Balancing America in the future of Egypt through strategic cooperation

I. Egypt deserves Russian attention because of its long-lasting political relevance

During the last three years the Egyptian state has lived through a revolution and a military coup, and has shifted from military dictatorship to Islamic democracy and then again to military dictatorship. At least 840 protesters were killed during 2011 revolution[1], and around 1340 were the casualties in the aftermath of 2013 military coup[2]. The country is highly unstable because of the extremely dangerous interaction between the activity of jihadist groups in Sinai and the political repression pursued by the present government, which could push towards militarization those Islamist movements that since the present moment have limited their activeness to the political and social arenas, like the Muslim Brothers themselves.

 

Nonetheless, Egypt will become neither a catalyst of instability, nor a failed state, basically because its scale and geopolitical significance do not allow such developments. On the one hand, it would be rather the case to ask ourselves in whose hands a weak Egypt could definitely fall, but on the other hand, it must be kept in mind that Egypt has a strong historic and political identity that prevents the elite from totally accommodating a condition of “puppet government”. In this light, Hosni Mubarak presidency was the exception, not the rule.

 

There are very good reasons not to disregard Egypt, even in the present difficult and confusing situation. Firstly, with a swelling population of more than 75 million, Egypt is the most populous Arabic-speaking country, located in a strategic position between Maghreb and the Middle East. Secondly, Egypt has historically been a precursor of regional political trends. It was the first Arab nation to achieve independence and the first Arab country to agree a peace settlement with Israel. Egypt has been the hub of both 20^th century’s Arab political ideologies. Not only Gamal Abdel Nasser, the father of Arab nationalism was Egyptian, but also Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sayyid Qutb, the father of modern political Islam and his heir Ayman al-Zawahiri were Egyptian.

II. Current Egypt-US ties have been weakened

The process of convergence between Egypt and America started during the Seventies under President Anwar Sadat and strengthened under Mubarak. 2011 revolution reshuffled the cards, depriving Washington of a key ally in the region. Now, in 2014 the militaries are back to power and the Muslim Brotherhood has been declared once again illegal, but the situation resembles the past only superficially.

 

The US could not grant unconditional support to the actions undertaken by the militaries because the massacre of more than one thousand protesters was broadcasted in the whole Arab world and manifestations of support in favour of President Mohammed Morsi were organized in Turkey, Tunisia and Palestine, with huge media coverage by the most pro-Brotherhood broadcaster, Al-Jazeera. It was true that General Al-Sisi was highly popular in Egypt, but the situation was completely different outside Egypt, where Al-Sisi was presented even as “a Jew implementing the protocols of the Helders of Sion”[3]. Obama administration simply could not be associated with a man that was perceived as a betrayer of the Muslims, after that a decade of war in the Middle East had already spoiled American image.

 

This is the main consideration supporting Obama’s lukewarm reaction to the military coup. The US did not completely cut economic aids, but American unenthusiastic response led General Al-Sisi to look for more reliable allies. He found them in Saudi Arabia, and the huge Saudi financing reappraised the importance of the American help, since the kingdom was ready to provide a package of 12 billion dollars, four times as much as the military and economic grants from the US and the EU combined ($1.5bn and $1.3bn respectively)[4]. The counterpart of Saudi support consisted in the intensification of Salafi influence during the political transition.

III. Potential for strategic cooperation and Russian image enhancement

Russia must seize the moment to rebuild solid ties with new Egypt. The first visit abroad of general al-Sisi has been to Russia, where an arm deal of 2 billion US dollar has been signed. This fact reveals that “Egyptian authorities are capable of pursuing a balanced international policy and staying away from solely relying on its relationship with Washington” [5]. Russia can achieve a lot in this period of reassessment in Egyptian-American relations, but it needs to elaborate a long term approach to the Egyptian issue, which must be primarily based on technological and military cooperation. Moscow must focus on providing upgrading for Egyptian military forces, including air defence missile systems, while enhancing assistance in the field of civil technology, especially within energy domain.

 

At present, Russia plays only a secondary role in the Egyptian economy. Moscow has a tiny 2.8% share of Egypt's external trade – far behind the EU (23%), but also China (8%) and the United States (7%)[6]. Still, Russia holds a strong position in wheat import and in the touristic sector: Moscow is Egypt's most important wheat supplier and also holds the largest share of tourists, with over two million annual travellers to the country. Having said that, it remains true that “Moscow lacks cooperation projects of strategic importance through which it could gain political influence”[7]. In this perspective, the most promising cooperation could take place in the joint development of civil nuclear plants, and in the military field. Projects for cooperation in these strategic sectors already existed under Mubarak. However, because of economic troubles, they have never been concretized.

 

Most importantly, if the Egyptian people should perceive that Russian presence in Egyptian strategic sectors does serve Egyptian interests, it would be a great victory of image for Moscow. A strong Russian role in the economic development of Egypt could work as “leading by example” policy, attracting Egyptian sympathy. A positive image of the Russian Federation among the Egyptians would be a priceless achievement that will have positive spill-overs beyond the borders of Egypt. Furthermore, Russian political culture will be a key factor for the successful accomplishment of this task. Differently from the West, Moscow will not interfere in Egypt’s domestic affairs; will not issue statements of condemnation about alleged violations of human rights, showing comprehension for the difficult situation of the country.

 

Finally, most likely General Al-Sisi will become the next Egyptian president and supporting him politically in this delicate phase, could be rewarding in perspective, and Russia could achieve a significant position in Egyptian politics. It is not out of touch to rebuild the influence Moscow once enjoyed on Egypt, if Russia is accurate in managing this bilateral relations, while other players are making strategic mistakes. A revolution and a coup in few years’ time in Al-Sisi’s mind have been the proof that the problems of Egypt are more economic than political, and that instability and terrorism will not find fertile ground when Egypt will be able to provide for the needs of its citizens. This is an illusion, a simplistic view, but it suggests that Al-Sisi will be a pragmatic head of state, with whom productive cooperation will be possible.