An Anniversary of Late Recognition
Soviet Ambassador Maxim Litvinov and Cordell
Hull. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
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Doctor of History, RIAC member
The USSR and the U.S. acted as superpowers leading different countries and forming two global spheres of influence. They became two poles of attraction for different ideas, models, political systems and paths of progress, and different perceptions of the world and man's place in it. However, even in this atmosphere of irreconcilable struggle, the two sides were still able to find opportunities to maintain a dialogue, search for compromises and achieve agreements.
Today marks 80 years since 16th of November, 1933, the day of recognition of the Soviet Union by the United States of America and of the establishment of diplomatic relations between them [1].
The policy of non-recognition
Shortly after the Bolsheviks seized power, the U.S. broke off diplomatic relations with Russia. The American embassy in Russia abstained from any direct contact with the new authorities. In February 1918 its employees left Petrograd and moved to Vologda, and later to Arkhangelsk. In autumn 1919 the American diplomats left Russia for a long time to come.
M.M. Litvinov, and later L.K. Martens, who unofficially acted as RSFSR diplomatic representatives in the U.S., were denied accreditation as Ambassadors of Soviet Russia in Washington. The powers of the employees of all consular offices of Russia in the U.S. were also annulled. The policy of non-recognition and diplomatic isolation of the Soviet State by the United States continued for almost 16 years. Many unsolved problems between the two countries accumulated during this period.
Russia's debts. The Wilson administration and its successors explained their unwillingness to recognize the new Russian authority by the Bolsheviks' refusal to honor prior debts. Debts incurred by Tsarist Russia and the provisional government to the United States totaled as much as $150million [2].
Nationalization. The U.S. was also concerned with the issue of nationalization of the property of foreign companies that had been engaged in economic activities in pre-revolution Russia. Many affected owners demanded compensation for losses as a result of the seizure of their property.
The Brest peace. The Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty concluded by the Soviet government with Germany, which ended Russian involvement in World War I, became a serious additional argument in favor of the policy of non-recognition.
The activity of the Comintern. The Communist International established after World War I was perceived by the rest of the world as the headquarters for preparation for the "World Revolution", and an instrument of Soviet foreign policy. Its activities and its support of the American Communist party were regarded by the U.S. government as nothing less than USSR interference in the internal affairs of the United States.
The legal status of U.S. citizens living in the USSR. The absence of religious freedom and legal guarantees for Americans living in the USSR also caused concerns on the U.S. side.
Franklin Roosevelt and Henry Morgenthau
The counter claims of the Soviet government against the U.S. were limited to the demand for compensation for the damage caused by the U.S. expeditionary forces in the Far East and the Kola Peninsula. This had taken place as a result of U.S. intervention during the years of the Civil War in Russia [3].
Despite the end of diplomatic isolation, the recognition of Soviet Russia by the major Eastern and Western countries, and the growing trade relations between the USSR and the U.S. during the 1920s, Wilson's successors in the White House (Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover) continued the policy of non-recognition of the USSR.
Prerequisites for recognition
A complex combination of domestic and foreign prerequisites led to late recognition of the USSR by the United States and the establishment of diplomatic relations between them in 1933.
Among the most significant factors that contributed to the recognition of the USSR by the U.S., the following should be mentioned:
Less intensive Communist propaganda. The conviction that the American Communist Party received regular instructions and assistance from Moscow, where the Comintern headquarters were located, began to subside in the early 1930s. Thereafter, the USSR was expected to give assurances that the activity of the American section of the Comintern would be limited from now on [4].
Indeed, the spread of fascism in Europe and Hitler's rise to power in Germany compelled the Soviet leadership to look anew at the prospects of the World Revolution and the activity of the Communist parties. The objective absence of the very idea of world revolution from the speeches made by USSR leaders in the 1930s created a favorable basis for establishing diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the USSR. Many Americans believed that the Soviet state had radically changed its propaganda methods, emphasizing coverage of the successes it had achieved in an attempt to prove its case before the rest of the world by example and by concrete achievements, instead of organizing "destructive" propaganda abroad [5].
Despite the end of diplomatic isolation, the recognition of Soviet Russia by the major Eastern and Western countries, and the growing trade relations between the USSR and the U.S. during the 1920s, Wilson's successors in the White House (Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover) continued the policy of non-recognition of the USSR.
Economic cooperation. Soviet-American economic cooperation became an important prerequisite for recognition. With the beginning of NEP in the USSR, interest emerged in trade and economic cooperation with the U.S. Without using American experience in equipment and technology in the 1920s, it would hardly have been possible to overcome the post-war devastation and organize industrial and agricultural production [6].
The U.S., despite the absence of diplomatic relations, was also willing to expand trade with the USSR. Economic interest in the Soviet market motivated many entrepreneurs to risk exploring the vast expanse of Russia. Trade turnover between the two countries grew twofold over the decade (1923-1932) and reached $621 million [7]. The U.S. business community, especially major American corporations, provided technological assistance to the USSR and, being interested in further development of trade relations, actively supported the normalizing of relations with the Soviets. Thus, in May 1933 more than 30 prominent American economists addressed a letter to President F.D. Roosevelt on the need for close cooperation with the USSR. At the same time the professors of a number of leading U.S. universities came forward with similar messages. They considered the policy of political disregard of the Soviet Union to be "false" under the circumstances [8].
In June 1933, the Head of the Soviet Delegation at the International Economic Conference in London, M.M. Litvinov, stated that his government was ready to place orders abroad to the amount of $1 billion. This statement did not fail to receive attention from the U.S. business community [9].
Waiver of the USSR's outstanding claims against the U.S. It is also important that the Soviet leadership, in its willingness to normalize bilateral relations, was sending the signal that it would be prepared to unilaterally waive its claims against the U.S. in connection with the U.S. intervention in Siberia in 1918.
The US Communist party congress
The international factor. While acknowledging the importance of the above factors, one should nevertheless note that it was the international factor that played a key role in the recognition of the USSR by the United States. The aggravation of international tensions, Hitler's rise to power, and the spreading Japanese aggression in the Far East genuinely troubled Roosevelt. The alignment of forces in the world was rapidly changing. There were no remotely serious counter-balances to the policies of the aggressive powers that threatened peace. The U.S. was particularly concerned with the actions of Japan. Its occupation of Manchuria in 1931, and further advance to far inland China, forced U.S. capital out of that area. Its isolated position in the Far East compelled the U.S. to look for allies. At that time, the Soviet Union was the only strong potential ally that could resist Japan's expansion in the Far East.
The U.S. business and political establishment seriously discussed an alliance between the USSR and the U.S. in the Far East, one which would save the U.S. from "any and all contingencies" from Japan [10]. In September 1933, the U.S. Secretary of State C. Hull emphasized the Japanese factor in particular [11].
Roosevelt – Litvinov negotiations
Based on all the above factors, F.D. Roosevelt decided to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR almost immediately after he came to power. At the same time, he clearly understood that recognition of the USSR would serve U.S. strategic interests in terms of limiting Japanese expansionism in Asia and strengthening American trade interests in the USSR. The latter was particularly important at the height of the Great Depression in the U.S. Finally, many people were puzzled by the very fact that the United States had remained the only Great Power that did not recognize the USSR for such a long time. Thus, the need to address the "Russian issue" as early as possible was dictated by the times themselves.
Roosevelt intended to act through his two personal intermediaries: Henry Morgenthau Jr., the future U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, and William Bullitt, a diplomat, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Roosevelt's Foreign Policy Advisor. It was they who established contacts with the unofficial Soviet representative in the U.S., B.E. Svirsky, by handing him the letter, dated 10 October, 1933, from President Roosevelt to the Chairman of the USSR Central Executive Committee, M.I. Kalinin. The message expressed the desire of the U.S. to start recognition talks, and proposed that an authorized emissary should be sent to Washington to discuss the issue personally with President Roosevelt.
One week later, on 17 October, 1933, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (VKP (b)) adopted the resolution "Regarding America", which endorsed a draft response letter by the Soviet Government to President Roosevelt, and appointed the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, M.M. Litvinov, as the USSR Representative at the negotiations [12].
American troops in Vladivostok
After arriving in the U.S., the Soviet envoy began the talks with Secretary of State C. Hull. On the 9th of November he also met personally with President Roosevelt. According to the participants' memoirs, the talks made little headway, but they were conducted in an unusually constructive and friendly atmosphere. The demands and conditions of the U.S. vis-à-vis the USSR were presented in a voluminous document (comprising 300 pages), the Department of State Memorandum. They initially discussed issues of American concern: Tsarist Russia's and the A.A. Kerensky Provisional Government's debts to the United States; restriction on religious freedoms in the USSR; legal rights of U.S. citizens living in the USSR; and the role of the USSR in the Communist movement and propaganda within the territory of the U.S.
The issue of refraining from agitation and propaganda against each other's state systems was solved quite quickly and positively. In doing so the parties were willing to narrow down the scope of their differences and find an acceptable compromise [13].
After several hours of conversation between M.M. Litvinov, Secretary of State C. Hull, and President Roosevelt, the sides came to a mutual understanding by the 15th of November, at which point they had overcome most of the impediments that had blocked negotiations.
Soviet-American economic cooperation became an important prerequisite for recognition. With the beginning of NEP in the USSR, interest emerged in trade and economic cooperation with the U.S.
Under the understandings reached between F.D. Roosevelt and M.M. Litvinov, the USSR (while still refusing to repay the debts of the Tsarist and Provisional Governments) pledged to participate in future negotiations on the repayment of outstanding debts to the U.S. Moreover, the two sides came to a mutually acceptable compromise that allowed them to circumvent an acute issue: the U.S. was to issue a loan to the USSR at a higher interest rate (4% yearly rate plus an additional 2-3%), which would at least partially cover the Russian debt [14].
The parties made a mutual obligation "to refrain from any interference whatsoever in the internal affairs" of each other, and agreed to secure the religious and legal rights of the U.S. citizens living in the USSR.
The USSR, in its turn, dropped its claims against the U.S. regarding compensation for damage incurred during the American intervention in the Far East.
On the 16th of November, 1933, the People's Commissar for the Foreign Affairs of the USSR, M.M. Litvinov, and the President of the U.S., F.D. Roosevelt, exchanged notes verbales on the establishment of diplomatic relations. At the same time, notes were also exchanged on non-interference in each other's internal affairs, the legal protection of citizens, freedom of religion for American citizens living within the territory of the USSR, and legal cases whereby the USSR waived all rights to assign or make claims against the American citizens, including the amounts assigned by the decisions of U.S. courts.
Roosevelt, 1933
The 16 years of non-recognition of the USSR had come to an end.
A.A. Troyanovsky and W. Bullitt were respectively appointed as first ambassadors of the two countries.
Cooperation
In reality, the spirit of cooperation between the two countries quickly began to melt away. Soon after his arrival in Moscow in 1933. W. Bullitt (who had a reserved attitude towards both Russia and Roosevelt) understood that the Soviet leaders had no intention of negotiating over the outstanding debts. It was becoming obvious that the USSR was not complying with its pledge to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the United States, and continued to support the American Communist Party through the Comintern. The two sides were never able to fully implement their arrangements.
This was very quickly aggravated by a more detailed American understanding of the very substance of the Soviet regime. The toughening of political repressions after the assassination of S.M. Kirov, and the actual repressive character of Soviet state policy, horrified many diplomats.
Nevertheless, a year and a half later, on 13 June, 1935, the USSR and the U.S. signed the first Agreement on Trade Relations, followed by the second Agreement on Trade Relations between the USSR and the U.S. on 4 August, 1937.
Only German aggression against the Soviet Union in 1941 allowed the two countries to once again find a basis for cooperation. After that, relations between the two allied nations began to expand.
In the hope of improving relations with the USSR, in 1936 Bullitt was replaced in Moscow by a close friend of Roosevelt, the businessman J. Davies, who managed to establish close contact with the Soviet leadership. Davies, who found himself in Moscow at the very height of the repressions, defended Stalin's policy everywhere, and did his utmost for closer Soviet-American relations [15]. However, despite his efforts, against the background of a deteriorating political situation in Europe and the Far East, and given the inability to create a collective security system in these regions (which contributed to the signing of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact in August 1939), the USSR and the U.S. strayed further away from each other.
Only German aggression against the Soviet Union in 1941 allowed the two countries to once again find a basis for cooperation. After that, relations between the two allied nations began to expand: during World War II, Soviet-American interaction ascended to its highest level. The joint struggle against a common enemy, and the determination of the contours of the post-war world, pushed aside all differences and the unsettled issues of the past.
Lend-Lease for USSR
The Cold War era that followed was a polarized world where former cooperation turned into nuclear deterrence and global standoff, regional conflicts and an arms race. The USSR and the U.S. acted as superpowers leading different countries and forming two global spheres of influence. They became two poles of attraction for different ideas, socio-economic models, political systems and paths of progress, and different perceptions of the world and man's place in it. However, even in this atmosphere of irreconcilable struggle, the two sides were still able to find opportunities to maintain a dialogue, search for compromises and achieve agreements.
After the collapse of the USSR and the loss of Soviet greatness, the legacy of the Soviet Union faded into the past, for all that it had taken decades to build. Its spheres of influence turned out to be eroded, its ideology useless, and its development model unattractive. Nevertheless, the nuclear deterrent, which had in many ways contributed to the establishment of the Cold War world order, continued to serve as the basis of bilateral relations between Russia and the U.S. even after the war's end.
The modern world, the world of the 21st century, is much more complex and diverse than the previous era. The yardsticks of the past can hardly apply here. The information revolution, international terrorism, and demographic shifts have created new realities, presenting new challenges that often require different answers.
What, then, will the main vector of development of Russian-American relations be in the near future? Will it be 1. Strategic interaction between allies; 2. Selective cooperation between partners in addressing specific problems; or 3. Open irreconcilable confrontation?
It is nearly impossible to give a simple and unequivocal answer to this question. However, in the absence of a common strategic interest, we should probably expect a combination of the second and the third options.
1. Diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Tsarist Russia were established back in 1809.
2. History of the U.S. Volume 3. 1918-1945. M. 1985. Page 290.
3. V.O. Pecharnov, A.S. Manykin. History of US foreign policy. – M., 2012. – Page 213.
4. Moscow-Washington: policy and diplomacy of the Kremlin, 1921-1941: Collection of documents in three volumes. Volume 2. 1929-1933. – m., 2009. – Page 487.
5. Op.cit. Page 425.
6. Op.cit. PP 625-632.
7. V.V. Sokolov. 50 years of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the U.S. // USA: economy, policy and ideology. 1983. #11. Page 20.
8. Moscow-Washington: policy and diplomacy of the Kremlin, 1921-1941: Collection of documents in three volumes. Volume 2. 1929-1933. – M., 2009. PP 637-638.
9. E.A. Ivanian. History of the USA: Manual for Universities. – M., 2004. – Page 399.
10. Moscow-Washington: policy and diplomacy of the Kremlin, 1921-1941: Collection of documents in three volumes. Volume 2. 1929-1933. – M., 2009. – Page 515.
11. E.A. Ivanian. Op.cit. Page 399.
12. Moscow-Washington: policy and diplomacy of the Kremlin, 1921-1941: Collection of documents in three volumes. Volume 2. 1929-1933. – M., 2009. – Page 13.
13. Op.cit. PP. 26;28.
14. Op.cit. Page 64. V.O. Pecharnov, A.S. Manykin. Op.Cit., Page 213.
15. Joseph Davies was the only Western diplomat to be awarded the Order of Lenin, in 1945.
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