... with a Muslim country, and of confirming Turkish regional ambitions in the Middle East and the Black Sea. If Turkey intervenes militarily, the only two possible options will be to leave Nagorno-Karabakh to the Azeris or else a military intervention by Russia to support Armenia in its actions in Nagorno-Karabakh, as the Westerners do not want to risk interfering.
Azerbaijan can count on the sporadic presence of Chechens, often mercenaries, who are used to taking part in this type of conflict, as has been the case in Abkhazia and Syria. Mercenaries from Syria also join the conflict for similar reasons to the ...
... BUK-M1 AD system battalions. Of the
latest deliveries
, the American Javelin anti-tank missile systems and French Mistral
ATLAS
short-range air defense systems are of particular interest. These are insufficient not only for the war against a limited Russian group but also for the confrontation with Armenia or Azerbaijan.
Nagorno-Karabakh: Armenia and Azerbaijan Ready for War?
The Azerbaijani-Karabakh conflict is rather unpredictable. The April war of 2016 proved that as well as constantly confirms the ongoing arms race between Armenia, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) ...
... ties with Brussels and to balance relations with Kremlin is stemming from Russia's decreasing reputation as an ostensible 'security guarantor' in Armenia, mostly due to: (1) Russia's arms export to Azerbaijan, which Armenia is in conflict with and (2) Russia's neutrality during the military escalation in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan in April 2016. Moreover, the impartiality of Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) on the protection of Armenia in case of potential military escalation in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Favourable gestures with preferential relations ...
... to the conflict view Russia as a desired intermediary (that was not the case in either Abkhazia or South Ossetia, at least during the early 2000s)
[6]
. Both Baku and Yerevan are interested in developing bilateral relations with Moscow outside the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement. Azerbaijan and Russia are brought together by their common border in Dagestan and by a series of threats, such as the spread of radical Islamism. Baku and Moscow also cooperate on a wide range of issues in the Caspian region. Armenia is a member of the Collective Security ...
... moment prove to be wrong. Thereby, the growing instability and unpredictability of Azerbaijan will continue to channel a sizeable portion of Armenia’s budget to... ... “A Little War that Didn’t Shake the World: a View from Yerevan,” Russian International Affairs Council, 08 April 2016,
/en/inner/?id_4=7516
3
.
http://newsarmenia... ....am/news/armenia/eabr-v-armenii-zafiksirovano-rezkoe-padenie-vospriyatiya-rossii-kak-druzhestvennoy-strany/
4
.
http://www.panorama.am/en/news/2016/06/27/Washington-Nagorno-Karabakh-Vienna-Saint-Petersburg/1603785
5
.
http://www.mediamax.am/en/news/foreignpolicy/20352/
...
raised
the issue of the Russian arms supplies at a meeting with Russia’s PM Dmitry Medvedev.
Russian experts tend to explain the continuing arms supplies to Azerbaijan by, first of all, the fact that they are consistent with the objectives of Russia, which is interested in a partnership with Azerbaijan. Secondly, they are necessary to maintain a
balance
of power in the region. Yet the fact that the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh has been deteriorating over recent years has naturally concerned all interested parties, including Moscow. The flare-up of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in recent years is largely a result of Baku’s increased confidence in their ...
... intend to force any country into the EEU and to turn it into a “Soviet pioneers” organization. If the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is not settled, Azerbaijan will not be able to become a full-fledged member of the EEU. This is why Moscow insists that the countries move to a compromise discussion via negotiations in bilateral or trilateral format.
Baku and Yerevan often attempt to view Russia’s policy only through the prism of “what is my advantage?” However, they forget that Moscow also wants ...
... that will bring the parties back to the negotiating table. In conceptual terms, the answer to this depends on a complex configuration of external and internal diplomatic and military-political factors that have not yet encouraged optimism.
1
. With Russia acting as a mediator, a ceasefire agreement was signed by the respective defense ministers of the three warring parties (Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic) and confirmed by subsequent agreements in 1994-1995. See more:
http://www.vn.kazimirov.ru/docs.htm
... worldwide.
minval.az
Vladimir Evseev:
Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Minsk Process as
a Path to Settlement
After interventions from Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, the Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu, Duma Speaker Sergei Naryshkin and then, in the afternoon of April 5, President Vladimir Putin himself, Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan agreed to cease fire and establish truce along the Line of Contact. As it would emerge on April 6, Chiefs of the General ...
... and paved the way for Turkey to reach beyond the Caspian Sea and increase its long-time backward relations with the countries in the region in various spheres, including energy, commerce, and transportation. Notwithstanding the fact that Turkey and Russia heretofore have sided with different parties between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, Ankara and Baku both could have found ways to overcome their territorial limitations (Turkey borders Azerbaijan only through its exclave, Nakhchivan), and at the same time to advance the relations with Moscow.
However, Turkey ...
