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Working Paper #66, 2022 Working Paper #66, 2022 The Russian-Ukrainian conflict will lead to long-term global socio-economic and political consequences in the foreseeable future. Russian and foreign experts are currently exploring a wide range of scenarios for such transformation—from relatively positive ...
For the West, the battle for Ukraine has become the battle for Russia. The battle for Russia is only the first phase of the battle against China For the West, Russia’s actions in Ukraine have revealed and confirmed the true face of Russia and its leadership. For much of the global East and South, the West’s policy from the mid-1990s right up to its gross overreaction to the situation in Ukraine was a reminder ...
... together matter more than the West. Dayan Jayatilleka: Putin’s Ukraine Pushback: Existential War & The Moment of Rupture China, of course. Russia already talks a lot with China. But Russia has still been so focused on getting things “right” with the West, that Russia has not optimally used the opportunities which China has to offer. Not only politically, but also commercially. Look at Russia’s exports to China and deduct revenues from oil and gas. The it becomes evident, how much room for improvement Russia has. Not U.S., not the EU are the World’s biggest ...
... it is only a second strike after Russia’s first strike when launching the intervention in Ukraine. That would be a specious argumentation. The sanctions signal the adoption of a strategy of economic eviction as well as a dramatic abandonment of the West’s old strategy of a truly globalized capitalist economy, in which Russia and China are stakeholders. It also signals the abandonment of any vestige of the Kissingerian notion of Russia being a partner in co-managing the world order. The West has adopted an offensive strategy—while Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, though tactically ...
... AUKUS; however, neither side commits to any actions in response. Instead, the bulk of the text is devoted to a largely defensive statement of principles and rebuttal of selected elements of the Western agenda. Notably, its first section is devoted to de-Westernizing the concept of “democracy”, claiming this status for both China and Russia, and seeking to deny the U.S. its usage as a moral high ground and dividing line in world politics. This critique is clearly triggered by the recent U.S.-sponsored “Summit for Democracy” and expanding on an earlier joint response by Russian ...
... like a whale and an elephant, to put them into one basket of "global autocracies" is a very questionable and misleading generalization, to say the least. Second, there is nothing in the joint statement that would give reasons to believe that China and Russia are eager to launch an ideological war against liberal Western democracies or to question the right of the West to stick to political systems that have evolved in Western countries over the last two or three centuries. The statement underscores only the obvious: No country, and no political party or movement ...
... of the Western normative model. No other community has yet been able to successfully exploit the values of freedom, human rights, the rule of law, and other principles of the Enlightenment, while maintaining democracy as the main political value. The West will remain a significant value guide. China, Russia and any other power may well offer intelligible projects for their internal audiences based on patriotism and their own culture. But they will be forced to wage a constant defensive war. On the field of values, they lack the means for a large-scale ...
... anti-China coalition. New Delhi has uneasy relations and deep-rooted differences with Beijing. However, India is also reluctant to take on binding commitments in the US-led drive to deter China. In turn, China has not established a coalition against the West, either. Russia and China are listed in US doctrines next to each other as adversaries. That said, they do not have a military-political alliance although their partnership is deep and the level of trust is unprecedentedly high. Another important feature is the preservation ...
... Netflix than any service from a particular the BRICS country is the massive size of the combined BRICS film market. In 2019, China was the world’s second largest theatrical film market , India — seventh largest, Russia — tenth; combined BRICS film market would be the world’s largest. Many of these consumers are now turning to digital ... ... services such as Netflix or Amazon Prime and the risk of losses caused by online piracy. However, if it fair to say that if a non-Western cultural power sets to achieve a global success, digital technology would be crucial for such an effort (like in case ...
... question directly, I think Russia can only return to the West if some Russian leadership sets itself a goal to undertake serious social and economic modernisation. At present we just do not have the social and economic demand for cooperation with the West. If all of your exports are crude oil and gas, then you do not care to whom you sell it. Russia would not be able to copy China’s model, because we just do not have that kind of demographic and cultural background. In this case, Russia’s only option would be the Western one, because culturally and psychologically we are simply closer to the West. It is said that nothing ...
| U.S. wants to establish partnership relations with Russia on condition that it meets the U.S. requirements |
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| U.S. wants to deter Russia’s military and political activity |
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| U.S. wants to dissolve Russia |
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| U.S. wants to establish alliance relations with Russia under the US conditions to rival China |
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