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Review of James Sherr book “Hard Diplomacy and Soft Coercion. Russia’s influence abroad”

September 5, 2013
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The book, written by James Sherr, the associate fellow of the Russian and Eurasian Programme at Chatham House (Royal Institute of Foreign Affairs, London), an expert with extensive advisory experience on the Soviet and Russian military, security and foreign policy, was launched in June, 2013. Those who are interested in Russian foreign policy and international relations are the main target. The book provides in-depth insight into how Russia’s foreign policy perceived in the West. The Chatham House, the central platform of foreign policy expertise in UK, concluded with this book the project entitled “The Means and Ends of Russia’s Influence Abroad” carried out between 2009 and 2012 year.

 

This book is the first for many years comprehensive attempt to re-examine and analyze modern conventional Russia’s soft-power and means of its application. The context in which modern foreign relations exists has changed since the USSR collapse in 1991. Furthermore the relevance of the topic is determined by enhanced role of soft power in Russia’s official policy during the last decade along with the crises of Eurozone and American’s misadventures which underscored its claim to be a “value center”. Although the “colored revolutions” of 2003-2004 in Georgia and Ukraine were a catalytic moment for re-novation of Russia’s soft power development.

 

The relationship between hard and soft power was acknowledged by Joseph Nye – a person who introduced this term. James Sherr argues that in case of Russia this is an understatement as the tendency of Russian foreign policy actors is to combine hard and soft power approaches. In Nye’s definition the soft power predicated to archive a positive end. But the author considers that the Russian conception of power and even more the exercise of it, often fails to meet this test. In Russian policy modus operandi power can just be applied with the end to dominate or damage others or to “neutralize” opponents.

 

The study of James Sherr is an attempt to analyze recent developments in Russian foreign policy in comparison with previous periods of Russian/Soviet history. Although the author denies the widespread belief that Russia has no soft power he admits that there are reasons to doubt whether soft power plays the most prominent part in Russia’s influence abroad. The main mean of Russia’s present-day influence is based upon what James Sherr calls “soft-coercion”: influence that is indirectly coercive, resting on covert methods (penetration, bribery, and blackmail) and on new forms of power, such as energy of supply, which is difficult to define as hard or soft.

 

Study elucidated the connection between the Russian authorities, internal interests, their international conduct and their approach to influencing others. Author assumes that modern political elite of Russia uses Lenin pedigree that the separation of internal from foreign affairs is “erroneous”. According to the expert one of the distinctive features of Russian policy is that its methods have emerged from Russian historical experience. Today as in the past, the combination of means that Russia relies upon – “humanitarian” and destructive methods– causes disorientation as much as discord.

 

 

The study shows that Russia’s internal order remains a problem in international affairs (less menacing than it was presented by USSR). Today’s differences of international environment are not doctrinal but value-based (in the vocabulary of West) and civilizational (in vocabulary of Russia). Outside the Eurasian space defined as “privileged”, Russia is not intended to export its form of “sovereign democracy”. Mr. Sherr is convinced that now as in times of Nikolas I and Brezhnev, Russia sticks to outmoded practices. If these practices can’t produce the positive end – a new European security treaty, a revised Energy Charter, “equality” inside NATO, Ukranian membership of the Eurasian Customs Union and new Eurasian Union - then the achievement of negative ends is sufficient - voting further “humanitarian interventions”, foiling NATO and EU enlargement in the post-Soviet region, obstructing shale gas exploration, blocking a Transnistia settlement and keeping Ukraine out of the EU’ embrace. It exceeds the scope of themes addressed in this book. (Apparently the West uses this approach to explain the dispute over situation in the Middle East, particularly the discord over Syria in the Security Council).

 

Mr. Sherr also admits that to respond to Russia’s less attractive methods of influence will be futile in the adsence of a coherent and balanced policy towards Russia. He confirms that the West will also need to abandon the conceit that Russia faces a choice between pro-and anti-Western alternatives. Russia’s political figures are at best-pro-Russian and at worst only interested in their own arrangement. Less authoritarian Russia will not necessarily be more liberal towards Russia’s neighbors; a less corrupt Russia will not necessarily be more democratic.

 

Author urges to pay more attention to the country that to the Russian regime. The West needs to remind itself that the purpose of its policy is not to punish Russia, but to uphold interests and standards upon which Russia might look more positively tomorrow than it does today. For these reasons the West should not only reconsider its visa policy but to change it.

 

Author suggests three directions of Western activities:

 

1. Regenerating expertise about Russia;

 

2. Develop active public diplomacy;

 

3. Institutional reinforcement (mechanism of consultations, coordination and support need enhancement).

 

According to the writer (and it’s very difficult not agree with him) such policies will not jeopardize the West’s current scheme of internal and global priorities, and they can be put in place by governments which have the will to do so. If some lack the will, that should not deter other form acting, individually or in concert.

 

Sometimes the author is not concrete in his statements and the analysis of modern Russia’s means of soft coercion is deficient in the prominent examples.

 

Furthermore the study doesn’t highlight the means and methods of soft power used by the West. Anyway in general it is very comprehensive study worth getting familiarized with.  

 

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