Nickolay Pereslavtsev: North Korea and International Sanctions

After the adoption of UN Security Council Resolutions 2270 of March 2, 2016 and 2321 of November 30, 2016, there appear many assumptions about North Korean collapse in near future. Experts in the West consider this collapse as probable and even very close. 

Supposedly, the economic hardships from sanctions will cause social unrest and turmoil that will lead to the change of leadership in the North. Immediately, Pyongyang will abandon its nuclear and missile programs, all citizens will condemn and curse North Korean Worker’s Party and vote for reunification and market economy.  

There is no need to say that such hopes are unfounded. American and European politicians forget that North Korean regime is by its nature a system based on the mixture of nationalism and autocracy and is not inclined to agree with the methods of pressure, which are applied by Western powers.

Despite predictions about collapse, the talks about refugees and human rights North Korea (or DPRK) has survived in difficult conditions for many years and this makes to admit that the country is run not by the group of “crazy generals” and party officials, who have lost the sense of reality, but by experienced and sober enough politicians, who know how to maneuver and find ways for their own survival. They are not prone to suicide and the loss of power.

In the North there is no and is not expected to appear the consolidated internal opposition and the power vacuum, which are the base of social instability and chaos and may lead to the changes in domestic and foreign policy. The majority of population supports the authorities on a patriotic basis and a certain number of defectors can not change this conclusion. In fact, the dissidents may exist in any country, including Republic of Korea and Russia. But it does not mean that the system of this country’s government will come soon to quick disintegration. 

The press, radio and intra-party propaganda in DPRK explain to the citizens that international sanctions are unfounded, inhuman and aimed actually at the destruction of economics and elimination of North Korea as a state. Ordinary citizens are constantly inspired with these views, read and hear about examples from the practice of other countries, indicating that only strong country can protect its own interests. Here can be mentioned regular publications of North Korean News Agency about unannounced inspections and exercises in the Russian Armed Forces, weapon tests, the official statements on this subject. Then the questions are asked: why one country can do so, and for another it is prohibited?         

From North Korean point of view, the initial reaction of the world community after the first UNSC sanction resolution (1695) could be and had been in some respects taken into account. On March, 2009 North Korea has joined to Outer Space Treaty (1967) and Convention about registration of space objects (1974) and expressed willingness to comply with all the rules and restrictions, set by these documents. In the process of space launches there have not been recorded attempts to launch into orbit objects with nuclear weapons or any other weapon of mass destruction. None of the neighboring countries has suffered ecological or economic damage due to the launches. On April 2012 Pyongyang invited foreign journalists and observers to visit the Launch site and Mission Control center [9]. Observers refused to come, but nevertheless the   invitation was!

As for nuclear tests North Korea suggested several times to stop them in response to real measures from opposite side, for example, temporary moratorium on implementation of regular US-South Korean military exercises [7]. Unfortunately, Republic of Korea and United States invariably insist on the right to implement them due to their defensive character. 

But during 10 years after resolution 1695 the international situation has changed significantly. Due to the world events DPRK has really understood the main global trend – everything is decided and solved not only on the basis of international agreements but by the “rule of the gun”. In other words, the stronger side is always right and determines in what country there is democracy and where it needs to be integrated. Examples are before eyes: Lybia and Iraq. This implies the need for Pyongyang to strengthen defense capabilities and to protect the state interests and boundaries by all means. 

Military potential of any country is based on demographic, economic, technological, scientific and political capabilities but all these options give the advantage to South Korea [15]. 

Undoubtedly, the leadership in Pyongyang is well aware of this situation and clearly understands that conventional war with Western coalition means the end of the regime. Therefore we can agree with renowned Russian and foreign experts on Korea, for example, Mr. Georgy Toloraya from Moscow Institute of Economics, Russian Academy of Sciences,  Mr. Andrey Lankov from Kookmin University [6], Seoul, Mr. Peter J.Hayes from Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability who say that a full-scale conflict is not beneficial for DPRK and  all assumptions about a “step of despair”, when North Korean leadership is likely to break a war for preventing domestic social and economical collapse are not true. 

Moreover, the real basis of North Korean military doctrine is still an active defense. Pyongyang said several times that DPRK would use nuclear weapons only in case of direct aggression [11]. As for all threats addressed to United States and their allies they are mainly the traditional rhetoric for domestic and international users. Even a cornered cat hisses and shows its claws. But that does not mean that she is willing to attack.

Nevertheless, Pyongyang considers it necessary to have the simple and effective means of deterrence and therefore will continue to modernize nuclear and rocket weapons despite international sanctions.  

As for the economy, it is most probable that in the coming years the North Korean leadership will be much more engaged in “import substitution” with a focus on the creation and upgrading of domestic industrial base. 

By the way, it’s impossible not to notice the increased attention, paid by leadership to higher and secondary education, training and motivation of young people who can contribute to technological modernization of the country.  The newspapers regularly report about new technologies supposedly invented and implemented by scientists in the fields of agriculture, light industry, metal processing. Young professionals dominate in North Korean companies (“Ragwon technological company”) oriented to high-tech products. [3]                                                                                          

When visiting factories and plants in various regions of the country Kim Jong Un often says about the importance of the production of quality domestic products [10]. Knowing North Korea we can say that the instructions of Supreme leader will be fulfilled and in the absence of external obstacles most of the North Koreans will be provided with domestic accessories at affordable prices. 

The new equipment for factories and raw materials can also be obtained through “grey export and import schemes” with the use of dumping prices. All these “grey schemes” are unlikely to be kept under effective control. 

At the same time there will be continued the introduction of market principles with the aim to eliminate the outdated elements of the planned economy, increase the level of profitability of state enterprises, which form the basic budget revenues. In order to obtain income the factory products must be in demand and for that there is a need to have an effective internal market and demand. In other words, the citizens must have the opportunity to earn and spend the money.  

Summing up we can say that on the whole, DPRK has fairly large opportunities for political and economic survival: natural resources, certain domestic industrial capacities, semi-legal channels of export and import, scientific and technical potential, lack of social instability. Such disadvantages as small domestic market and shortage of foreign currency can be counterbalanced by certain market measures, aimed at expansion of population’s purchasing abilities.   

In any case, Pyongyang will continue to implement the planned military programs, despite the hostility of the West, focusing (due to the scarcity of resources) on targeted areas, in particular, the production of more cheap but effective weapons. 

As Russian expert Georgy Toloraya writes:”The nuclear program probably demands fewer resources than conventional arms buildup. Once the basic infrastructure has already been built, the state costs for labor – including wages for highly qualified personnel – are negligible, potentially representing no more than several percent of the national gross domestic product” [1]. 

There is another reason for concern. Refusing to compromise with DPRK the West closes by its own hands the possibility of control over North Korean nuclear and missile programs. Because of technological backwardness of North Korea and absence of international cooperation it is impossible to exclude the risk of random technical errors and incidents. If in the situation of regional military tension (created by the acts of both opposing parties) the launched North Korean missile accidentally loses control and explodes on the way to the point of objective, who will gain from that?

In general, most of the participants in the sanctions campaign (except, maybe, US) against the North play the role of a “loser”, because the list of sanctions, imposed especially in 2016, would not solve all problems, related to North Korean nuclear weapons. 

South Korea should not forget that the territory of North Korea is its closest and integral sphere of influence and factor of national security. No country, if it considers itself independent, will allow anyone, even allies, to determine policy in relation to these areas.  

Meanwhile, there is an impression that the policy towards North Korea is now being developed not in Seoul. The most of experts agree: US do not welcome uncontrolled closer ties between two Koreas anticipating the emergence of regional political and economic rival and will do everything in order to prevent such possibility. 

According to American scheme of Korean reunification, Republic of Korea absorbs DPRK and for many years forgets about global interests, because all resources and financial aid will have to be invested to the territories of North Korea. Besides, United States will get military bases in the North and that will have a direct impact on the relations of Korea with Russia and China [12]. Is not this should be taken into account?  

If Seoul believes that there are no other ways except following the United States in the actions toward the North (though maybe it is temporary), then nothing will change, everything will stay at the same point and no sanctions will help to convince the North to make concessions. 

In 2000 and 2007 South and North actually recognized each other unofficially after signing of Inter-Korean Declarations. It may be reasonable to return to such negotiations with North Korea, maybe under international mediation, but to expand their scope over nuclear framework, designating as the topic all questions of regional security. It seems this is a more effective way than the pressure of the sanctions.  

REFERENCES

1. “Deciphering North Korean Economic Policy Intentions”, by Georgy Toloraya, URL: http://38north.org/206/07/gtoloraya072616/print; 

2. “N.Korean kerosene sanction unlikely to be effective:Report”, by Leo Byrne, March 11th, 2016, URL: https://www.nknews.org/2016/03/n-korean-kerosene-sanction-unlikely...

3. “Ragwon Technological Company”, URL:http://www.naenara.com.kp/news/news_view.php?0+97680 

4. “Russian experts: US must engage North Korea”, URL: https://www.nknews.org/2015/11/russian-experts-u-s-must-engage-north-korea/

5. United States Mission to the United Nations, Fact Sheet: DPRK Resolution 2270 (2016), March 2, 2016, URL: http://usun.state.gov./remarks/7161#/Vtlprfi2Z90/facebook.com

6. «Как Пхеньян полюбил бомбу и заставил весь мир беспокоиться», 5 марта 2016, URL: http://ria.ru/world/20160305/1385277734.html

7. «КНДР предложила мораторий на ядерные испытания», 10 января 2015, URL:http://www.newsru. com/world/10jan2015/north.html

8. «КНДР удивила мир своими ракетно-ядерными возможностями», 03.05.2016, URL:https://rg.ru/2016/05/03/kndr-udivila-zapad-svoimi-raketno-iadernymi-vozmozhnostiami.html

9. «Космическая программа КНДР», Википедия, URL:http://did/academic.ru/dic.nsf/ruwiki/648799

10. «На Пхёнсонском заводе по производству синтетической кожи», URL:http://www.naenara.com.kp./ru/news/news_view/php?22+2675

11. «Отчетный доклад ЦК ТПК 7 съезду партии, Ким Чен Ын», 07.05.2016, http://naenara.com.kp/ru/news/news_view.php?22+2656

12. «Проблема северокорейских ядерных разработок»: история вопроса», К.Асмолов, 23.01.2007, URL: http:// vestnik.kr/articles/articles_expert/3085/html

13. «Санкции против КНДР и российские интереcы: нет ли противоречия?», Г.Толорая, 2 марта 2016, URL:/inner/?id_4=7336#top-content

14. «Северокорейская нефть – уравнение со многими неизвестными», 13 апреля 2015, URL: http://portnews.ru/digest/print/15546/?backurl=/digest/

15. «Cравнение сил армий Северной и Южной Кореи», 9 января 2016,     http://voprosik.net/sravnenie-sil-armij-severnoj-i-yuzhnoi-korei/

16. «С этой дороги Пхеньян не свернет», Г.Толорая, 20 июля 2016, URL: https://m.lenta.ru/articles/2016/07/20/2270_against_dprk/