Президент РСМД Игорь Иванов выступил на семинаре Initiative for the Development of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community, прошедшем в МГИМО (У) МИД России 3 июля.
I would like to start my brief presentation with several theses which I’m sure will resonate with you.
• In the XXI century the Euro-Atlantic relationship should include a large part of the Northern Hemisphere - stretching from Vancouver in the West to Vladivostok in the East.
• We are talking about a large group of nations united not only by geography, but also by a common history, culture, traditions, multiple economic ties and shared values.
• Proceeding from these assumptions we have to confess that such a Trans-Atlantic community (or as some would say a Euro-Atlantic neighborhood) of nations does not exist today.
• The paradox we currently face is that unlike in the past, we do not have any significant disputes that present security challenges and needs. Yet we still cannot claim that we are prepared to cope with the security problems of the XXI century, which range from international terrorism to cyber security; and from energy security to cross-border organized crime and drug trafficking.
• Our ongoing inability to address the security component of the Trans- Atlantic relationship has had a profound impact on our capacity to cooperate in other important areas such as finance, energy, innovation and even civil society interaction.
This state of affairs we have today and there is hardly any opposition to it.
The infamous disputes that occur between Russia and the West regarding European missile defense is probably the most graphic illustration of the dismal state of Trans-Atlantic security. The conflicts on this topic have become a very serious challenge to the US-Russian “reset” and might pose to be a stumbling block in the relations between Russia and NATO.
Last February in Munich the group of former policymakers, diplomats, generals and business leaders from Russia, North America and Europe presented a report looking at options to address the region’s faltering security system and to chart a roadmap of practical actions that would lead to a more secure future. Wolfgang Ischinger, Senator Nunn and I, we co-chair this unique process called the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative (EASI).
The conclusion that we draw in this Report is that the only means to assure long-term security lies in building an inclusive, undivided, functioning Euro-Atlantic Security Community – a community without barriers, where all would expect the resolution of disputes exclusively through diplomatic, legal or other nonviolent means. Governments within this community would share a common strategy and understanding in the face of common threats and a commitment to the proposition that the best and most efficient way to tackle threats, both internal and external, is through cooperation.
Recently I came out with a speech on the topic in the Senate of the Netherlands. The Senators agreed that we made a mistake after the end of the Cold war and missed chances to start formation of a new architecture of Euro-Atlantic security. They asked me concrete questions: what should be done, what we should begin with, who should take a leading role in this process.
These are the questions we should find answers for.
Frankly speaking I am not too optimistic about any “magic solution” that could solve our problems with one strike. There is no “institutional deficit” in the Euro-Atlantic Zone. I’m not sure that we really need new security agreements to cover all the security problems of the region. In fact there are many signed already.
Nor do we need compromises grounded in the same Cold war logic – involving the archaic notions of “deterrence potential”, “unacceptable damage”, “mutual assured destruction” and so on. I’m convinced that the concept of deterrence does not have to constitute the foundation of modern Trans-Atlantic relations. I’m also sure that all the attempts to “modernize”, “reform”, “update” deterrence are doomed to fail. We have to move on away from this legacy of the XX century, if we want the Trans-Atlantic zone to remain a vibrant and innovative region in the world.
That goal is ambitious and will be the work of a decade. But unless we begin to move in this direction now, the risk that the Euro-Atlantic community may retreat to its old patterns of suspicion, confrontation and distrust is too real. We should think in very bold, strategic terms, but our thinking should be converted into very practical incremental steps.
In my point of view this very approach is the best for today.
Time has come to think about very specific, incremental steps that can help us to deal with limited, but not unimportant areas of the Euro-Atlantic security. I would like to emphasize the significance of promoting security regimes in Europe. These regimes might cover various security dimensions – like cyber security, or drugs traffic, or migrations, or energy. They can also focus on sub regional problems (The Arctic, the Black sea zone, the Balkans). We will be able to take one issue after another, or to handle them in a parallel way.
The advantages of the regime approach, in my view, are evident. First of all, regimes are more flexible than institutions; we do not need to negotiate very complex and ambiguous decision making processes and feed multiple layers of bureaucracies. Second, regimes are more democratic – they can embrace any party, which is interested in joining the regime (maybe, in certain cases we can even accept non-state participants). Third, regimes can first be launched where the conditions are ripe and the cooperation is already on; we can reach out for low hanging fruits and later on build on our initial success.
Let me give you one example of how this approach can work. As all of us know, Russia and NATO are successfully cooperating on the issue of the Afghan transit. However, this cooperation so far does not reach out beyond specific, tactical matters. Could we expand it by launching serious Russia-NATO consultations on the future of Afghanistan after the NATO troops withdrawal in 2014? If we agree on common perceptions and common interests in Afghanistan, then it would be much easier to discuss the future of the Middle East. If we have a common denominator on the Middle East, we have high chances on reaching an agreement on Iran and so on.
This is something that can be applied to our current debates about the missile defense.
Despite the current diplomatic impasse, cooperative missile defense offers an avenue to the larger goal of transforming the very nature of security relations between the Russian Federation and the United States/NATO. In other words, it can be a game changer.
U.S.-NATO-Russia missile defense cooperation is not only insurance against a potential intrinsic threat but also a critical component in building a larger security community.
Of course, it would be great to have an integrated all-European or even a global system protecting all of us. But if it is not yet feasible, why not trying something more modest, but still meaningful? Without sacrificing their principles on the European missile defense Russia and the USA/NATO could start working on very concrete matters. This may be the collecting and sharing of information and data satellites and radars operating in real time to provide a common notification of missile attack; resumption of joint command-stuff exercises on ballistic missile defense; continuation of threat discussions and so on. Maybe these forms of cooperation look trivial and not imaginative, but this is exactly what creates trust, eradicates mutual suspicions and ultimately paves the way for more ambitions and for reaching agreements.
One of the essential preconditions for building trust in relations between Russia and NATO is a common vision of our preferred future relations. Can we agree on an ideal model of this relationship? What such a model might look like? We should recognize that a full Russia’s membership to NATO is not the goal that we could pursue in the foreseeable future. However, why do not we consider the Russian engagement to political institutions of the Atlantic Alliance? After all, this was the long term goal of the NATO-Russia Council when the Council was incepted.
Likewise, today it is essential to link Russia to political institutions of NATO wherever it is possible. The engagement at the political level will help to gradually move toward a common political culture, to eliminate misunderstandings mutual suspicions. It will also allow us to increase radically the scale of communications between Russia and NATO by engaging into this communications leading politicians, experts, journalists, educators and other opinion makers. I would venture to say that Russia should infiltrate key NATO institutions to learn more about the Alliance – its basic principles, values, procedures, and aspirations. From its side, NATO should provide more opportunities for the Russian participation. We must make sure that our communications are not limited to a small group of top level bureaucrats or generals – only very broad and diverse contacts can really change public attitudes and bring us to a new level of trust and mutual understanding. That was the case of the German – French reconciliation after the end of the Second World war, that was the case of the German – Polish reconciliation later and I see no reason why it should be any different in case of the Russia – NATO relations.
