The divergence of Russian and Western views on the future of Afghanistan and Post-Soviet Central Asia can become one of the main obstacles on the way to cooperation after the withdrawal of NATO forces in 2014. This paper contains the analysis of these divergences as well as proposals on concrete spheres of cooperation.
Two different points of view in Russia on cooperation with the West
The interaction of Russia and the West on Afghan issues is complicated by a New Great Game for the influence in Central Asia. Within its framework Russia and the West often see the situation as a zero-sum game.
Even now there exist in Russia two opposing views on the situation in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of coalition forces. The first one is that it would create serious security problems (such as the growing danger of Islamic terrorism and drug trafficking) for Russian allies in Central Asia and for Russia itself. This point of view is held, above all, by the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
However, there is an opposite point of view according to which it should be taken for granted that Russia will only benefit from the withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan and Central Asia. This point of view is most favored by Victor Ivanov, the chief of The Federal Drug Control Service of the Russian Federation, former FSB General. He backs it up by statistical data about diminished poppy production in Afghanistan in the last year of the Taliban rule and by drastic increase of poppy production after the occupation of Afghanistan. This point of view is also maintained by Russian security community because of the fears of strategic consequences of American military bases’ potential permanent presence in Central Asia.
The West is above all concerned about the effect which these opposing points of view will have on Russian attitude to the Northern Distribution Network of coalition forces in Afghanistan. There are fears in Russia that permanent presence of NATO forces in Central Asia might weaken Russian influence on Central Asian states. It is manifested in pressure that Russia periodically exerts on Kyrgyzstan with a view to closing down American military base in Manas airport as well as in the attempts to toughen up the conditions of transit through the Russian territory. However, there is an opinion that Russia should by all means support the Northern Distribution Network because NATO forces’ presence in Afghanistan is in line with Russian interests.
A New Great Game and ideological conflict
The new Great Game is dangerous not only because of the clash of interests of the actors involved into it. There is also a divergence of values and ideological beliefs between the West and Russia that resembles the Soviet-British rivalry of the 1920-1930-s and the Cold war-time confrontation (from the late 1940-s to the end of the 1980-s).
A substantial part of Russian political elite believes that democratization and liberalization of Central Asian states will bring about different security threats, especially, the rise of Islamic extremism and state failure. The Chinese leadership as well as political elites of Central Asian states supports this point of view. This position is based on the reminiscences of coming to power in Tajikistan of Islamic-Democratic alliance and subsequent Civil war and on the failure of state institutions in Kyrgyzstan in the aftermath of two revolutions in a row.
This value consensus is shared by the SCO and the SCTO. In the West this consensus is usually perceived as an anti-Western one. For example, the SCO supported the withdrawal of American K2 military base from Uzbekistan after the Andijon rebellion (Tashkent accused Americans of supporting rebellious Akramia movement).
The West believes that more liberal and more polyarchic regimes are more stable and therefore can withstand different security threats more effectively. In this regard the democratization of Central Asia and Afghanistan is often perceived as an organic part of the policy aimed at ensuring security in the region.
However, Central Asian and Afghan realities are in many respects in contradiction to this basic belief. "Values vs. interests" dilemma is inherent in all Western actors in Central Asia. From the point of view of democratic values to cooperate with Karzai regime and with Central Asian governments means to support authoritarian regimes. However, this is necessary from the point of view of Western interests not only in the sphere of security, but energy security as well. This dilemma leads to constant changes of Western policy in the region.
Russia and China are not faced with this purely Western dilemma. However, pressure the West exerts with a view to democratizing Central Asia is sometimes viewed by Moscow and Beijing hardliners as a strategy of deliberate destabilization of Russian and Chinese neighboring region. Thus, value differences widen the gap between the two alliances, Russian-Chinese and the Western.
This conflict of values and believes often widens the objective divergence of interests in Central Asia and Afghanistan thus hindering normal cooperation between Russia and the West.
The difference of geographical outlook: mutual complementarity and conflicts
There is a difference in geographical outlook on Central Asia development prospects that Russia and the West (especially, the USA and UK) have. These positions have developed because of their specific interests and specific historical experience. These differences are very important because it might be assumed that the significance of traditional geographical interests will grow in case of serious deterioration of security situation in Afghanistan.
From the point of view of the majority of Western experts the so-called "AfPak" region is the manifestation of the whole set of Afghan problems. So, Afghanistan-Pakistan region is in the main focus of Western efforts (see, for example, Obama's Afpak strategy). This is also in line with historical traditions of the British Empire.
Russia, in its turn, has many reasons to be interested in Central Asia and in the ethnically close to it Northern part of Afghanistan both in terms of its economic and security interests and of its historical and cultural ties with this region. This vision is close to the concept of Greater Central Asia that was formulated by Frederick Starr (with the only important exception that Starr does not support the idea of reintegrating this geopolitical space into Russia).
Because of this specific interest all Russian plans to stabilize the situation around Afghanistan boil down to establishing different "security zones" (anti-drug, anti-terrorist, etc) along the Tajik-Afghan and Uzbek-Afghan borders. Remembering the sad Soviet experience Russia would never agree to again send its troops to Afghanistan. Many Russian experts believe that in case of serious deterioration of Afghan situation after the withdrawal of Western forces the restoration of a new buffer zone in Northern Afghanistan can become Russia’s main priority (for example, by revitalizing the former Northern Alliance).
Different geographic priorities create a certain potential for "division of labor" between Russia and the West along the "North-South" line in case of serious deterioration of Afghan situation. The USA and the UK can, for example, concentrate on South Afghanistan and on the Pashtuns, while Russia – on Afghan Tajiks and Uzbeks in the North. However, there always exists the danger that different as well as similar geographical priorities can lead to fiercer rivalry between outside actors in Central Asia and Afghanistan. For example, there are fears in Russia that the USA after 2014 would shift their main focus to the more stable North of Afghanistan and to Central Asia. This can aggravate Russian-American strategic rivalry.
In which spheres can Russia cooperate with the West in resolving the Afghan problem?
Below, I would list potential spheres of Russia-West cooperation in Afghanistan. However, I would like to point out that this potential can be realized only in case the cooperation prevails over the rivalry in a New Great Game.
1. Smooth functioning of Northern distribution network. Cooperation on Afghan issues can become one of the key dimensions of Russian-American cooperation after the Obama's "reset policy" broke the ice in the relations. Northern distribution network is the only viable way of providing supplies now and, probably, in 2-3 years-term perspective taking into account the situation in Pakistan.
2. Russian support of the Afghan government and anti-Taliban forces. Russia can help Kabul through providing training programs to its security forces, and also by supplying helicopters and other armament. Since the times of the Soviet occupation the Afghans have got accustomed to Russian armament, which is simpler to use than the Western one. In case of very serious deterioration of security situation in the country Russia can even step up its assistance to anti-Taliban forces, but it’s obvious that in these circumstances the Tajik forces will be prioritized.
3. The increase of military and economic assistance to Central Asian countries in the context of creating "security zones" on the northern borders of these countries with Afghanistan. Russia can further step up military and economic assistance to its Central Asian allies both through the CSTO and through the structures of Eurasian economic union and Customs union (among Russia’s priorities are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and, probably, Tajikistan, to much lesser degree disloyal to Russia Uzbekistan).
In military vein Russia continues to support Tajikistan in securing its border with Afghanistan. Russia has the biggest military base beyond its borders located in this country. Russia also provides substantial military assistance to Kyrgyzstan, where it has Kant airbase. These forces can be used in case of incursion of extremist groups (such as the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan) into Central Asia. Russia-sponsored CSTO alliance also supports annually conducted anti-drug operation "Channel".
4. The formation of coalition of CSTO with NATO and EU in order to more effectively oppose the threats from Afghanistan. Closer cooperation between the CSTO and Euro-Atlantic organizations such as NATO and the EU is very important for stabilizing the situation on the northern periphery of Afghanistan. If such cooperation does not gain ground, the CSTO and Euro-Atlantic structures will continue to spend their resources in Central Asia not on countering real threats emerging from the Afghan territory, but on supporting competing forms of cooperation with Central Asian states.
The same can be said about SCO. However, CSTO has already expressed its readiness to cooperate with NATO. There was the decision of the Council of Collective Security, the supreme body of CSTO of June 2004. In NATO there are also many advocates of the dialogue with CSTO (for example, see the recommendations of the group of experts on the new strategic concept of NATO, "NATO in 2020: guaranteed security, dynamic interaction"). In the EU's official Central Asian doctrine (2007) there is also a provision about establishing an "open and constructive dialogue" with CSTO. However, as some Wikileaks documents indicate that the U.S continues to be strongly against such dialogue, especially, inside NATO.
Finally, it must be said that Russia and the West have serious contradictions over Central Asia and Afghanistan and, as a result, more conservative part of Russian political elite does not at all support the cooperation in this field. However, the objective situation in the region pushes both sides towards cooperation.
