Letter to a young political science colleague in Russia

Of course, I understand what you write about the sorry state of affairs in Russia. I am far more optimistic than you about Russia, but can't disagree with most of what you say.  Most discouraging is that I wonder what can feed the hopes of your generation, on which the future of the country depends.  Of course, there is much about Russia that is good, and which gives grounds for hope.  Yet, this does not negate your arguments.  

To be sure, there has been enormous progress in the last twenty years.  I personally watched it happen in the course of frequent visits to Russia throughout this period.  More importantly, so did Russians who lived through it.  It helps explain the consistently high approval ratings Putin has enjoyed, despite all the negative features of the situation, to which you rightly draw attention.

“Where is this New Deal” to which I compared Putin’s accomplishment, you ask.  In fact, it is not difficult to argue that Putin’s accomplishments are even more impressive than Roosevelt’s, since they were realized under far more difficult circumstances.  You mention Roosevelt's achievments during the first 100 days of his presidency.  But remember that Roosevelt became the leader of a stable polity, with respected political institutions, and a well-functioning, not too corrupt governmental apparatus.  Moreover, as serious and complex as the problems of the Great Depression were, they don’t hold a candle to the problems left by the collapsed Soviet Union.  And don’t forget that many Americans continued to suffer for many years after the first 100 days. Many detested Roosevelt, and saw him as a dictator.  Many worshiped Roosevelt, yes, but others felt like you feel now about Putin.  The ranks of the Communist Party of the USA grew significantly under Roosevelt.

It is hard to take issue with the description Putin gives of the situation in Russia in the nineties in his programmatic speech, "On Russia’s Development Strategy through to 2020” http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/02/08/1137_type82912type82913_159643.shtml (February 2008). It is also hard to dispute the impressive accomplishments he claims to have made as President.  Russians who lived through this period as politically-conscious citizens do not need to be reminded of the nineties to appreciate Putin’s accomplishment.  Putin likely saved the country, as Mikhail Gorbachev once noted.  In the third part of his speech, Putin’s puts forth his vision of the future.  This part raises doubts.  It is clear now that that the program put forward in this 2008 speech will not be realized by 2020. And, if they ever are realized, it will certainly not be achieved with the kinds of policies that have been tried so far. 

Your generation is a different story.  Although you people may have some memories of the hardships of the nineties, these years are history for you.  It is easy for you to take for granted the dramatic improvements that have taken place since then, and focus only on how bad the situation still is.

The most important questions for us to ask are: (1) what are the underlying causes of Russia’s woes (also those of most of the other former Soviet republics); (2) are they remediable at all, and (3) if they are remediable, how? Keep in mind that there are entrenched social networks, and entrenched elites in all countries.  When Perestroika arrived, and when the Soviet Union collapsed, there were no alternative networks and elites waiting in the wings to take their place.  Existing networks and elites simply adapted to the changed situation. Keep in mind that there likely were no other options.

Think about the situation in the Soviet period.  The overwhelming majority of Soviet citizens were thoroughly cowed into passivity and obedience—passivity and obedience deeply rooted in habit.  These behavior patterns naturally carried over into the post-Soviet situation, and transmitted from parents and grandparents to their children by by teachers to their pupils.  How could one expect their basic attitudes and behavior to change, except where necessary to survive?

When the Soviet Union collapsed, the freedom that came with it meant little to the overwhelming majority of citizens.  It was the Soviet elites, the apparatchiki, the powerful, the connected, and the criminal elements who were the main beneficiaries of this new freedom.  In the nineties, some of my friends among the intelligentsia ridiculed the voucher privatization that was taking place at the time.  They told me with gusto how they had exchanged their voucher for a bottle of vodka, or sold it for $10.  Yet, in front of every metro station, there would be someone standing quietly with the sign: “I buy vouchers” – and those who deployed these people with the signs acquired huge chunks of the national wealth of Russia for almost nothing, using these vouchers. Positioned to take advantage of the situation were those already organized, who knew the ropes, who were accustomed to acting collectively in pursuit of their collective interests.  These included all kinds of networks within the Soviet power system, criminal networks… and mixtures of both.

Long before the collapse of the Soviet Union, unnoticed by virtually all the experts, the Soviet regime had transmuted from a disciplined command system, into a kind of loose, soft-authoritarian, fragmented neo-feudalism.  Under Brezhnev, there were hundreds of thousands of little Brezhnevs throughout the country, acting within their own fiefdoms beyond effective control from the center.

These were the people, the networks, the patterns of authority and wealth that post-Soviet Russia inherited from the Soviet Union, and which have evolved into the present-day system.  These were people like former Komsomol functionary, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who knew the ropes and were able to take advantage of this while the Soviet Union was collapsing.  They were in positions that enabled them to consolidate power and wealth under the new circumstances.

Those in the networks that evolved out of the Soviet system enjoy protection from above, support from below, and the collusion of those around.  Everyone protects him/herself and the system that sustains and protects them.  As Ajay Goyal wrote in 2003, referring to the situation Putin inherited, “Putin’s greatest battle lies with the super-rich elite that is now comfortably established and whose tentacles reach deep into all levels of politics and government. Bureaucracy, business and politics are all one in this rare blend of corrupt governance, in which all state power is rhetorical and all service to the people minimal. It is an extreme form of robber capitalism in which the largest section of the population serves as virtual serfs while officials of the state run amuck unchecked, extracting benefits from the system” (“Can Putin Change Russia?” The Russia Journal, 9 April, 2003).

Certainly, this is no longer the Soviet system.  Many of those who enjoyed power, privilege, and status under the Soviet regime were unable to adapt, and lost their advantages along with the Soviet collapse.  Some new types appeared on the scene, like Boris Berezovsky – clever, aggressive, and ruthless, though not anchored in the old system.  They became wealthy and powerful under the new conditions, and created new networks and power systems – of course within the framework left over from the Soviet system.

The system that exists today is very different from the Soviet system.  In some ways it is worse.  An American businessman once noted: “In the Soviet Union, you only had to pay off the top guy.  Now, you have to pay off everybody in the hierarchy.”

So, how can this state of affairs be changed?  There is no easy answer.  There is immense inertia and resistance, deeply rooted in habits, friendships, networks, and interests. Although the Russian people have slowly begun to emerge as a political force, passivity and apathy remain as problems. 

You write that Putin has had enough time to bring about change … more than fifteen years.  But is that really enough time?  Think about the situation I've described.  The next phase will have to involve breaking bones of people whose support was indispensable during these fifteen years. Some change will require a change of generations, as young people without deeply-rooted Soviet bad habits, who have travelled and lived abroad.  The "Russian People" do not yet quite constitute the kind of support base which will be absolutely necessary to enable reformists in the leadership to break out of existing patterns.  Change that matters cannot happen without broad-based support outside the ruling elites.  Yet there are indications that such a support base may be slowly beginning to emerge.

Whatever the solution, it will have to involve more than just talking about exalted principles, like democracy, freedom, and human rights--important as these may be.   The fate of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine is evidence of this.  President Obama’s current problems also show how difficult it is to bring about the kind of “change that matters” which he promised, even in political systems that are not as warped and criminalized as those of the former Soviet republics.  Leadership talent and ability to hold onto high ideals while coping with the pernicious forces at work in Russia, in fact in any political order, will be essential for success.

Putin began his third term as President of Russia in 2012.  Yet, he did not just coast back into the Presidency. Many people in Russia, including much of the elite, were unhappy about his decision to return to the Presidency, and the Russian public is no longer disposed to curl up and play dead, no matter what Putin does. Moreover, for the first time in the history of post-Soviet Russia, there is a significant number of high-profile individuals, publically taking divergent stances on political issues, and even leveling serious criticism at Putin.

Many observers have noted that Putin's political persona has changed significantly since return to the Presidency.  He no longer tries to please everyone.  He has been leaning more towards generic conservative positions--law and order conservativism, social conservative values, and Russian and Great Power nationalism. He now even calls himself a conservative.  This change in political persona, in addition to promoting positions Putin favors, has helped to crystallize and energize opposition to his regime--opposition both in Russia the international arena.

Ironically, while Putin has been moving away from what many observers take to be "democracy," he has actually been strengthening his democratic support base. A "Great Silent Majority," as President Richard Nixon used to call his political support base during the Watergate crisis, exists in Russia too, and the new Putin has been successfully appealing to it.  Pro-Western elements of the political class may be furious at Putin for his stances on high-profile issues like Gay Rights, Pussy Riot, and relations with the United States, yet such political stances resonate strongly with large segments of the Russian public.  One may well see the Russian Great Silent Majority as unenlightened, and dislike the values and views it expresses.  However, the fact that Putin has been mobilizing it is not necessarily bad news for the development of liberal-democracy in Russia.