Disagreement about success and failure, and about learning and not learning from mistakes, far from being peculiar to debates about socialism, is endemic to all kinds of political debates. Debates about socialism have, however, been much complicated by the problem that it has never been clear whether socialism is to be regarded as a purely utopian ideal or, quite on the contrary, as an unavoidable necessity, or at least a feasible political program.   

 

 

Throughout most of history, until early in the 19th century, socialism has been regarded as a utopian ideal, even by those sympathetic to it.  A mere utopian dream does not serve well as a practical political program, since few people want to waste time trying to change the unchangeable.   

 

 

There have been periods when socialism has appeared, at least to some, not utopian at all but, on the contrary, inevitable.  The French Revolution and the revolutionary manifestations of the 1840s, the promises of Marxian theory, apparently backed by scientific authority, the victory of Bolshevism in Russia, and the defeat of fascism in World War II appeared to many as harbingers of new eras in which the true social nature of man would come to fruition, in which new societies would be born.  For those so convinced of the possibility, even inevitability, of such beautiful dreams, it is easy to see any opposition at all as an incarnation of evil.  How, after all could any person of good will be opposed to such a desirable thing as socialism?  One would have to be either selfish or among the minorities personally threatened by the advent of socialism, short sighted or unenlightened.  This helps explain why cool, rational deliberation about socialism can be so difficult.  It seems that whenever serious efforts have been made to implement socialist ideals, the results have been discouraging, to say the least, suggesting that socialism is no more than a utopian dream after all.  They lead one to wonder whether appearances of its realizability, let alone inevitability, may not have been mere illusions after all.   

 

 

What, for example, is a socialist supposed to think when the revolutionary élan that was supposed to lead to the Socialist Revolution fizzles out, and when the anticipated inevitable victory of socialism leads to reaction or mere politics as usual?  Even worse, what is a socialist supposed to think when carriers of the ideal of socialism come to power and set up bureaucratic Leviathans, establish tyrannies, adopt policies that lead to economic decline and other social dysfunctions, and in consequence suffer widespread popular hostility against what is supposed to be an ideology of the people?   

 

 

To be sure, the history of modern socialism is full of examples of socialist thinkers and movements refusing to compromise the democratic, humanitarian, and libertarian ideals they took to belong to the very definition of socialism, and modifying their socialisms accordingly. However, when socialist solutions begin to look like politics as usual, advocates and adversaries of socialism alike often conclude that socialism has been abandoned.  After all, isn't socialism supposed to be very different from politics as usual?   Isn't socialism supposed to create a new kind of society and form a completely new kind of human being?  This helps explain why so many participants in socialist movements throughout its history have equated the evolution of socialist doctrine into practical and successful policies with failure, if not betrayal of socialist ideals.  Similarly, anti-socialists have liked to gloat that such evolution toward politics as usual only proves what they had been saying all along about the unworkability of socialism.   

 

 

I will argue that disillusionment about socialism results largely from confusion of socialism as an ideal with socialism as a metaphysic.  By an "ideal" I mean a hope or abroad vision of the good society.  It might include such characteristics as greater emphasis on communitarian values, a more egalitarian understanding of the ideals of brotherhood of mankind, the rights to liberty, equality, and pursuit of happiness and the benefits of modern industrial society.  By a "metaphysic," I mean some particular set of assumptions about what socialism must look like, which are treated as unassailable first principles rather than being viewed as hypotheses.  None of the mistakes attributed to socialism destroy socialism as a vague ideal, hope or broad vision.  The "socialism" that has in fact been discredited by experience is various concrete interpretations and applications of socialist ideals.   

 

 

It may be that the vague ideal, hope, or vision of socialism will always remain utopian, and will thus never be fully realized.  However, there is nothing necessarily wrong with utopian ideals, even if embodying apparently conflicting aims and values.  Many things have been realized in human societies that had previously been dogmatically declared to be impossible.  If people always accepted as unchangeable only that which is currently believed to be possible, there could be no progress in human affairs.  Just as unforeseen, hitherto unimaginable inventions can represent "miraculous" breakthroughs in technology, so can ways be found of realizing social and political ideals hitherto thought to be utopian.  For example, the ideal of socialism includes both liberty and equality.  Students of political philosophy learn in their introductory courses that is is a necessary trade-off between these two values.  Yet Western civilization has already made considerable progress in reconciling these two ideals and extending their enjoyment to broader segments of the population.  Moreover, who knows?  Perhaps we can do better.  Utopian ideals can play an important role in raising the level of civilization.   

 

 

One committed to socialist ideals can look failure directly in the eye, admitting that any assumption of any theory or policy called socialist may not, in fact, promote socialist ideals. One committed to socialist ideals can also remain true to these ideals while tempering them to respect the rights and opinions of others in society who espouse different ideals.  One committed to socialist ideals may even discover in the light of experience and critical discussion that even socialist ideals themselves may need modification.   

 

 

Danger lurks only when socialists dogmatically assume the certain truth of their own particular metaphysics of socialism, i.e., their a priori notions of what socialism must look like and how to bring it about.  Whenever attempt is made to implement the vague cluster of ideas associated with socialism, the problems of relating these ideas to real people and real societies have to be confronted.  Decisions have to be made about what concretely to do in order to move toward the ideals of socialism.  Conflicts among socialist ideals have to be confronted, and failures of specific expectations to materialize have to be recognized.     Anti-socialism can also be based on a metaphysic.  There are opponents of socialism who declare as commonsense that socialism is and must always be incompatible with individual freedom.  Such a view is also metaphysical since, like socialist metaphysics, it also assumes, a priori, an answer to a question that should be treated as hypothetical.   Contrary to this anti-socialist metaphysic, if all individual wants and desires happened to harmonize with each other and if they also happened to coincide with the needs of "society," there would be no tension between individual freedom and socialism.  Anti-socialists who argue that socialism is incompatible with freedom would thereby stand refuted.  Perhaps these anti-socialists never will be refuted.  Perhaps there will always be an irreducible tension between socialist ideals and freedom.  However, this cannot be determined a priori.  Who knows, perhaps ways will be found to modify social structures and to socialize individuals so as to solve, at least partly, what has been assumed by many to be an insoluble problem.   

 

 

In the remainder of this paper I will examine the sources of this confusion between ideals and metaphysics of socialism, between the view of socialism as utopian and the view of socialism as inevitable, in order to suggest why socialism has sometimes had difficulty in learning from its mistakes.   

 

 

The words "socialist" and "socialism" came into use in Great Britain and France around 1825, and came to be applied to the doctrines of certain writers who were seeking a complete transformation of the economic and moral basis of society by the substitution of social for individual control and of social for individualistic forces in the organization of life and work.  However, the general ideas underlying these doctrines were present in mythic, philosophic, and theological thought long before the term "socialism" was coined, and before socialism emerged as political movement early in the 19th century.  Until fairly recently, however, such ideas were almost universally regarded as utopian, even by those who thought them desirable. As Sanford Lakoff writes:  

 

  

Material scarcity and moral weakness were held to require and even to justify social systems in which inequality and hierarchy were assumed to be synonyms of order.  All egalitarian alternatives were likely to be dismissed as impractical.  Equality was thought of as a standard that may once have had bearing in the remote past, or that might apply in the distant future, but that could have no relevance to present conditions, except as an invitation to chaos.  Because it was treated as an impractical ideal, the idea of equality remained vague and undifferentiated, a catchall for panaceas of every  description, and an easy target for skeptics.  Socialism was for a long time one facet of this relatively amorphous ideal....   

 

 

In the nineteenth century these ideas were transformed into elaborate arguments for social change, with the once utopian dream coming to be viewed by many as an inevitable necessity. 

 

 

A combination of factors account for this metamorphosis of socialism from utopian ideal into concrete political programs.  These factors include the fundamental disruptions accompanying the emergence of industrial society of the American and especially the French Revolutions.  To people living in the revolutionary period heralded by the French and American Revolutions change, change was the most fundamental reality.  The old social and political order seemed to crumble with such ease that its demise seemed like a natural and inevitable process.  Its old, established principles were replaced by radical ideas that had previously been utopian, but now appeared as "common sense."  It seemed to many just common sense that the newly-created working classes which had showed themselves to be a powerful revolutionary force supporting the new order would continue to drive social change until social justice was achieved.   

 

 

The liberal-capitalist revolution against feudalism is, of course, not usually regarded as socialist since it proclaimed the inviolability of private property.  Nevertheless, by taking ideals like equality and fraternity out of the domain of the purely utopian and establishing them in the domain of common sense, the liberal-capitalist revolution helped prepare the ground for socialism to emerge as a political program that seemed attainable to many.  The American Declaration of Independence proclaimed that "all men are created equal," that "they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights," and that "among these are life liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."  The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen proclaimed liberty, equality, the inviolability of property and the right to resist oppression.   

 

 

The drafters of both documents had in mind only equality of rights, not social and economic equality.  Moreover, the middle classes which benefited from the liberal-capitalist revolution still represented an elite.  However, that revolution proclaimed universal principles that supposedly applied to all of humankind.  By undermining traditional aristocracy in the name of equality, it opened the door for the ideal of equality to be taken seriously and extended to include social and economic equality as well.  Inevitably, an understanding of equality restricted to equality of rights would eventually come to be seen as no more than hypocritical rationalization for maintenance of the privileges of the privileged.  Anatole France articulates this insight very nicely: "The law, in its majestic equality," he writes, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread."  As the mass consciousness developed, it became increasingly clear that the ideal of equality of rights, so much celebrated by liberals, did not mean equality for them.  The common sense status of the ideal of equality, the growing political power of the workers' movement, and the revolutionary optimism of the age all lent plausibility to the belief that economic and social equality were moral imperatives in the realm of the possible.  The enthusiasm, solidarity, and collectivist spirit of the workers' movement made it natural to assume that equality could be carried over into the organization of economy and society.  Marx's invention of a theory/faith that was millenarian, easily understandable, and apparently scientific made it possible for socialism to become the ideological core of a mass movement.  Whatever scientific merits Marx’s theory may possess, it would never have given rise to such a powerful mass movement these extra-scientific features. And the success of the Bolsheviks in Russia helps account for the fact that Lenin's revision of Marx’s theory has come to be identified by many with socialism, itself.   

 

 

That there has so far always been conflict among individuals and tension between the individual and society is obvious and uncontroversial.  Where opinions have been divided has been on questions such as whether this state of affairs is good or bad and whether it is alterable or unalterable.  Moreover, people have always been ambivalent about such questions.  Certainly the Biblical story of the fall of man is intended as an explanation of the origins of our troubles.  Had Eve not eaten of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge, the implication is that she and Adam could have lived forever in happiness.  On the other hand, it is only with the Fall that Man became human.  It is not clear that we would want not to be fallen despite all the problems it has brought about.   

 

 

I think it is fruitful to regard as "socialist" those programs and ideals that place primary stress on problems of the individual’s social existence, as opposed to problems of his/her existence as an individual.  Unlike other animal species, tensions between the individual and society are not fully resolved in humans by their genetic programming.   Since people cannot do away with either the social or the individual aspects of their existence, any political or social theory must comprehend and address both aspects.  Socialists must somehow address the problems of the individual’s existence as an individual, just as individualists have to address the problems of the individual’s social existence.  The distinction between socialists and liberals is thus primarily a matter of emphasis.  Many of the problems inherent in concrete variants of both socialist and individualist arguments is their neglect of the other aspect of human existence--i.e., the aspect that is not their main concern.   

 

 

It should be clear at this point in history that socialism is not inevitable, and that attempts to realize socialist ideals will necessarily turn out well.  It should also be clear that socialist ideals are not likely to be realized by any kind of quick fix, such as nationalization of the means of production or central planning.  To be sure, successful socialism may entail some form of common ownership of the means of production and/or central planning.  But these kinds of things are only instruments, which may be hypothetically proposed as solutions to certain kinds of problems.  They need not be seen as ultimate values of socialism, and cannot be assumed a priori to be essential to any genuinely socialist solutions.  It has been widely recognized, for example, that ownership need not necessarily mean control.  Socialist solutions might therefore be discovered that respect and preserve private ownership.  The belief that ownership of the means of production is an integral part of socialism is a good example of socialist metaphysics.  Nor is there any particular virtue in central planning.  My guess is that the only reason central planning has come to be almost part of the definition of socialism is that it has been the quickest, most obvious way for socialist parties that have gained control of the machinery of the state move to implement their aims.   

 

 

Socialism can learn from its mistakes if its adherents are willing to learn from experience and criticism and if they fix their gaze on the ideals and values of socialism rather than clinging to particular theories or models of socialism and blueprints purporting to show how a socialist order can be created.  If it is found that certain ideals or values entail unacceptable costs in terms of other ideals and values, such problems have to be faced honestly.  If something expected to happen automatically (like the Social Revolution) does not occur, it behoves socialists interested in learning to examine the assumptions upon which these expectations were based instead of rationalizing away the failure of their expectations.  .   

 

 

There is, of course, an opposite danger, that socialists will become disillusioned and abandon their ideals when experience suggests that they were wrong.  I hope I have shown in the present paper that this is primarily a matter calling for faith, hope, and courage.  

 

Recognizing mistakes does not imply being defeated by them.