New Uncertainty in Spain

Early parliamentary elections held in Spain on June 26, 2016 largely repeated the situation of the December 2015 elections. The People’s Party failed to receive enough votes to form a new government. Six months did not bring the principal parties any closer to a compromise, and on June 26, the distribution of votes hardly changed. And little has changed in terms of the readiness of the parties to form an alliance: their statements made by their leaders during the electoral campaign demonstrate that coming to an agreement on a new government will still be a very difficult task.

Early parliamentary elections held in Spain on June 26, 2016 largely repeated the situation of the December 2015 elections. The People’s Party failed to receive enough votes to form a new government. Six months did not bring the principal parties any closer to a compromise, and on June 26, the distribution of votes hardly changed. And little has changed in terms of the readiness of the parties to form an alliance: their statements made by their leaders during the electoral campaign demonstrate that coming to an agreement on a new government will still be a very difficult task.

A Blocked Situation

For several decades, the People’s Party (PP) and the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) have essentially taken turns forming the government. The December 2015 elections changed the situation radically: the traditional parties lost many votes and were joined by the “newbies” – Podemos (We can) and Ciudadanos (Citizens), which, on the contrary, showed very good results. The seats in the lower house of parliament were distributed in the following way: the PP won 123 seats, the PSOE 90 seats, Podemos 69 seats and Ciudadanos 40 seats (link in Russian). The power distribution made it impossible to form a government without reaching a consensus between the parties. Under the Constitution, a vote of confidence in the chairman of the government requires an absolute majority of votes in the lower house (176 votes out of 350). If the majority is not achieved, a new vote is scheduled, and the vote of confidence is considered valid if a simple majority votes for it. However, in the time that elapsed after the elections, the parties failed to achieve even a simple majority.

Mariano Rajoy, President of the People’s Party, refused the offer from King Felipe VI to form a government, citing insufficient support in the parliament. At the same time, immediately after the December elections, Rajoy suggested that the PSOE and Ciudadanos agree to cooperate and form a government that would enjoy a broad parliamentary support. Of course, the PP would hold the key positions in the new government as the party that won the elections. However, no specific steps to develop such cooperation were taken.

Pedro Sánchez, the Secretary-General of the Socialists, also failed to form a government. He managed to conclude an agreement with Ciudadanos, yet together, they only held 130 seats, far from an absolute majority. Other parties did not join their agreement. In addition, the attitude of both PSOE and Ciudadanos to forming blocs with other “big four” members is very complicated and ambiguous.

The blame for the failure to form a new government is shared by all parties, although to different degrees. Instead of looking for common points and interests, the parties drew red lines in their coalition policies and declared incompatibility with their rivals. Too often, party leaders put the interests and ambitions of their parties, as well as their electoral calculations, ahead of the national interests. The impetus towards tolerance and searching for mutually acceptable compromises set by the famous “pactos de la Moncloa” (the Moncloa Pacts) has exhausted itself. The unwillingness and inability of party leaders to agree on the issue of forming a government stood in a sharp contrast with the hopes of the majority of voters, who endorsed inter-party agreement and wanted to avoid a new election.

For half a year, Spain has been living without a new government. However, this is not a new thing in modern European history, as we have the example of Belgium, which d lived without a government for 541 days and had had even stronger disagreements between the parties than those in Spain. But this is small consolation. A blocked political life demoralizes society (particularly the business community), does not allow pressing issues to be resolved, worsens the investment climate, leads to the outflow of capital, decreases the country’s role on the international arena, weakens social cohesion, and many democratic institutions begin to function poorly.

The Conservatives are Picking up Steam, the left wing is weakening

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Pedro Sánchez, PSOE leader and Pablo
Iglesias, Podemos leader

The PP’s position as Spain’s leading party is not affected by the corruption scandals that rock the party in the centre and in the regions. Nor is it affected by the unwillingness of the voter majority (including the voters of the PP itself) to see Mariano Rajoy as the party leader and the head of government.

Electoral turnout was 69.8 per cent (the December figure was 73.2 per cent), which is markedly below the statistical average during the years of democracy (73.7 per cent) (link in Spanish). Low voter turnout is due to the Spanish people becoming tired of having elections all the time: in 2015, regional, municipal and general elections were held. The inability of the parties to arrive at a consensus also affected voters negatively. The influential Spanish newspaper El Pais wrote that it was “quite possibly the worst electoral campaign during all the years of democracy, so muddled and empty it was,” (link in Spanish). In June, 82.3 per cent of people surveyed assessed the political situation in the country as “bad or very bad” (link in Spanish). It should be noted that the day before the elections, 32.4 per cent of the people surveyed had not yet decided which party they would vote for (link in Spanish).

The People’s Party won the elections again; it received 33 per cent (7.9 million) of the votes (up from 28.7 per cent in December) and won 137 seats in the Congress of Deputies, 14 seats more than in the last election (link in Spanish). The PP’s position as Spain’s leading party is not affected by the corruption scandals that rock the party in the centre and in the regions. Nor is it affected by the unwillingness of the voter majority (including the voters of the PP itself) to see Mariano Rajoy as the party leader and the head of government. Several factors may explain the preferences of the voters. Firstly, the PP definitely has a few feathers in its cap as regards handling the economic crisis. Secondly, it has very loyal voters; it shows none of the voter “fluidity” that is typical of the PSOE and the “newbie” parties. Thirdly, the stance assumed by the PP’s leadership in recent months is a factor. Having rejected the King’s offer to form a government, Rajoy placed himself “above the fray,” so to speak, untouched by the failure to solve the task. At the same time, as has already been noted, he appeared willing to form a large coalition, a solution that many voters favour.

The left wing expected major changes. The overwhelming majority of forecasts put Unidos Podemos (United We Can) coalition, an election bloc formed by Podemos and Izquierda Unida (United Left, IU) and which is mostly comprised of communists, in second place. Having formed a coalition with the IU, Podemos, which keeps vacillating between left-wing radicalism and moderate social democracy, linked itself to a union which is firmly rooted on the left. At the same time, Podemos sought not to alienate its moderate followers: its leader, Pablo Iglesias, rejected the description of Podemos as an “anti-system party” and called for uniting “a social majority which could bring together people with absolutely different views,” around his party (link in Spanish). It is noteworthy that the “election pre-agreement” concluded by the two parties does not include the IU principles that Podemos does not agree with. It does not mention the republican form of government that the IU stands for as an opponent of the Spanish monarchy; there is nothing in there on the need to nationalize the energy sector or the need for Spain to withdraw from NATO (link in Spanish). The leadership of Unidos Podemos did not conceal its intentions to become an alternative to the People’s Party and push socialists into third place.

Yet it did not happen. Defying all forecasts, the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party came in second, thus confirming its status as the leading left-wing power. The voters gave due credit to the efforts that the leader of the party, Pedro Sánchez, poured into overcoming the current political and institutional crisis and forming a government. At the same time, PSOE is far behind the People’s Party. It received 22.7 per cent (5.4 million) of the votes, enough for 85 seats, five fewer than in December. The socialists are looking for a way out of the grave crisis that has befallen the party in recent years.

REUTERS/Susana Vera
Albert Rivera, Ciudadanos leader

PSOE is far behind the People’s Party. It received 22.7 per cent (5.4 million) of the votes, enough for 85 seats, five fewer than in December.

Unidos Podemos received 21.1 per cent (5 million) of the votes and got 71 seats. Experts view this as a defeat, since in December, Podemos and the United Left received a combined 24.4 per cent of the votes. The coalition lost 1.1 million followers.

Ciudadanos, whose leader Albert Rivera held the first place in the ranking of Spanish politicians, suffered the heaviest losses among the “big four.” The party received 13 per cent (3.1 million) of the votes (down from 13.9 per cent in December). It lost almost 400,000 voters and eight seats in parliament (it has 32 seats).

The electoral campaign was accompanied by an outburst of intolerance in public and political life. The emergence of Unidos Podemos, which many voters see as radical left-wing, played into the hand of the People’s Party, whose propaganda had already been geared toward heightening tensions, polarizing public life and painting itself against that background as the guarantor of stability and order. In his speeches, Mariano Rajoy argued for stability over “extremism and radicalism, which could lead Spain to uncertainty, instability and insecurity,” (link in Spanish). In essence, it was “us or Unidos Podemos.” The PP’s leader called upon all reasonable, moderate people who do not support the IU to vote for his party. The IU acted in a similar vein, positioning itself as an alternative to the PP. Pablo Iglesias called upon all those who wanted the PP out to cast a “useful vote” for his party (link in Spanish).

The confrontation between the PP and the IU cannot be separated from the divide in the ages of their voters. About half of those who voted for the PP are over 65. Elderly voters, who now make up 24.5 per cent (over 8 million people) of the electorate and whose number is growing, are typically stable in their party loyalties. Before the elections, 83 per cent of elderly voters stated with utter certainty who they would vote for (the average indicator was lower by 10 points). Retirees are less pessimistic about the situation in Spain and, compared to other age groups, they are far less inclined to favour a multi-party system. In their eyes, the ranking of Spain’s leading politicians looks like this: Mariano Rajoy (37 per cent), Pedro Sánchez (27 per cent), Pablo Iglesias (13 per cent) and Albert Rivera (11 per cent).

Young Spaniards, by contrast (the survey puts people between 18 and 34 in this category) prefer Unidos Podemos. On June 26, 2016, 44 per cent of respondents were prepared to vote for the party, while 17 per cent were planning on voting for the PP, 17 per cent for Ciudadanos and 13 per cent for the PSOE. The young generation prefers a multi-party system and puts Pablo Iglesias in first place in the ranking of the country’s leading politicians (link in Spanish).

Given all this, polarizing society is both fruitless and destructive for Spain, which needs serious political and institutional reforms. Splitting the country into blocs that oppose each other destroys the reconciliatory centre and dooms the country to uncontrollability. Many polls show that the majority of Spaniards are largely centrist in their political positions.

The results of Brexit were announced 48 hours before the elections in Spain, and they had a certain effect on the party struggle. Although Spain does not have an influential Eurosceptic movement, each party interpreted the results of Brexit in terms of its own electoral interests. Thus, the People’s Party once again put forward its favourite idea of “enhancing stability,” blaming “populist” forces (hinting at Podemos) for the “uncertainty” that has now emerged within the European Union. In that connection, Mariano Rajoy once again said that he would not allow a referendum to be held on Catalonia’s independence (Podemos supports the idea). Iglesias, on the contrary, spoke in support of popular referendums and said that opposing them means “defending the principles of authoritarianism and totalitarianism,” (link in Spanish).

A New Government or a Third Election?

REUTERS/Susana Vera
Albert Rivera, Ciudadanos leader

On July 19, 2016, King Felipe VI begins consultations with the leaders of the parliamentary parties, and then he will propose a candidacy for the office of Chairperson of the Government, who is to be elected by the parliament in late July 2016.

In the meantime, same as in December, the PP cannot form a government without agreements with other parties. Mariano Rajoy spoke about the need to create a stable majority government with an approved programme to resolve the major problems Spain is facing. The first party Mariano Rajoy intends to start a dialog with is PSOE. At the same time, the leader of the PP said he was ready to negotiate in order to form a coalition with Ciudadanos, the Basque Nationalist Party and the Canarian Coalition (link in Spanish).

However, both Ciudadanos and PSOE are refusing to work together with the PP. It is partly due to the “Rajoy problem,” since many Spanish politicians and average citizens view Rajoy as the main obstacle on the path towards the changes the country needs. The leader of Ciudadanos, Albert Rivera, refuses to join Rajoy’s government and speaks against his retaining the office of the head of government. At the same time, Rivera may support a conservative government if it implements reforms approved by his party (link in Spanish).

In the current situation, a lot hinges on the stance of the socialists. For decades, PSOE propaganda has instilled in the minds of its members the image of the PP as a “retrograde, reactionary force.” In this context, supporting Rajoy’s candidacy for Chairman of the Government can hardly imply that the socialists want to form a broad coalition with the PP. For them, to support means to abstain when voting for confidence in Rajoy, which will allow the PP to receive a simple majority and form a government. Of course, with such people in it, the government will not enjoy broad parliamentary support. But it will be a permanent government, and this is what Spain so badly needs now. A negative vote is a step toward reproducing “the blocked situation” with all the attendant negative consequences for the country, and a probable third parliamentary elections.

PSOE faces a difficult and painful choice. Its leadership is split on the issue. Pedro Sánchez and several regional leaders are against any support for the PP. At the same time, some regional leaders do not want to hinder the People’s Party, which won the elections by a wide margin, and they do want to form a government. On July 9, 2016, the Federal Committee of the PSOE will determine the party’s position on the issue.

However, the PP also faces a psychological trial. The willingness to form a coalition or govern alone, being dependent on partnership obligations, does not mean that they have the ability or capacity to coordinate joint actions with a partner (or partners) in order to reach mutually acceptable compromises. For a party which until recently had an absolute majority in the Congress of Deputies and was used to governing without regard to anyone, this is a serious and dramatic psychological change. Regardless of their ideological and political orientation, Spanish politicians will have to live under the new circumstances and to come to a consensus with each other.