The prospects of relations between Turkey and the new Syria

Author: Efecan Ozdem, 1st year Master's student of HSE University - Saint-Petersburg School of Social Sciences

The civil war in Syria, which had been ongoing for more than a decade and appeared to be frozen in recent years, unexpectedly ended with a victory for the opposition groups in December 2024. Despite aid from Russia and Iran, the Assad regime faced a sudden collapse on 8 December. Opposition forces in Syria rapidly took control of major cities by encountering minimal resistance. In this new unified Syrian state, referred to as the “new Syria” and governed by opposition groups, the transformation process has been going on for a while. According to many analysts, as well as leaders like Donald Trump, Turkey played a significant role behind this sudden success of the Syrian opposition. While Turkey initially denied any direct involvement, subsequent developments revealed Ankara’s sense of victory. Since 2011, Turkey has supported regime change against Assad, and has now found a unique opportunity to address its own concerns about terrorism and geopolitical stability. 

Source: Unsplash

Although Turkey has recently been suffering from serious domestic political challenges, it has maintained a determined stance in its Syria policy, undertaking multiple cross-border operations to provide its border security despite international backlash. It still hosts 2.888 million Syrian refugees despite growing public discontent. In order to understand Turkey’s firm approach to Syria, we need to consider its national interests. Syria is of great importance to Turkey due to its long shared land border and the presence of groups that are defined by Turkey as terrorist organizations. Additionally, the social fabric of cities like Aleppo, Damascus, and Hama is closely tied to Turkey’s southern provinces. Turkey has historical connections with Syrian Turkmen, Arab, and Kurdish communities. Also, Turkey may seek to sign a maritime agreement with the new Syrian government similar to its 2019 deal with Libya, aiming to reshape the Eastern Mediterranean system which is excluding Turkey. Moreover, a more stable Syria could provide investment opportunities for the Turkish economy. In particular, the highly developed Turkish construction sector could play a major role in the reconstruction of the new Syria. However, Turkey’s top priority remains the dissolution of Kurdish groups, such as the YPG, which is recognized as a terrorist organization by Turkey. All these factors help explain Turkey’s Syria policy since 2011.

In order to achieve all these objectives, the process that began in December 2024 provided a unique opportunity for Turkey. It took place while Russia was preoccupied with its special operation in Ukraine, and Iran was dealing with domestic unrest and deteriorating relations with Israel. Meanwhile, the U.S. was focused on its presidential election, and the newly elected president Donald Trump took a favorable stance toward Turkey. Under such conditions, the timing and the sudden downfall of the Assad regime suggest a well-planned, long-term strategic plan. After Assad’s fall, Turkey’s role became even more visible.

Turkey reopened its embassy in Damascus, closed since 2012, and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan met with Ahmed al-Sharaa in Damascus to express Turkey’s support for the new Syrian government. Turkey clearly stated its interest in partnering in the state-building process, security, and humanitarian issues. In fact, several Syrian bureaucrats educated in Turkey and with ties to the country began taking up ministerial roles. Still, the internal dynamics of the new Syria remain highly complex. The current administration is a coalition of various opposition groups, including radical groups like Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)*. Although Ankara officially denies any ties to such radical groups, many experts believe Turkey facilitated the transition behind the scenes. During this period, President Trump confidently stated that Turkey had a role in Assad’s downfall, praising both Turkey and its leadership, though he concluded his remarks with “but Turkey did an unfriendly takeover,” by leaving Washington’s future policy toward Ankara unclear.

Nonetheless, it wouldn’t be exaggerated to say that Syria presents not only opportunities but also significant risks for Turkey. Countries such as Russia and Iran, which had been actively involved in Assad’s Syria, appear dissatisfied with the current situation. Despite years of aid, Russia has seen a significant reduction in its influence in Damascus. Still, it remains determined to protect its core interests, maintaining its military bases in Tartus and Hmeymim through new agreements with the transitional government. Turkey avoids taking actions that might damage its relationship with Russia and currently seems to approach Russia’s regional interests with a degree of tolerance. Although Turkey and Russia have competing interests in places like Nagorno-Karabakh, Libya, and Syria, the two countries typically manage to de-escalate problems and maintain a level of cooperation. In short, Turkey aims to reduce Russia’s presence in Syria without harming bilateral relations, while Russia continues to see itself as a major stakeholder.

Iran, on the other hand, has lost its only Arab ally since 1979. It is expected to take steps to regain its influence in Syria. Indeed, during a February 26 interview with Al Jazeera, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan was asked, “Will Iran accept losing Syria this easily? Some say it might even consider supporting the SDF.” Fidan responded, “If by supporting a group in another country, you are trying to cause anxiety in a third country – other countries can also disturb you by supporting groups in your own country” a remark which heightened tensions between the two nations. For now, however, both countries seem to be avoiding direct confrontation.

Those most disturbed by Turkey’s strengthened ties with the new Syrian government are Israeli politicians. Israel clearly perceives Turkey’s growing influence in Syria as a threat. In fact, Israeli jets have strategically bombed the new government’s military bases and infrastructure, aiming to send a message to both Syria and Turkey Israel has also effectively taken control of the buffer zone along the Syria-Israel border to establish a “security belt” near the Golan Heights.

The Arab world also remains cautious and distant toward the new Syrian government. This is largely due to Turkey’s previous support for the Muslim Brotherhood* during the Arab Spring. The UAE and Egypt, in particular, appear to be uneasy about the rising influence of Islamist groups in Syria.

Indeed, the challenges Turkey faces not limited to external actors. Domestically, Turkey has not yet achieved its goals against terrorist organizations in Syria. It seems that the new Syrian government is not ready to meet Turkey’s demands in this regard not yet ready. It is possible that Turkey is determined to solve the issue through peaceful means. The recent move to have imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan call for disarmament may signal a new process aimed at mending ties with Kurds. If this initiative is successful, it could neutralize the PYD and gradually erode its influence. However, the PYD leaders' public rejection of Ocalan's call significantly reduces the possibility of such a scenario occurring.

Since the Syrian civil war, Turkey has faced an intensive influx of refugees. As a result, the Turkish public continues to demand the repatriation of Syrian refugees. Under Assad’s regime, the lack of communication between governments and the risk of punishment or persecution upon return had prevented this. But when Assad regime ended, the threat of being targeted by the regime is gone as well, reopening the possibility of returns. Nevertheless, the number of returnees has fallen short of public expectations. The relatively small number of returnees is mainly due to Turkey’s adherence to a policy of voluntary return, so improvements in housing, infrastructure and employment in Syria are essential to attract more refugees to return.

Furthermore, the political structure of the new Syria is not established at all yet. The opposition groups are far from homogeneous, representing diverse ethnic, sectarian, and ideological backgrounds. Also, if we consider the distribution of power over Syria, the transition period will be tested with difficult challenges. Turkey believes that, beyond its closer ties with Syrian Turkmens and the Sunni majority, other minorities also should be represented equally. Turkey, which has experienced sectarian and ethnic conflicts during periods when the central authority is weakened, understands that stability in Syria is vital to its own security. In addition, an inclusive political approach by the new Syrian government could help neutralize organizations like the YPG, which have long troubled Turkey.

 

Conclusion

In the near future, a joint Turkish-Syrian effort against PKK/YPG elements, akin to the 1988 Adana Agreement, is likely to become Turkey’s top priority. Ankara will seek to strike a deal with the new Syrian government toward this end. However, the current focus must remain on institutionalizing the new government and rebuilding its infrastructure. Considering public opinion in Turkey, resolving the refugee issue is also critical and given the voluntary nature of returns, Syria’s development becomes essential. In this reconstruction process, there will be significant opportunities for the Turkish construction sector. Of course, investments will depend on the establishment of a secure environment. In this regard, Turkey also aims to play a key role in training the new Syrian army and supplying its defense needs.

*  recognized as terrorist group on the territory of the Russian Federation