Will We Witness a BRICS Currency “R+”evolution?

Recent reports from June indicate that Saudi Arabia, along with four other emerging economies, has recently joined the BRICS alliance and has allowed to expire a purported 50-year-old agreement with the United States, which stipulated it selling its crude oil exclusively in US dollars. This development has reignited speculations about the imminent introduction of a BRICS currency.

Does this signify the potential conclusion of the era of global US hegemony, underpinned by the petrodollar? How might this herald the dawn of a new, multipolar financial world order?

BRICS nations will certainly not pursue a currency union, taking heed of the Eurozone’s cautionary tale. Their economic diversity and commitment to national sovereignty in monetary policy make such an endeavor unlikely. At best, a common BRICS currency might be introduced as a parallel medium of exchange in the medium term, coexisting with national currencies as legal tender, facilitating balance of payments settlements and supporting bond issuance. This parallel currency could be pegged to a basket of member state currencies, gold, or commodities, and might even be issued as a digital stablecoin.

However, it is more plausible that a common account unit will be introduced first to supplant the dollar in this capacity. More realistically and significantly, BRICS nations will continue their gradual de-dollarization process and build an effective joint financial architecture, critically through the revitalization and revamping of the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement Fund.

Beyond the substantial technical challenges, it is certain that Washington will not stand idly by as the Global South endeavors to create a less dollar-dependent multipolar world order. Many have fallen in their efforts to challenge US financial supremacy; Saddam Hussein planned to sell Iraqi oil in euros instead of dollars; Muammar al-Gaddafi advocated for a gold-backed pan-African dinar. On the other hand, in December of last year, Javier Milei thwarted Argentina's entry into BRICS+ and has plans to replace the peso with the dollar. Whether the Saudis will further oppose global dollar dominance by selling off its Eurobonds, or instead agree to a new epochal defense agreement with the US—which could breathe new life into the petrodollar—remains to be seen. One thing is certain: the US “empire” always strikes back, or at least it will for as long as it can.

Introduction

Recent reports from June indicate that Saudi Arabia, along with four other emerging economies, has recently joined the BRICS alliance and has allowed to expire a purported 50-year-old agreement with the United States, which stipulated it selling its crude oil exclusively in US dollars. This development has reignited speculations about the imminent introduction of a BRICS currency.

Does this signify the potential conclusion of the era of global US hegemony, underpinned by the petrodollar? How might this herald the dawn of a new, multipolar financial world order?

Bretton Woods: The Birth of Dollar Hegemony

Ivan Timofeev:
Financial Settlements Within the BRICS Framework: Moving Forward, Despite Problems

To understand the origins of US hegemony, it is important to revisit the year 1944, when the so-called Bretton Woods compromise established the worldwide supremacy of the US dollar. Even though World War II was still raging on, it was already apparent that the United States would emerge victorious. In anticipation, Washington orchestrated a new financial and monetary order for the post-war era. This system was devised by economists John M. Keynes, a foremost advocate of expansive government policies and high public debt, and Harry Dexter White, who was later accused of espionage and being a socialist sympathizer. [1]

The Bretton Woods system pegged the US dollar to gold (at $35 per ounce), while all other currencies were tied to the US dollar (e.g., 4.2 Deutsche Marks to 1 USD). European central banks were compelled to purchase US dollars to maintain exchange rate stability and could acquire gold solely in exchange for US dollars. For European economies, stringent capital controls were enforced. The establishment of this system was feasible only because by 1944, the United States possessed over 57 percent of the world's gold reserves (16,700 tons, valued today at approximately USD 360 billion). [2]

While the gold-backed stability of the new structure was advantageous for all participants, it primarily conferred significant benefits upon the US economy, with European economies bearing the cost. Studies by the Federal Reserve Bank reveal that the "exorbitant privilege", as French Finance Minister Valéry Giscard d'Estaing termed it, diverted capital flows to the United States instead of Europe, which otherwise would have boosted European GDP by about 20 percent during the 1950s and 1960s. [3] Consequently, Europeans largely financed their own post-war reconstruction, further debunking the myth that the Marshall Plan was decisive in Germany's recovery. [4]

The Fiat Era and Rise of the Petrodollar

The Bretton Woods system collapsed after a mere thirty years due to the insatiable desire of the American government apparatus to continuously escalate public spending, particularly for costly and bloody military interventions abroad, such as the Vietnam War. [5] Despite the depletion of its gold reserves, the US Treasury could not achieve the level of expenditure and debt desired by the White House. The US dollar experienced a drastic devaluation, worth only 3.5 Deutsche Marks by 1971. This situation was exacerbated by the Arab oil crises, with US inflation nearing 6 percent. [6] Under these circumstances, the gold backing of the dollar became untenable. In his infamous 1971 speech, President Richard Nixon announced the "temporary" suspension of gold convertibility—a condition that has persisted for over half a century to date. [7] The world entered the era of fiat currencies, whose value is maintained solely by citizens placing trust in their governing authorities and their capability to tax their national economies intensively enough to cover interest costs.

Only a diplomat of Henry Kissinger's stature could turn such a predicament into an opportunity. In June 1974, he negotiated a historic and partly secret agreement with the Saudis: in exchange for American weapons and security guarantees, they would sell their oil exclusively in US dollars. The veracity of this agreement, and how much of it is "fake news", continues to be debated. [8] However, it is undeniable that the fiat era also marked the advent of the petrodollar. Other oil and commodity exporters followed suit, cementing the dollar's status as the primary international reserve and transaction currency.

As a cornerstone of "Pax Americana", the petrodollar exemplifies a neo-colonial tribute system, providing the following advantages for Uncle Sam:

• Imports are significantly undervalued for the American economy, i.e. cheaper, currently between 14 and 17 percent, as they are priced in dollars, incurring minimal transaction costs. [9]
• Through the seigniorage effect, the US government can export domestic inflation abroad. Newly printed fiat dollars are utilized by US corporations in the form of cheap credit through the American banking system to purchase foreign goods and services. Foreign exporters, at the long end of this process, are left to manage the surplus of dollars, dealing with the adverse effects of this monetary expansion.
• Consequently, the US accumulated a massive current account deficit, amounting to a total of $15 trillion between 1971 and 2022. [10] This sum can be interpreted simultaneously as credit-financed domestic consumption, suppressed inflation that would have arisen without the petrodollar system, and as a "tribute" from foreign countries.
• Pricing commodities in dollars generates substantial demand from all commodity-importing countries. Germany, for example, must first acquire dollars to purchase Saudi oil. Thus, at the height of the Pax Americana in 2013, the “greenback” accounted for 87 percent of global foreign exchange transactions [11] and 36 percent of SWIFT payments. [12]
• This results in a massive accumulation of dollar reserves by foreign states, which are subsequently "recycled" into US Treasury securities. In 2013, American securities worth USD 7.7 trillion were held by foreign entities, [13] and 62 percent of global foreign exchange reserves were denominated in dollars. [14] This, in turn, enables Washington to sustain an enormous public debt of USD 34.7 trillion (as of June 2024), equivalent to more than a third of the global GDP. [15] Conversely, according to estimates by the Eurasian Development Bank, the opportunity costs for holding their reserves in US Treasuries amount annually to 0.2 percent of China's GDP, 0.6 percent of India's GDP, and previously 1.5 percent of Russia's GDP. [16]

The Conflict in Ukraine

Of course, the petrodollar system is not solely founded on coercion but also on a finely tuned balance of trust. Its greatest advantage for all parties lies in the guaranteed stability and security, provided they operate within the rules set by Washington. However, skepticism towards US hegemony had been growing among the emerging economies of the "Global South" even before escalation in the Ukrainian conflict. This skepticism was fueled by Western sanctions against countries like Iran, Syria, Venezuela, and Russia, as well as recurring trade disputes with China. Under the banners of "de-risking" and "friendshoring", the achieved trade globalization is gradually fragmenting into regional trade blocs, often with the enthusiastic intellectual support of transatlantic think tanks. [17] Consequently, between 2018 and 2023, trade between G7 states and BRICS decreased by 1.1 percent, while intra-bloc trade increased by 2.1 percent. [18]

A turning point occurred in February 2022, when the US and its European "foederati" seized Russian dollar-denominated currency reserves and foreign assets worth USD 350 billion (equivalent to 19 percent of Russia's GDP) and excluded Russia from the SWIFT payment system. [19] This geopolitical weaponization of the dollar for foreign policy objectives, a concern already highlighted by US Treasury Secretary Jack Lew in 2016, [20] prompted countries of the rising South to reassess the risks of using Western financial infrastructures, trading in dollars, and holding dollar-denominated assets. De-dollarization emerged on the agenda of finance ministers and central bankers of non-Western states. Compared to its peak in 2013, China halved its holdings of US Treasury securities from USD 1.68 trillion to USD 822 billion in 2023, while Russia's holdings dropped to zero. [21]

Simultaneously, calls for an alternative BRICS currency grew louder. This idea was first proposed in 2018 by Russian economist Yaroslav Lissovolik at the Valdai Forum, suggesting the currency be named "R+" after the initials of the BRICS-state national currencies. [22] The concept gained significant support at the 14^th BRICS Summit in 2022 and was endorsed by Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva in April 2023. [23] Speculations about the introduction of a BRICS currency peaked just before the 15^th BRICS Summit in Johannesburg, but for now, the idea remains in its conceptual and preparatory phase.

Will BRICS Dare and Desire the Global Revolt?

Aleksei Kuznetsov:
BRICS in Global Financial System: The Need to Level the Playing Field

Can BRICS herald the currency revolution? Initially conceived as an investment concept by Goldman Sachs for the rapidly growing economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and later South Africa, the Kremlin initiated their loose intergovernmental association in 2006, based on annual summits and joint declarations. [24] The motivation behind this initiative is to transition to a freer multipolar world order. In 2024, the group expanded to BRICS+ with the inclusion of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. More than 40 non-Western countries have expressed interest in joining. [25]

BRICS+ represents 45 percent of the global population [26] and 34 percent of the world's gross domestic product (GDP) measured by purchasing power, [27] making it a collective force to be reckoned with. By 2020, they had already surpassed the G7 economically, [28] and projections suggest that by 2050, they will constitute two-thirds of the global economy. [29]

However, is this sufficient to dethrone the dollar from its financial supremacy? The process of de-dollarization will proceed gradually due to political and technical challenges, involving many interim steps and supplementary options. Even if it culminates in the establishment of a new BRICS currency, the goal, according to official statements, is not to replace the US dollar but to build a parallel financial and monetary pillar. Additionally, it is likely (and fortunately) not to become a currency union like the euro. The chief economist of the Eurasian Development Bank, Evgeny Vinokurov, categorized the various options based on feasibility, innovation, advantages, and disadvantages. [30]

Gold - Yes, Standard - No

Gold has always been a hedge against geopolitical risks. Thus, further restructuring of dollar-denominated reserves into gold holdings is a logical step. Central bank gold purchases have reached record levels: while the average net purchases were 514 tons per year from 2013 to early 2022, they surged to 984 tons annually from mid-2022 to early 2024. [31] Since the global financial crisis, central bank gold reserves worldwide have increased from 29,500 tons in 2008 to 36,700 tons in 2023, [32] nearly matching the historical peak of 36,800 tons in 1973. [33]

Beyond its universal acceptability, gold's advantage lies in its appreciating value: it has doubled over the last decade from 33 to 76 US dollars per gram. [34] Concurrently, BRICS countries have raised their national gold reserves from 5,260 to 5,627 tons, representing an increase from 14.8 to 15.7 percent of global central bank holdings. Collectively, BRICS+ nations hold 6,500 tons of gold, accounting for 18.1 percent of the world's reserves. [35]

The drawbacks of this precious metal include its limited fungibility (divisibility), the difficulty of transport, and the lack of regular income (interest), which can only be realized through sales. Despite BRICS nations increasingly reallocating their dollar assets into gold reserves, the introduction of a BRICS gold standard is highly improbable. This would only be feasible if enough other states participated or if the issuer held the majority of the world’s gold reserves, like the United States did with 57 percent at the inception of Bretton Woods. The current share of BRICS+ is significantly lower. Additionally, the US—with over 8,133 tons—remains the world’s largest gold holder and, along with Europe, controls more than half of the world’s reserves, enabling them to easily crash the price through coordinated sales.

China's Ambitions: Yuan as the New Global Reserve Currency?

With nearly a fifth of the global GDP based on purchasing power parity, [36] China—a key BRICS member—stands as the world's strongest economy and the leading exporter, accounting for 14.2 percent of all merchandise exports. [37] Consequently, the Chinese Renminbi (RMB, also known as the Chinese Yuan) appears to be the most plausible candidate for a new global transaction and reserve currency, rather than a yet-to-be-developed BRICS currency. The Chinese Communist Party explicitly aims to internationalize the RMB through its financial architecture. By 2024, China had established SWAP agreements with 40 countries [38] and founded the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) to reduce dependence on SWIFT. CIPS already has 141 direct and 1,377 indirect participants, handling an annual business volume of USD 17.1 trillion and daily transactions worth USD 87 billion. [39] In 2023, over half of China’s cross-border payments were conducted in RMB, [40] surpassing the dollar share (43 percent) and tripling from 16.8 percent in 2021. [41]

Despite these advancements, the yuan’s global influence remains limited: its share of worldwide foreign exchange transactions increased from 2.2 percent in 2013 to 7 percent in 2022; [42] its SWIFT transaction value from 0.7 to 2.9 percent; [43] and its share in global foreign exchange reserves from 0 to 2.6 percent. [44] CIPS remains twenty times smaller than SWIFT, which boasts a daily transaction volume of USD 1.81 trillion. [45] Technical and political obstacles hamper the Renminbi's role as an international reserve and transaction currency: Firstly, the dual currency system (domestic RMB and offshore Yuan), stringent capital controls, and a relatively small financial market. Secondly, China has a substantial current account surplus of USD 823 billion. [46] Thirdly, India has declined to conduct trade with Russia in yuan. [47]

Ultimately, stakeholders should consider whether replacing the dollar hegemony with a global financial system controlled by the Chinese Communist Party is indeed preferable to one dominated by transatlantic oligarchs.

Dragging Progress with National Currencies

Rather than speculating about the one new single currency, official declarations from BRICS summits repeatedly emphasize the shared ambition to increase the use of national currencies in cross-border trade. [48] However, the results have been disappointing, at best asymmetric: aside from China, only Russia has made significant progress in de-dollarization, driven by necessity. In 2023, 68 percent of Russian imports were paid in rubles and currencies that Moscow classifies as “friendly” [49] (modestly surpassing the government’s target of 60 percent by 2025), as well as two-thirds of exports. The intra-Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) trade is conducted four-fifths in rubles, [50] and transactions between Russia and China are almost entirely dollar-free.

Disappointing trends are evident: excluding the Yuan, the share of BRICS currencies in global foreign exchange transactions decreased from 4.8 percent in 2013 to 3.7 percent in 2022. [51] India’s refusal to conduct trade with Russia in yuan presents Moscow with a dilemma: how can it utilize its substantial rupee reserves, [52]a result from its USD 57.2 billion in trade surplus with the subcontinent? [53] There are now smaller attempts to settle transactions in UAE Dirhams. Furthermore, the Dirham, the Saudi Riyal, and the Ethiopian Birr remain pegged to the dollar. Although China has established SWAP lines with almost all BRICS+ countries, such agreements are scarce among the other member states, except for the United Arab Emirates and Egypt. [54]

The only two existing BRICS institutions, the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) and the New Development Bank (NDB) based in Shanghai, should have been well-positioned to fill this gap. Yet both have fallen short of expectations. Brazilian economist Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr., former vice president of the NDB, does not hold back in his self-criticism: [55] both institutions have only modest capital of USD 100 billion each (by comparison: IMF—USD 864 billion, World Bank—USD 325 billion, EIB—USD 270 billion). In May 2022, the CRA currency fund was frozen by the participating central banks, [56] hampered by numerous restrictions and safety measures, with no balance-of-payments support carried out to date. The NDB, while approving individual projects, implements them at a sluggish pace. As a cherry on top: the accounting unit and operational currency of both institutions is the US dollar.

Real Assets Instead of Currency Reserves

Looking beyond, BRICS nations are diversifying away from the US dollar by reinvesting their trade surpluses into other real assets, other than traditional gold and foreign exchange reserves. A proven strategy involves investing foreign currency surpluses into domestic “human capital” or regional infrastructure projects via sovereign wealth funds and development banks. By the end of 2023, the national wealth funds (SWFs) of BRICS+ managed over USD 6.08 trillion, constituting 51 percent of global SWF assets. [57] The advantages are evident: productive assets that benefit the domestic population and infrastructure, generate returns, and stimulate economic growth. An exemplary case is China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Since its announcement in 2013, China has sold USD 853.2 billion worth of US Treasury bonds, which had peaked at that time, and instead invested USD 1,054 billion in loans and infrastructure projects for the BRI. [58] This has proven to be a shrewd move: rather than being dependent on Washington, Beijing has since reaped tangible economic benefits and gained geopolitical influence. China now holds stakes in 92 foreign ports, including majority interests in 13 of them. [59]

Another diversification idea that is being discussed is the establishment of joint commodity reserves. Collectively, BRICS+ countries possess, for example, two-fifths of the world's oil reserves, nearly half of the global natural gas reserves, 63 percent of platinum reserves, and two-thirds of known rare earth elements. [60] Instead of amassing currency reserves, they could create shared commodity reserves to support balance of payments. Advantages include tangible assets with real economic utility and the ability to influence strategic markets. However, like gold, the disadvantages are also significant: no interest income, high storage and transportation costs, and limited divisibility.

Dawn of Digital Currency

Ivan Timofeev:
Eurasia’s Security System: The Economic Aspect

A more innovative approach towards de-dollarization involves the increased use of digital payment methods, including both private cryptocurrencies and central bank digital currencies (CBDCs).

Over the past decade, the market capitalization of cryptocurrencies has surged from under USD 1 billion in 2013 to 2,300 times that amount. [61] The advantages of cryptos over the dollar lie in their decentralized structure, rapid transaction capabilities, and the contractual security provided by blockchain-based smart contracts. However, regulation varies significantly among BRICS nations: Brazil and India adopt a permissive stance, while China strictly prohibits cryptocurrencies. Despite a daily trading volume of approximately 100 billion, [62] the cryptocurrency market is 66 times smaller than the average daily dollar turnover in global foreign exchange trading. Additionally, cryptocurrencies are highly volatile: the daily fluctuations of the Bitcoin/USD exchange rate exceed 150,000 pips, compared to 200–1,000 pips for conventional currency pairs, rendering them impractical for hedging cross-border trades and direct investments. [63]

Thus, the increasing role of central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) within and between BRICS states appears more likely. Nearly all BRICS+ countries are pursuing CBDC projects at various stages of development. Compared to private cryptocurrencies, CBDCs are less volatile and can be easily controlled through national monetary policy. In March 2024, Kremlin advisor Yury Ushakov announced that BRICS is working on creating an independent payment system based on digital currencies and blockchain technology. [64] The "mBridge" platform holds promise for enhancing the role of national digital currencies in BRICS trade. It supports real-time payments and foreign exchange transactions between CBDCs and is currently used by China, the Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. [65] Nonetheless, the spread of state-backed digital currencies remains limited, with their share of currency usage in China at only 0.13 percent. [66]

Is a Currency Uprising Imminent?

BRICS nations will certainly not pursue a currency union, taking heed of the Eurozone’s cautionary tale. Their economic diversity and commitment to national sovereignty in monetary policy make such an endeavor unlikely. At best, a common BRICS currency might be introduced as a parallel medium of exchange in the medium term, coexisting with national currencies as legal tender, facilitating balance of payments settlements and supporting bond issuance. This parallel currency could be pegged to a basket of member state currencies, gold, or commodities, and might even be issued as a digital stablecoin.

However, it is more plausible that a common account unit will be introduced first to supplant the dollar in this capacity. [67] More realistically and significantly, BRICS nations will continue their gradual de-dollarization process and build an effective joint financial architecture, critically through the revitalization and revamping of the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement Fund.

Beyond the substantial technical challenges, it is certain that Washington will not stand idly by as the Global South endeavors to create a less dollar-dependent multipolar world order. Many have fallen in their efforts to challenge US financial supremacy; Saddam Hussein planned to sell Iraqi oil in euros instead of dollars; [68] Muammar al-Gaddafi advocated for a gold-backed pan-African dinar. [69] On the other hand, in December of last year, Javier Milei thwarted Argentina's entry into BRICS+ and has plans to replace the peso with the dollar. [70] Whether the Saudis will further oppose global dollar dominance by selling off its Eurobonds, [71] or instead agree to a new epochal defense agreement with the US—which could breathe new life into the petrodollar—remains to be seen. [72] One thing is certain: the US “empire” always strikes back, or at least it will for as long as it can.

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