Greater Eurasia has yet to develop its own criteria for successful coexistence – one that doesn’t create threats that would necessitate questioning the cherished principle of the inviolability of state sovereignty
Greater Eurasia has yet to develop its ...
There are some things that signify entire historical processes and eras
There are some things that signify entire historical processes and eras.
The Berlin Wall is perhaps the most glaring example. What could better symbolize the pision of Europe and the world into two ideologically, militarily, and politically irreconcilable blocs? A massive, technologically advanced fortification, cutting through the soul of a leading city of the Old World. In January 1989, East German leader Erich Honecker ...
...
Finally,
unlike the Balkans—where Yugoslavia’s disintegration reopened old conflicts and created new ones—the Baltic states suffer from only modest internal contradictions and frictions. The situation is more comparable to that which was in Central Europe in the 1950s–1980s: a direct confrontation between two blocs, not separated by any buffer states or neutral zones.
Currently, all countries of the Baltic Sea region, except Russia, are members of the EU and NATO, but their internal situations ...
... accusations of parochialism and separatism that are often thrown at the Trans Urals development initiatives. But such suspicions are sometimes disingenuous. Some of the elites in our old capitals refuse to admit the obvious: Russia’s more-than-300-year European journey is over. It should have been completed more than a century ago; in this case we might have avoided the huge losses our country and people suffered in the 20th century. This journey has given us quite a lot in terms of technical development ...
... appreciated consequences of the comparative exhaustion of the liberal economic model that emerged in the last third of the 20th century is the reduction in the ability of Western countries to effectively and rationally dominate international affairs. Europe provides the most striking and dramatic example of this change, but the United States, which still retains colossal potential, also no longer feels as confident as it did a decade and a half or two ago.
At the same time, the relative independence ...
... and no major power is insulated. The question is not whether the turbulence will continue, but how well political systems can withstand the waves.
Here there is a crucial difference between the United States and its allies, on the one hand, and the European Union on the other.
The US, Canada, Britain, and Japan remain sovereign states. Their degree of sovereignty can be debated, but their governments retain legitimacy and can act quickly when circumstances demand it. Those decisions may be good ...
... Western countries, remains alarming, although the events taking place there now do not outwardly cause such heightened interest as, for example, the entry of Sweden and Finland into NATO, writes Professor Konstantin Khudoley, Head of the Department of European Studies at the Faculty of International Relations at St. Petersburg State University.
In recent years, when several development options arose in the international relations of the Baltic Sea region, a tendency towards the most confrontational ...
The spirit of Helsinki is gone, and so is the old idea of European security
This week marks the 50th anniversary of a landmark event in European diplomacy. In 1975, the leaders of 35 countries, including the United States, Canada, and almost all of Europe, gathered in the Finnish capital Helsinki to sign the ...
... British and German leaders say their pact covers everything from defense cooperation to environmental policy. In reality, it’s a political pantomime. Unlike the raw aggression of Israel or the economic ultimatums coming from Washington, this is Western Europe’s softer contribution to the week’s geopolitical theater – a performance full of noise but void of substance.
Consider the Israeli strikes on Syria, a continuation of Tel Aviv’s self-declared role as
“sheriff of the Middle East.”
...
... observers, this will not occur. History offers no examples of rapid transformations in the international order – even the fall of the Roman Empire spanned centuries, marked by internal decay and external pressures. Similarly, the decline of medieval Europe’s political system endured for over a century and a half, remaining incomplete even after the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648). Every recorded attempt to overturn the existing order through revolutionary means has ended in the rebels’ defeat ...