... drastically changed (Azerbaijan
took control
of very little ground), the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic preserved its infrastructure, the negotiation process continued both
under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group
[3]
and as
three-party talks
(Russia – Armenia – Azerbaijan). At the same time, after the events of April, the de-escalation of the military confrontation
did not put an end
to incidents along the line of contact.
minval.az
Vladimir Evseev:
Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Minsk Process as
a Path to Settlement
...
... “foreign policy begins at home” maxim, refreshed by the brilliant political scientist and President of the American Council on Foreign Relations Richard Haas in his book with the same title (Basic Books, 2013), will continue to apply to Armenia in its relations with not only Azerbaijan and Turkey, but also its major ally — Russia, and indispensable security partner — the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh.
The prevailing mood in Armenian society on any new deals with Azerbaijan or initiating (rather than responding to) a new rapprochement with Turkey have become highly ...
... two sides of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Recent years saw a lot of talk about how this balance had been tilted as Azerbaijan used oil revenues to build up its military potential. At the same time, Armenia was particularly appalled by the fact that Russia, Armenia’s strategic ally, was also the
biggest
supplier of arms to Azerbaijan. Whereas prior to 2016 Moscow was blamed for those supplies mainly by the media, the expert community or by civil activists, after the April events even Armenia’s president Serzh Sargsyan, known for his cautiousness in public pronouncements,...
... parties and through a lack of compromise between the states. Compromises and a struggle to achieve them are the foundation of stabilizing the situation. One can conclude that Russia prefers such a resolution of the conflict which will have no losers. Russia will balance between Armenia and Azerbaijan, try to shift the settlement into a diplomatic format and maintain it within that format so that it does not look like the victory of one party and the crushing defeat of the other.
There is much talk in Armenia now that Moscow will put pressure ...
... volumes of production and export between the two countries cannot make Russia see Azerbaijan as a potential opponent at the European market.
The South Caucasus region cannot be regarded as a vital oil and gas market for the Russian Federation. Currently Russia provides only its strategic partner with energy – Armenia, while Georgia is partly dependent on Azeri exports, and Azerbaijan is self-sufficient. Even if Georgia decides to reject Azeri exports in favor of Russia, the region will not account for any vital part of the Russian export ratio.
Russia does not export its natural resources to Europe or Turkey (its two most ...
... significant political results. Azerbaijan’s attempts to denounce the 1994 tripartite ceasefire agreement that Baku took a shot at immediately after reaching a verbal agreement on a ceasefire (Moscow, April 5, 2016) by the chiefs of the General Staff of Armenia and Azerbaijan, with their Russian colleague acting as a mediator, are unlikely to be regarded as such political accomplishments.
In all probability, it is Moscow’s position that appears to play the crucial role in maintaining the negotiation process and the format that have ...
... inspiration in social media, could have been behind encouraging Aliyev for the military escalation, too. Leaving aside conspiracy theories, main source of these judgments was the fact that only Turkey, among all other nations, voiced unequivocal support to Azerbaijani military adventure, to quote Erdogan, “till the end”.
True, on the other hand, Russia is thought by many to be the staunch ally of Armenia, based on the depth and spectrum of bilateral relations, including within the frameworks of CSTO and EAU. However, the Kremlin has made no statement of support to Armenia unilaterally, and from the early hours of escalation voiced only “concerns” ...
... exchange reserves of the Central Bank of Azerbaijan, which in January 2015 amounted to $15.052 billion,
declined by $5 billion within a year
. The continued rapid fall of the manat is fraught with negative consequences for internal political stability in Azerbaijan.
Karo Sahakyan/PAN Photo
Sergey Minasyan:
Armenia and Russia: Pragmatics and
Stereotypes
No matter how banal and simplistic it may sound, the ongoing escalation of unrest on the front line appears to be a very handy tool for the Azerbaijani authorities to distract public attention from the domestic problems....
... with the centre of former military, economic and political power, which is now embodied by the Russian Federation as the legal successor to the USSR. Of the 15 former republics of the Soviet Union, four have no diplomatic relations with one another (Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russia and Georgia). Unregulated border disputes are the bane of practically all Central Asian states. Russia and Ukraine have not broken diplomatic relations formally, but relations between the two countries are at their lowest ebb since December 1991....
... prevail in Moscow. It is believed there that, despite the controversial external context and notwithstanding Yerevan's profound discontent with the situation in such a sensitive sphere as intensified military-technical cooperation between Russia and Azerbaijan, Russian-Armenian relations in any case will overcome their tactical divisions. Apparently, Moscow assumes that given the geographical, political, military, strategic and economic context, Yerevan actually has no choice but to accept the current parameters of ...
