan and the Commander of Border Troops were also Russian.

Granting the Russian speaking citizens of Turkmenistan the right to double citizenship was a friendly gesture to Russia.

Nevertheless, from the time of gaining independence the official Ashgabat was careful to distance itself from “the democratic” Russian leadership in political issues. In the early 1990s Turkmenistan (as well as Uzbekistan) declared that they were following “the Chinese” rather than the “Russian” model of reforms.

Transformation into “a New Kuwait” and a Policy of Isolationism

After the collapse of the USSR Ashgabat soon realized that it can take advantage of its independence to turn into “a new Kuwait”.

In the economic sphere Turkmenistan was one of the least privileged republics of the USSR. It did not pay anything into the Federal Budget but got next to nothing from its oil and gas resources due to the peculiarities of the Soviet pricing system which artificially subsidized the final product at the expense of lower prices for raw materials. After the collapse of the USSR Ashgabat soon realized that it can take advantage of its independence to turn into “a new Kuwait”.

However, the transportation of Turkmen gas along the northern route was carried out through the pipeline system “Central Asia-Centre” built in the Soviet period. The Russian Companies (Gazprom, Itera)were either buying the Turkmen gas by themselves or acted as intermediaries in its resale on the markets of the post-Soviet countries which were either unwilling or could not afford to pay world prices. It was the major incentive for the search of new transportation routes. Temporary curtailment of gas purchases by Gazprom was a terrible blow to the Turkmen economy. As a result of that, as early as by the mid-1990s Turkmenistan started to pursue a multi-vector foreign policy aimed at “stepping up” keener competition among the potential buyers of its natural gas. It was this opportunity to dispose of its own resources that was declared by the leaders of Turkmenistan as a major achievement of the independence era.

On the international arena this policy was maintained by the official neutral status and non-membership in all post-Soviet organizations. Turkmenistan always abstained from joining the post-Soviet organizations, both sponsored by Russia (Organization of the Collective Security Treaty, the Euro-Asian Economic Cooperation) and “the alternative ones” (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) and insisted on the bilateral format of relations. By the end of President Niyazov’s lifetime this policy finally transformed into isolationism and in 2005 led to the withdrawal of Turkmenistan from the CIS membership (while retaining the observer status).

The formation of autocratic power of President Niyazov-Turkmenbashi was logically completed by the creation of the “Rukhnama” nationalistic quasi-religious ideology. One can identify strong anti-Russian elements in it, notably in the assessment of the role of Russia in the historic “decline of the Turkmen”. Persecution of the Russian and other minorities especially intensified after a failed assassination attempt on Turkmenbashi’s life on November 25, 2002.Early in 2003 Turkmenbashi decided to unilaterally abolish double citizenship and in order to minimize a strong reaction from Russia concluded a lucrative contract with Gazprom. The Russian speaking people regarded double citizenship as the only form of protection from the despotism of Turkmen authorities therefore this decision was tantamount to immediate exile.

Mass exodus of the Russian speaking population and flight of most Turkmen intellectuals became the major loss of the state during the years of independence. According to Turkmenbashi himself, “first left golden brains, then golden hands, now only gold teeth are left…”

Turkmen-Russian Relations: the Present and the Future

So far Russia has not taken any particular interest in Turkmenistan except for the gas issues.

Russia completely lost its military and political influence over Turkmenistan as far back as the second half of the 1990s due to the multi-vector, neutrality and isolationism policies. So far Russia has not taken any particular interest in Turkmenistan except for the gas issues.

Until recently Russia continued to maintain a strong influence over Turkmenistan by controlling its energy-transport infrastructure. In 2007 it tried to strengthen this control by agreements on the Caspian Coastal Gas Pipeline construction and extension of the pipeline “Central Asia-Centre” built during the Soviet period. However, both agreements were never realized.

In 2006 an agreement on gas pipeline construction was signed, with Turkmen gas going to China through the territory of Kazakhstan. The Construction started in 2007, and the official ceremony of opening the pipeline was held on December 14, 2009 on the Turkmen gas field Samandepe.

On March 11, 2008 Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan notified Russia that starting from 2009 gas would be sold only at the European prices. When in 2009 the crisis brought the gas sales down on the European market, purchasing the Turkmen gas resulted in heavy losses for Gazprom making it stop the intake of gas from the pipeline. As to the Turkmen side, they continued to pump gas into the pipeline. As a result of this decision on April 8, 2009 the pipeline Dauletabad -- Daryalyk (part of the “Central Asia-Centre” system) blew up. The Turkmen leadership blamed Gazprom for this disaster.

Though the Turkmen leadership agreed to reduce the prices, in 2010 Gazprom was able to sign a contract only for 10 billion cubic meters. It ceased being the major purchaser of Turkmen gas as alongside with the new pipeline to China the second pipeline was opened to Iran.

Recently in the EU the Trans-Caspian pipeline laying projects have been actively discussed (in addition to “Nabucco”). The position of the advocates of the Trans-Afghan pipeline is too consolidated. In connection with it one can assume that before long a still tougher international competition for Turkmen gas will unfold, above all between China and the EU. Yet, Gazprom’s role unfortunately may continue to diminish. Consequently, Russia will be losing the last serious remaining instrument of exercising influence over Turkmenistan.

Due to the exodus of the Russian speaking people and a sharp reduction of the share of “old” urban Russian speakers in comparison with that of former village dwellers the cultural influence of Russia in Turkmenistan is the lowest in the region. Besides, flows of working migrants and students between Turkmenistan and Russia are negligible. Persecutions against a small number of people with double citizenship have been intensifying. Therefore the long-term potential of retaining Turkmenistan ‘in the Russian world’ is unfortunately very slim as compared with other Central Asian states.

However, the revival of the interest of the Russian leadership in Turkmenistan could change the situation for the better. Unlike the authorities of neighboring Uzbekistan, the new Turkmen leadership represented by President G. Berdymuhammedov is trying to show their respect for Russia using different symbolic gestures. For instance, as a gesture of defiance Tashkent did not take part in the Moscow parade on May 9, 2010 while Turkmenistan sent its detachment thus showing that the road back to Ashgabat is not closed.

Growing influence over Turkmenistan can be useful for Russia for two reasons. Firstly, Russia cannot ignore such an important source of hydrocarbons located approximately in the same segment with Russian deposits (natural gas deposits considerably exceed those of oil).Secondly, Turkmenistan is located in the strategically important region for Russia: it borders on Iran, Afghanistan and post-Soviet Central Asia on land, and has a marine border with Southern Caucasus. Given all that, cooperation with Turkmenistan could be crucial for Moscow in the sphere of security, particularly in meeting new and unconventional challenges--religious terrorism, trans- border trade in Afghan heroin etc.

Turkmenistan also needs to cooperate with Russia in the said spheres, since Russia is a traditional partner in transportation of hydrocarbons along the northern route. Besides, Russia can play a crucial role in ensuring security of independent Turkmenistan in this complicated area particularly after the Americans withdraw their troops from Afghanistan.

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