Who Makes What in Japan –An Insight of Japanese Policymaking System

        On July 2013, the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP) won general election of the upper house by landslide and achieved its full control over both the upper congress (参議院: House of Councilors) and lower congress (衆議院: House of Representatives) of Japan. After coming through a period of unpopularity, fragmentation, and total political destruction, the LDP finally restored its historic influence over Japanese foreign and economic policymaking. Many foreign experts and business persons welcomed the full return of the LDP, which is expected to contribute for greater stability of the world’s third largest economy and increased interaction with foreign partners.

        There have been a great deal of discussions on how and to what extent the new Abenomics policies and security measures affect Japanese position in the world as well as her attitudes towards international cooperation. Yet, much less attention has been paid to how these policies are actually formulated. A brief exploration of Japanese policymaking is essential in acquiring a deeper understanding of these new policies. Particularly after the World War II, there have been a great number of scholastic efforts dedicated to unpack the mysterious process of decision making in every single country. Of course, each country has its unique system of policymaking, and any attempt to claim timeless universality should be seen with alert. Nonetheless, some monumental works such as Allison and Zelikow’s “Essence of Decision” can be utilized as a valuable guide of comparison and a starting point of discussion. Building on the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, Allison and Zelikow theorized three models of policymaking: Rational Actor Model, Organizational Process Model, and Government Politics Model. [1] Whilst each of these models emphasize different factors in decision making process (optimization of rational action, organization constraint, and political bargaining, respectively), all models are based on different level of analysis. Therefore, all of these three dimensions should be cautiously analyzed to capture a full picture of any complex policymaking process.[2]

Photo: SankeiBiz Online

       If we base our analysis on the Rational Actor Model, Japanese government as a unitary entity makes decisions out of a rigorous calculation of costs and benefits entailed by any proposed policy. From a stereotypical view to see the Japanese as disciplined (sometimes even over-disciplined), risk-averting formula-lovers, this stance seems to fit the reality at glance. Yet, through my personal experiences and interaction with Japanese policymakers, I have come to understand that rationality is not always the first thing comes up to their mind. Generally, rational approaches and recommendations are proposed by academic experts whose expertise allows them to see a fairly good picture of what is beneficial and what is harmful (needless to mention, even the most celebrated professor cannot have perfect information thus there is always a room for error). But unlike U.S. and many other European countries, academic figures in Japan have a unique way of being connected to the policymaking process. For example, in the U.S., many prominent professors and academic figures relocate themselves to the White House as advisors when a new administration comes to power. Some even say that at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, one of the most renowned American public policy schools, the period of presidential transition is the time when the faces of teaching staff changes most dramatically. In contrast, experts and academic figures in Japan have relatively less relevance in the decision making process. When a new policy is to be discussed, relevant ministries or other governmental bodies usually host 有識者会議 (yuushikisha kaigi: expert conference) as an ad-hoc roundtable meeting to listen to academic and professional opinions. The invited experts are usually presented with pre-made draft ideas of new policy by ministerial officials or party members and then they are expected to make professional remarks. The conference can have several meetings, but it is rare that these experts hold residential advisory position to any ministry or political figure, although personal connections do exist. Furthermore, prominent Japanese think-tanks also enjoy close tie with ministries and these research institutions are usually responsible for gathering information prior to the drafting of new policies. In American and European bureaucratic bodies, there are many researchers regularly hired as resident experts and they contribute for information gathering, policy research, and paper publication on a daily basis. In Japanese governmental bodies, there are a few research positions and a great number of the governmental reports are outsourced to the think-tanks. These think-tanks are particularly instrumental in making international policy comparisons, since a majority of ministries draft new policies based on best practices abroad. From privatization to economic stimulation, Japanese government rarely makes the first move to formulate innovative policies, but they rather tend to choose a “safe way.”  As a recent trend, screening of Japanese ministerial report published reveals a clear trend where they are particularly interested in tracking and implementing similar policies practiced by China. Therefore, I would evaluate that the proponents of the most rigid rational perspectives such as professors, researchers, and experts have relatively limited influence on policymaking process in Japan, at least compared to Western countries where extensive involvement of these academic figures are the norm. Rather, think-tanks are relatively more influential in Japan since they have ability to frame the issues set agendas. Of course, think-tanks as information provider cannot interfere in the decision making process, but they still have agenda-setting power to some extent.

        The second model of Organizational Process predicts that decisions are a product of bureaucratic procedures thus any drastic change in policy stance cannot the norm; in other words, organizations make decisions that are similar to the previous decisions, and this is how policy continuity is ensured. Particularly in Japanese policymaking system, it is well-known that ministerial bureaucrats have traditionally enjoyed strong grip on policy determination, and legislators tend to be the ones who approve drafted policies rather than formulating them from scratch. Compared to other parliamentary political systems such as U.K., Japanese policymaking can be characterized as bottom-up approach of ministerial bureaucracy rather than top-down approach of political leadership.[3] Since the year of 1955 when the LDP established its historic dominance over Japanese politics that lasted for more than four decades, a consultative model of policymaking has developed. A celebrated Japanese specialist professor Gerald Curtis vividly portrays that Japanese policymaking system is based on a complex network of informal consultations which involves the “iron triangle” of legislators (ultimate decision makers), ministerial officials (policy formulators), and interest groups (policy advocators). [4] The system has become more institutionalized in the late 1960s and thereafter when many legislators have accumulated knowledge and perspective on certain expertise such as agriculture, welfare, and foreign affairs. These legislators with specific expertise and influence on certain ministry became to be called 族議員 (zokugiin: legislator of specific ministerial expertise) and exercised monopolized influence on the matters of their own specializations. Hence, it was easier for interest groups to launch targeted advocacy since there existed an integrated informal network of legislators and ministerial officials who formulate and determine the policy outline. When the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) came to power by the monumental landslide winning on the general election in 2008, the first thing the party attempted was to break down the iron triangle and take back the policymaking process under full control of political leadership. The outcome was disastrous failure and total disintegration of the political party after four years of ruling; the DPJ was unable or unwilling to understand the systemic functioning of Japanese policymaking and defined bureaucrats as prime enemy who hinders national progress. Today, having the LDP reinstalled after the four years of political dramas (and exploding nuclear reactor that was by and large defined as human disaster of the DPJ administration rather than natural disaster), any attempt to explore the process of Japanese policymaking should not underestimate the significance of the informal consultation network that the LDP has established through its nearly half century of ruling.

        A third perspective of policymaking is the Government Politics Model whose priority rests upon the process of political bargaining. As I have noted earlier, many foreign experts evaluated the return of the LDP as a great beginning of new Japanese stability and prosperity. Yet, such proposition carelessly overlooks the dynamics of 派閥 (habatsu: internal faction) inside the LDP. Unlike American Republican Party or Democratic Party, what keeps the LDP together is not collectively shared political philosophy or common vision of policy stances. For example, when Japanese government was negotiating for the participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade regime, the strongest opposition came from within (mainly from those legislators of the special connection to the Ministry of Agriculture and even from the Minister of Agriculture himself). Professor Curtis described this phenomenon as very unique one to Japanese politics, since in Western countries, it is unimaginable that a secretary or minister of the current administration publicly oppose to the position taken by his or her president or prime minister (otherwise he or she will be discharged immediately from the position).[5] In Japan, politics does not work in this way. Particularly in the LDP, many groups of internal fraction serve as a mechanism of distributing power, finance, and positional appointment. A historically rare exception was former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi whose personal preference to stay as “lone wolf” gave him unprecedented autonomy in political decision making when he came to power in spring 2001. Yet, he successfully established a long-term administration just because he was well-aware of the internal fraction dynamics and he knew how to balance and counterbalance, or divide and control, of these groups. Therefore, however it seems to be odd, any foreign negotiator who makes agreement with Japanese prime minister should not expect that the agreement is a final consensus among the LDP or Japanese government. When Japanese prime minister returns home after signing agreement, he or she spends a great deal on convincing the heads of other faction groups so that he or she can be powerful enough to implement the agreement. This is precisely why the LDP manufactured so many prime ministers in the 2000s and many agreements with foreign partners unimplemented. No matter how strange it may sound, this is the reality of Japanese policymaking process and one should expect that prime minister of Japan is not always the one who holds the strongest grip. Hence, the success of newly implemented Abenomics policies also depends not only on Prime Minister Abe’s leadership but also on the supports given to him by the leaders of other faction groups within the LDP.

Photo: http://www.nippon.com/ja/currents/d00084/

        After scrutinizing the three models of policymaking and their implications on Japanese politics, one conclusion can be drawn that Japanese prime minister is no way similar to President Obama or President Putin; if one attempts to influence Japanese policymaking outcome, he or she need to simultaneously take into account the stances presented by the LDP faction groups, ministerial officials, and interest groups such as business federation. Unlike other countries led by strong presidential and prime ministerial leadership, Japanese policymaking is a process of multiple focal points and any analyst of Japanese policymaking should know who makes what in Japan; otherwise, his or her diagnosis can be totally wrong or even harmful.