Westerlies

Haughty by nature: on the EU’s outward rhetoric

March 14, 2013
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‘The arrogance of the EU knows no bounds’ - you could see this headline on the front page of a British tabloid any day. Normally, a criticism of the EU’s financial policies lies beneath these slogans, provoking  Eurosceptic sentiment in a dangerous and misleading manner. But there is a bit of truth in the headlines; the EU is arrogant, if nowhere else but in its foreign policy.

 

In the previous article, I accused the bloc of being patronising in its rhetoric toward its Eastern Partners, only to immediately acquit it, arguing that it is a primarily value-based conglomerate. Still, whether inevitable or not, this attitude stands in the way of the Eastern opening. Russia, for its part, will clearly not queue up to kiss Europe’s hands.

 

 

 

Not exactly happy-go-lucky

 

Certainly, there is motivation to join the queue. Every bit of the economies of the Eastern European countries involved in the EU’s Partnership programme (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine) is craving for Western investment and access to the EU’s market. (And of course, their populations would be happy to travel freely to the Union.) Only when it comes to the legal and political conditions set to these benefits do we experience a certain unwillingness to comply. Moral judgment aside, what if these countries wish to go on violating their citizens’ human rights and refusing to build a true democracy based on the rule of law, let alone harmonise their entire legal systems with the acquis of the EU?

 

Business goes on as usual in Brussels. Its 'more for more' principle applies conversely, too: if no improvement is made in these areas, the countries, well, no pasarán. A community based on shared values, the EU sees itself as a normative power, that is, a region that sets the universal norm. Europe and its federalists, evidently, have a solid historical ground and moral rationale to this vision.

 

Dreary clichés like ‘the cradle of modern civilisation’ serve them well, as do Christianity, memories of imperialism and suchlike. And when it comes to morality, democracy, the rule of law, and human rights are always a trump card. If in practice they are not to the east of the EU, the only thing it can do to earn true universal validity for its norms is precisely what it is trying to do: integration.

 

 

Wrong time to be cocky

 

The financial benefits might easily prove just not appealing enough for the autocrats of Belarus and Ukraine to turn democrats, or for the separatists of Moldova to give way to stability. Especially if the EU is not the only game in town.

 

First of all, we must realise that while the EU has no trouble blatantly projecting moral superiority towards the exterior, it has serious problems when it comes to enforcing its values inside. While it could easily keep Slovakia and its 1990s leader, Vladimir Mečiar - who showed a strong authoritarian tendency - at bay by delaying accession negotiations, it has in recent years been completely unable to stop Viktor Orban from knocking down neighbouring now-member state Hungary’s checks and balances. For the internal enforcement of Brussels’ policies, deeper, not further integration would be necessary - and it seems the Union can only focus on one of those at a time.

 

More importantly, although the author of this blog believes that the sovereign debt crisis will eventually leave the European Union more integrated, stronger, and growing, the crisis' current deterrent effect cannot be disputed. If the Eastern Partners are to choose between the EU and the Russian efforts to re-integrate the post-Soviet space, the latter might now seem more attractive. Not only has Russia recovered from the financial crisis faster than any EU member state, let alone the Union at large, it is also less self-righteous in its foreign policy. Although potential member-states of the Customs Union should probably not expect a great deal of influence over its policies, the Kremlin has not set any politico-legal conditions to accession; economic integration is what it says and what it means.

 

 

The symbolism of it all

 

Apart from the early planning stages, Russia has not taken part in the Eastern Partnership or the European Neighbourhood Policy. Amongst a number of practical reasons, they fear it endangers their own regional integration projects as well as their own rapprochement with the EU. But let’s not underestimate the role of national pride here. How could the world’s largest country by territory, a crucial global player in economic, military, and foreign policy terms, accept being put into the same basket as many of its former Soviet vassals?

 

Russia has, in fact, stated several times that it wishes to negotiate with the EU as equal partners, implying that it does not see the EaP or the ENP providing such an equal partnership. It was in this spirit that the two parties agreed to create their four Common Spaces ten years ago, an agreement that, however, much like the ENP Action Plans, was based on the acquis. It seems like, then, that the EU did not actually have to make any real concessions to partner up with Russia, but simply maintain the façade of special treatment.

 

 

Keep in low gear

 

The European Union has a fragile international image. ‘The turmoil in the EU has raised doubts in people’s minds about its continued ability to be a global leader’, suggests a BBC poll published last spring.

 

But it is picked up on its arrogance as well, and not just by the British Eurosceptic mass media and myself. Tommy Koh, former Singaporean ambassador to the UN criticised the bloc for ‘not understanding Asia’, arguing the last European leaders of global stature were Helmut Kohl and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing.

 

Naturally, the united Europe cannot and should not make concessions on the values that unite it. In the course of integration, it has to find a way to enforce adherence to them internally and to deal with defectors. Negotiating partnership deals and tightening relations with the rest of the world would be, nonetheless, a lot easier with a more modest rhetoric. Europe might consider itself the land of freedom and solidarity. But fancying itself capable of exporting its norms, while morally justified, can be an obstacle to smooth rapprochement with the outside world, especially Russia.

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  1. In your opinion, what are the US long-term goals for Russia?
    U.S. wants to establish partnership relations with Russia on condition that it meets the U.S. requirements  
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    U.S. wants to dissolve Russia  
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