Public policy, rational hope and economic ideology: A plea for hopeful realism

It would be irresponsible if those who make public policy did not pay serious attention to expert knowledge.  If experts advise that a proposed policy will fail, it would be irresponsible for policy makers to ignore their advice.  Advocating the impossible would appear to be absurd. Does this mean policy makers must resign themselves to accepting whatever advice experts give them? Must it be irrational for policy makers to maintain hope that a proposed policy will work, although experts tell them it will not? Not necessarily. I will argue that maintaining hope against expert advice is not always irrational.  

In politics and policy advocacy, aims are sometimes rightly set despite what experts believe to be possible. While it may be risky and irresponsible to ignore the advice of experts, there is an opposite danger–the danger of too much faith in experts.  Faith in experts allows experts to shoot down potentially fruitful proposals. Experts may be wrong. The question of what is possible always remains open in politics and policy making.  Many social problems once thought to be hopelessly insoluble, have been solved in whole or in part.  Remarkable progress has been made in overcoming many such “insoluble” problems, “facts of life,” in whole or in part.  Although respect for expert knowledge makes eminent sense, it can also be a serious mistake to abandon hope in the light of what experts advise.   

 

Politicians, civil servants, and others who propose public policies would be irresponsible if they did not pay serious attention to expert knowledge.  Experts obviously know more than most people what is and what is not possible in their fields of expertise.  If experienced, highly-qualified economists advise that a proposed policy will fail, it would be irresponsible for policy makers to ignore their advice.  It makes no sense to advocate the impossible (Eidlin, 1993). 

 

Should policy makers therefore resign themselves to accepting whatever advice experts give them about what is possible or impossible? Is it necessarily irrational for policy makers to maintain hope that a proposed policy will work, even if economists tell them it will not?  No, I will argue maintaining hope against expert advice is not always irrational.  In politics and policy advocacy, aims are sometimes rightly set regardless of what the experts believe to be possible. 

 

This may lead to failure, even disaster, but not necessarily.  Yes, Stalin’s program for collectivization and industrialization is a textbook example of the dangers of voluntarism, that is, of prioritizing will over reason.  Yet rejection of Stalinist voluntarism does not mean abandoning hope that “impossible” policy aims may turn out to be possible after all.  To be sure, it is usually risky and irresponsible to ignore the advice of experts.  This should be clear to everyone.  Yet there is also an opposite danger–the danger of too much faith in experts.  Faith in experts allows experts to shoot down potentially fruitful proposals since non-experts are too often reluctant to challenge them. The experts may be wrong.

 

In politics and policy advocacy, aims are sometimes set with little regard for what is "known" to be possible.  Although this can lead to failure or worse, it is not always bad, certainly not always futile.  When Winston Churchill said "as conquer we must, as conquer we shall," when John Kennedy said "We shall go to the Moon," when Martin Luther King said "We shall overcome," they did not know how these aims would actually be achieved, or even if they were possible at all.  The ability of political and religious leaders to inspire people to overcome "insoluble" problems and not to abandon hope in the face of apparent futility can sometimes make the "impossible" come true.  History is full of examples in which such leaders have shown the "experts" to be wrong.  Part of the measure of great leaders is their ability to achieve the "impossible."  Napoleon, Bismarck, Lenin and Hitler are just a few examples of leaders who challenged the facts and changed reality.

 

 The question of what is possible always remains open in politics and policy making.  Policies dogmatically declared to be impossible have often become commonplace (Popper, 1968: 360, 1966: 161). Many social problems have been thought to be hopelessly insoluble, yet have been solved in whole or in part.  The ideal of universal medical care was once utopian.  Poverty was regarded as an irremediable fact of life, even by Jesus, who said that “the poor you will always have with you.” Yet remarkable progress has been made in overcoming many such “insoluble” problems, “facts of life,” in whole or in part. 

 

Many Russians firmly believe that regardless of what their Government does in attempting to change things for the better, получается как всегда (it ends up as usual).  Skeptics can easily present convincing arguments showing that it is Russia’s eternal destiny to be unreformable. Does this mean that the only rational position must be to abandon hope, or might there be rational grounds for hope?  I don’t think so.  Maybe someday even corruption will be overcome–maybe with the assistance of social scientists. 

 

Improvements in social scientific knowledge may make it possible to defy current economic orthodoxy.  Economic science cannot exclude the hope of breakthroughs that will solve problems believed insoluble in light of current economic theory.  Economic science cannot exclude hope that religious and political leaders might come forward and crystallize movements that might even defy laws of economics by bringing about widespread changes in behavior. Better understanding of impediments to reform in Russia might even lead to discovery of ways to overcome them. Discovery may overturn what are believed to be eternal laws of economics, just as Einstein’s theory replaced Newton’s.  

 

Economists might devote more effort to seeking solutions to currently intractable problems.  Adam Smith overturned counter-intuitive beliefs by showing public interest to be best served by allowing individuals to pursue their own selfish interests. This theoretical breakthrough opened the door to policies allowing private business to develop unhindered with their sole motive being profit. The Keynesian Revolution represented a reworking of economic theory that supported policies radically different from policy recommendations that would follow from orthodox economic theory.  Keynes and his supporters with provided the theoretical basis for policies making use of government intervention to alleviate severe unemployment, rather than allowing the market to take its course (Booth, 1984).  Not many contemporary economists expend much effort to making breakthroughs in economic thinking, yet it might be beneficial if more of them did.  

 

The regularities of social life, unlike the regularities of nature, may actually change, and sometimes human agency can play a role in bringing about such change.  To be sure, the laws of the social sciences are not normative laws which can be disobeyed or changed at will.  They are what Karl Popper calls "natural laws of social life” (1966: 56).  Like the laws of nature, the laws governing inflation and unemployment are no more affected by anyone's decision to obey or disobey them than would be the law of gravity.  Thus voluntaristic attempts to ignore such natural laws of social life risk disappointment, even disaster. 

 

Yet many of the facts and laws of social life differ in a fundamental way from the facts and laws of the natural sciences. Some facts and laws of social science can change in a way that the facts and laws of nature cannot change. The way the physical world is is not a function of the way we perceive it to be, while the social world is is heavily influenced by the way we perceive it to be (Jarvie, 1983: 223). Only God can change the laws of nature, but the regularities discovered by economists are partly a function of prevailing social, political and economic institutions. These may change as these institutions change–sometimes fundamentally.  The institutions of feudal society gave rise to economic regularities that were vastly different from the economic regularities of advanced industrial society.   The regularities underlying inflation and unemployment, for example, are usually little more affected by anyone's decision to obey or disobey them than would be the law of gravity. 

 

Philosopher Alan Gewirth points out that knowledge and understanding of the psychological and sociological laws underlying economic regularities may actually make it possible to bring about changes in these regularities.  It may be impossible to “disobey” the laws underlying business or trade cycles.  Yet it is possible to understand how they operate and use such knowledge to bring about changes in the operation of the laws (Gewirth, 1973).  Much regulatory and taxation policy strives to do just this. It makes use of institutions to modify economic regularities and change the way they operate. 

 

Social science cannot exclude the hope of breakthroughs which might make possible changes that appear impossible in the light of current theory. 

 

                                                         REFERENCES        

 

          Booth, Alan. 1984. Defining a Keynesian Revolution.  The Economic History Review, Vol. 37, No. 2. May: 263-267.

          Eidlin, Fred. 1993.  Этические Проблемы Несовершенного Знания в Политологии. Вестник московского университета, Сер. 12, vol. 12, No. 2: 74-89

          Gewirth, Alan.  1973.  Can Men Change the Laws of Social Science?  in John O'Neill, ed., Modes of Individualism & Collectivism (London: Heinemann): 125-139.

          Jarvie, I.  C. 1983.  Social Perception and Social Change, J.  Theory Soc. Behavior 11 (3): 223-240.

          Popper, Karl R. 1966.  The Open Society and its Enemies I: The Spell of Plato, Fifth Edition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).

_____, 1968.  Utopia and Violence, in Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (New York: Harper Torchbooks): 355-363.