... makes sense to accede to Russian demands that missile defense and advanced conventional strike forces be part of any next step in bilateral U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear arms talks—provided Russia understands that no next steps are likely unless the INF treaty is preserved. If the goal, ten years from now, is to have resumed the effort to build a Europe at peace, with NATO and Russian military forces no longer facing off, and neither the threat or actual use of force an ever present danger, a country as crucial as Ukraine cannot remain a permanent source of tension. Progress in this case, however, requires rethinking ...
... nothing. After the Ukrainian crisis, no ‘business as usual’ is possible in any foreseeable future; Moscow and Berlin continue to sharply disagree on many critically important international matters. Germany is and will always be a disciplined member of NATO and that of the European Union; it will not take any initiatives that might look risky, inappropriate or untimely to other members of these organizations. To cut it short, there are absolutely no reasons to hope for any breakthrough in the German-Russian ...
... to act as an implementation body for the treaty, resolving questions of compliance and a dispute-resolution mechanism. As the INF Treaty is of unlimited duration, States Parties can convene the SVC at any time. On 15-16 November 2016, the 30
th
session ... ... through negotiations rather than threats of withdrawal from such an important treaty.
Russian concerns over the compatibility of NATO nuclear-sharing practice with the provisions of the NPT
Statement by the Euro-Atlantic Security Leadership Group: Support ...
... Russia, China, North Korea and Iran. The document repeatedly mentions this “revisionism”, so it is worth listing the nuclear-related accusations Washington is levelling against Russia.
The NPR accuses Russia of three main “sins”:
breaching the INF Treaty by testing and deploying a long-range ground-based cruise missile;
pursuing a “escalate-to-deescalate” strategy. This strategy implies delivering a limited tactical nuclear strike should the threat of losing a conventional conflict become ...
... however, emphasized the need to more directly link the settlement of Ukraine to a way forward on European security more broadly, whether through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) format or something else. Agreement that the NATO-Russia founding act remains in place and should continue to do so (although NATO members might argue that Russia’s actions in Ukraine violate it) is one possible starting point. So is having both officials and experts discuss how escalation dynamics ...
... however, emphasized the need to more directly link the settlement of Ukraine to a way forward on European security more broadly, whether through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) format or something else. Agreement that the NATO-Russia founding act remains in place and should continue to do so (although NATO members might argue that Russia’s actions in Ukraine violate it) is one possible starting point. So is having both officials and experts discuss how escalation dynamics ...
... the strategic arms control regime, namely – to extend the New START Agreement and to secure the continuous implementation INF Treaty. Second, to work together on dangerous regional problems – such as Afghanistan, North Korea or Libya and, hopefully,... ... of them we can take for granted.
2) Russian upcoming military exercise Zapad-2017 is causing concern in the Baltic States and NATO. Do you think Russia is interested in making the exercise transparent and defensive or is it rather going to be a demonstration ...
... approximately 2,600-2,900 kilometers. However, the R-500 is equipped with a non-nuclear (and consequently, significantly heavier) warhead and it is 1.5 meters shorter, which means a much smaller fuel supply and range. Yet it was another missile,
9M729
(NATO reporting name: SSC-8), that was the real troublemaker. The only thing known for certain about it is that it exists.
If the bill is passed the INF Treaty will have failed completely, and unlike in the 1980s, the U.S. plans to supply other countries with such systems.
militaryrussia.ru
RS-26 Rubezh (SS-X-31), Concept
A trade-off is possible: Russia abolishes its plans to deploy land-based mobile ...
... exceedingly high modernization potential. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the 1990s, Aegis was primarily intended to be used for intercepting ballistic missiles.
Strictly speaking, the first stage in Obama’s “phased approach” to NATO’s ballistic missile defence was using
Arleigh Burke
-class destroyers equipped with latest version of the CICS software and SM-3 Block IA missiles (RIM-161B in military classification) capable of intercepting short-range ballistic missiles,...
