Print Читать на русском
Rate this article
(votes: 2, rating: 5)
 (2 votes)
Share this article
Pavel Gudev

PhD in History, Senior Research Fellow at RAS IMEMO Sector for US Foreign and Domestic Policy, RIAC expert

In the spring of 2018, the Russian media reacted extremely sharply and painfully to the latest statement made by Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard Admiral P. Zukunft which, on the whole, did not contain anything radically new, but, on the contrary, reflected the very traditional, decades-old approach of the United States and some other countries to the issue of the legal status of Canada’s Northwest Passage (NWP) and Russia’s Northern Sea Route (NSR). In particular, the U.S. Admiral said that “Canada, like Russia, views the Northwest Passage as their internal waters. We interpret that as, no, this is an international strait and it is open for transit passage, which is our same interpretation of the Northern Sea Route.”

Most likely, the United States and its administration are perfectly aware of the fact that the Arctic is a common sea area for both the United States and Russia, and the two countries face the same threats and challenges there. And, despite the tightening sanctions and the growing propensity toward conflict in U.S.–Russia relations, fighting these challenges together would be far more productive.

Russia does indeed consider the NSR as a “historically formed national transportation corridor,” where navigation of foreign civil vessels and warships is possible only under Russia’s complete control.

Russia’s stance regarding the NSR is based on a comprehensive approach that relies on an entire range of legal arguments. Taken separately, none of the arguments are key, and they can certainly be doubted or disputed; however, when taken together, they make this model particularly stable and unshakeable from the legal point of view.

At the same time, it should be understood that Moscow will never be able to abolish the national level of regulating navigation on the NSR: it is largely a matter of ensuring its own national security.


In the spring of 2018, the Russian media reacted extremely sharply and painfully to the latest statement made by Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard Admiral P. Zukunft which, on the whole, did not contain anything radically new, but, on the contrary, reflected the very traditional, decades-old approach of the United States and some other countries to the issue of the legal status of Canada’s Northwest Passage (NWP) and Russia’s Northern Sea Route (NSR). In particular, the U.S. Admiral said that “Canada, like Russia, views the Northwest Passage as their internal waters. We interpret that as, no, this is an international strait and it is open for transit passage, which is our same interpretation of the Northern Sea Route.”

It should be noted that for Washington, Russia’s claims to controlling navigation on the NSR route and Russia’s entire Arctic policy are in many ways identical to what is happening in the South and East China seas, where Beijing lays claims to expanding its sovereignty and jurisdiction and its rights to control the various types of marine economic activities of other states. However, unlike in the South China Sea, the United States had no intention at that time of disputing those “legal claims” of Russia and Canada by using its naval forces under the Freedom of Navigation (FON) programme. Admiral Zukunft’s stance on the matter was peaceable and constructive, “If you want to build trust and confidence in another nation, don’t start with a freedom of navigation exercise. Start with something that’s humanitarian in nature, such as search and rescue, such as environmental…”

We should not ignore the fact, however, that the U.S. Coast Guard and its leadership are most likely perfectly aware of the fact that the Arctic is a common sea area for the United States and Russia, and the two countries face the same threats and challenges there. And, despite the tightening sanctions and the growing propensity toward conflict in U.S.–Russia relations, fighting these challenges together would be far more productive. Whether the State Department, the Pentagon and the Navy command share this point of view is another matter, but we will dare suppose that they do so to a much lesser extent. In any case, the Pentagon does not really hide the need to conduct operations under the FON programme in the Arctic should such a need arise.

Although, on the whole, the United States acknowledges that opening the Arctic region for international navigation and other types of marine economic activities requires that Russia pours special efforts into ensuring navigation safety and protecting the marine environment, the United States has a whole list of items where it disagrees with Russia’s stance on the legal regulations in the NSR.

First, the United States continues to dispute the statement that some of Russia’s Arctic straits (in particular, the Vilkitsky, Shokalsky, Sannikov and Laptev straits) are cut off by a straight baseline that makes them Russia’s internal waters. The United States also believes that the description of the NSR as an historically shaped transportation corridor of the Russian Federation relies on extra-legal terms.

Second, the United States disagrees that foreign vessels may only enter the NSR that goes through Russia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and territorial sea after submitting an official request and obtaining official permission from the Russian side. The United States believes that such restrictions violate the freedom of navigation within the EEZ, the right of innocent passage through a 12-mile territorial sea and the right of transit passage through straits used for international navigation.

Third, the United States acknowledges that stricter regulation of navigation in the NSR is based on the provisions of Article 234 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982). However, the United States emphasizes that even though this article grants the right to adopt certain laws in ice-covered areas within the EEZ, these steps should be intended solely to prevent, decrease and control seawater pollution by ships. These measures should not be discriminatory in essence and should apply solely to matters of navigation. Accordingly, Article 234 does not provide legal grounds for introducing notification or authorization requirements for passage.

The United States believes that if the provisions of the Russian law on the necessity to use icebreakers and pilotage are mandatory for all, they also lead to a broad interpretation of Article 234 of the 1982 Convention. American experts insist that the prohibition on the use of foreign icebreakers in the Russian NSR also goes beyond the competence stipulated in Article 234. The United States believes that any measures introduced by the NSR Administration should be mandatorily approved by the International Maritime Organization (IMO).

In addition, the United States insists that the navigation regime Russia has introduced for the NSR cannot be applied to vessels on government service. This interpretation is based on Article 236 of the 1982 Convention that reads: “The provisions of this Convention regarding the protection and preservation of the marine environment do not apply to any warship, naval auxiliary, other vessels or aircraft owned or operated by a State and used, for the time being, only on government non-commercial service.”

Russia Against Foreign Icebreakers

Russia does indeed consider the NSR an “historically shaped national transportation corridor” where navigation of foreign civil vessels and warships is possible only under Russia’s complete control. In that connection, the latest version of the NSR Navigation Rules states that “the navigation of vessels in the Northern Sea Route waters is organized by the Northern Sea Route Administration, which has been established as a federal governmental agency. An authorization navigation requirement applies to the waters of the Northern Sea Route.”

The NSR goes through sea areas with entirely different legal regimes, which have been established, among other things, by the 1982 Convention: internal waters, 12-mile territorial sea, 24-mile contiguous zone and 200-mile exclusive economic zone of the Russian Federation. Beyond the 200-mile external border of the EEZ, the high seas enclave begins, and even though the NSR theoretically may cut through its waters, too, Russian regulations are inapplicable there.

It is important to notice that, under the 1982 Convention, the right of innocent passage should apply within the territorial sea, and three out of six freedoms of the high seas (navigation, overflight, the laying of submarine cables and pipelines) should apply within the EEZ. Russia, however, considers the NSR as a single transportation route. Accordingly, regardless of the waters covered by Russian sovereignty or the jurisdiction the NSR goes through, a single legal regime of navigation applies, too.

In the Soviet era, compulsory icebreaker services and pilotage applied in certain NSR sections (in particular, in certain Arctic straits). It should be recalled that back in 1967, Viktor Bakaev, the Minister of the Marine Fleet of the USSR, was the first to voice the idea of opening the NSR to foreign transit subject to payment for compulsory icebreaker services and pilotage. During his 1987 speech in Murmansk, Mikhail Gorbachev again announced the USSR’s interest in allowing foreign vessels into the NSR in order to profit from others using this transportation route, but those vessels had to comply with a series of conditions, such as: the use of compulsory icebreaker services and pilotage, and the compliance of vessels with specialized ice requirements. Current Russian legislation preserves these requirements with certain amendments: pilotage is compulsory, while icebreaker services depend on the ice conditions and the vessel’s ice class.

The requirement of icebreaker services and pilotage, for which Russia assesses a charge, is a point for sharp criticism by the United States and other interested countries that consider this measure to be “discriminatory.” Nonetheless, Russia’s legal stance on the matter is based on the argument that these charges are not so much payments for specific services, which is quite legal under the 1982 Convention, but a payment for proper maintenance of the NSR infrastructure, which ultimately ensures protection of the marine environment and its diversity. This is why Russia is categorically opposed to letting foreign icebreakers into the NSR, regardless of whether they are American or Chinese.

The Soviet Legal Doctrine in Effect

The current legal stance of the Russian Federation concerning the NSR is largely based on those provisions of the Soviet legal doctrine and national legislation that are still in effect today.

For instance, when the icebreakers of the U.S. Coast Guard passed through the Arctic waters of the USSR, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR responded with a note of protest on July 21, 1964, stating that the NSR route is far from any international navigation routes and is traditionally used only by vessels flying the Soviet flag. Moreover, the note stated that developing infrastructure on the route had required major financial investment on the part of the USSR. The note also stated that the straits of the Kara Sea (the Shokalsky and Vilkitsky straits), as well as the Laptev and Sannikov Straits, historically belong to the USSR and have never been used for international navigation. All the Soviet legal norms on protecting the state border apply to those straits, and that means that in order to enter internal waters or the territorial sea of the USSR, foreign warships require preliminary authorization of the Government of the Soviet Union, which could be obtained by submitting an official request to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR no later than 30 days prior to the intended date of entry. On April 27, 1965, the Laptev and Sannikov straits were declared to historically belong to the USSR [1], and a few years later, compulsory icebreaker services and pilotage of all vessels were introduced for the Vilkitsky and Shokalsky straits [2].

The repeat attempt of American icebreakers to enter the NSR was not implemented due to difficult ice conditions, but on August 25, 1967, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR responded to it with a note indicating again that the Vilkitsky Strait was cut off by a territorial sea of the USSR, and passage through the Laptev and Sannikov straits is also regulated by the Soviet law on protecting the state border and, consequently, a special authorization for such a passage must be obtained in advance [3].

After those incidents, at a new stage in the Cold War – this time under the Reagan Administration – the USSR adopted two Resolutions of the Council of Ministers, one in 1984 and the other in 1985. These resolutions approved the list of geographic coordinates of points determining the baselines for calculating the width of the territorial sea, the economic zone and the continental shelf. Straightening out the baselines from the continent around Novaya Zemlya, Severnaya Zemlya and the New Siberian Islands and back to the continent as recorded in those resolutions made it possible to declare the Vilkitsky, Shokalsky, Laptev, Sannikov and Kara straits historical internal waters of the USSR, thereby setting the authorization requirement for the passage of foreign vessels through those straits.

It should be clarified here that applying the status of “historical internal waters” to a specific basin was based not on an appeal to an agreement-based source of law, but on taking the norms of customary law, the stance of the international legal doctrine and the rulings of international courts into account. For instance, the generally recognized categories for applying the status of historical internal waters – i.e., waters totally controlled by the state’s sovereignty – to particular basins were:

  • the coastal state had sovereignty over those waters for a long period of time;
  • the waters have an important and special economic, defence and strategic significance for the given country;
  • there is a tacit recognition by most states.

The problem is that while the first two categories are hardly disputable in regard to the Soviet/Russian Arctic spaces, including several straits, the last category is much less so. Despite virtual lack of objections from other states, the repeated passage of U.S. Coast Guard icebreakers and notes of protest by the U.S. Department of State can hardly be viewed as “tacit consent.” Additionally, the fact that American and other submarines most likely regularly passed through basins that the USSR viewed, and which Russia now views, as historical internal waters where passage should be based exclusively on an authorization requirement, should be taken into account.

However, the fact that there were no practical attempts to protest after the 1960s, and particularly after the Resolutions of 1984–1985, posits the question of how substantial the attempts of the United States to dispute Moscow’s legal claims are. Regarding the passage of submarines, the following can be stated: since such actions are not public and information about them remains classified, the answer to the question of whether this practice can be considered an official protest against Russia’s legal claims is certainly negative.

The 1982 Convention Factor

As we mentioned above, the United States insists on applying the right of innocent passage to the waters of the territorial sea along the NSR, the freedom of navigation to the 200-mile EEZ, and ensuring compliance with the conventional right of transit passage in Russia’s Arctic straits. However, the United States is not a party to the 1982 Convention, which de facto undercuts the statements coming from the U.S. side.

Even though the United States continues to treat the 1982 Convention as an instrument that codified customary law norms that are binding for all members of the international community, this stance is no more than a “convenient fallacy” of U.S. experts. Clearly, from the military and strategic point of view, Washington is extremely interested in absolutely all states, including non-signatories of the 1982 Convention, complying with its norms and provisions, and the United States would successfully use the advantages derived from this.

However, at the level of the doctrine of international law, there is another point of view which holds that many provisions of the 1982 Convention still cannot be considered long-standing customary law norms. In particular, this applies to the right of innocent passage of warships through the territorial sea of a coastal state, the right of transit and archipelagic passage and other norms. In practice, it means that states which are parties to the Convention certainly cannot ignore those norms; states that are not parties are able not to recognize them; and only signatory states may use these norms to their advantage. The United States is not yet one of those signatory states.

The established point of view is based on the fact that transit passage has become an international compromise and is currently only moving towards becoming a customary law norm in the future. It is no coincidence that some states recognize only the right of innocent passage, and not the right of transit passage through straits that are cut off by territorial waters. Others, for instance, Iran, go further and insist that the United States has no right of transit passage (in this case through the Strait of Hormuz), since it is not a party to the 1982 Convention.

The same applies to the right of innocent passage for warships. Apparently, the right itself arose with the establishment of the institution of territorial sea. Since its inception, it has been universally recognized and has become a widespread practice for the absolute majority of states. Undoubtedly, enshrining this right in the 1982 Convention was nothing but a step in codifying a right that has long become a norm of international customary law. However, it should be remembered that the uniform and continuous practice of states that recognize the right of innocent passage through territorial seas exists only in regard to commercial vessels. In regard to warships, this practice is not universal: about 40 states insist on either a notification or authorization requirement for passage. Therefore, there is obviously still no customary law norm on the passage of warships through the territorial sea of a coastal state.

One should not believe that the point is that Russia insists on restricting the right of innocent passage through territorial seas or the right of transit passage through international straits. This is a very dangerous error, since under the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, any state may consider itself not bound by certain treaty provisions in regard to a country that periodically violates those provisions. Russia’s naval vessels are highly interested in unhindered passage through the key basins of the World Ocean, including international straits.

Additionally, as a party to the 1982 Convention, Russia has undertaken to respect and comply with those legal norms. In addition, the 1989 USA–USSR Joint Statement on the Uniform Interpretation of Rules of International Law Governing Innocent Passage still applies in U.S.–Russia relations. This statement is also known as the Jackson Hole Agreement signed by Secretary of State James Baker and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Eduard Shevardnadze. In that statement, the USSR agreed that the right of innocent passage applies to all ships without exception, including warships, and this right can be exercised in any basins of the USSR’s territorial sea.

In this connection, what is meant here is that Russia can not only appeal to the unique legal regime of the NSR, which is based primarily on its national legislation, but can also consider itself not bound by any obligation to take Washington’s legal stance on innocent and transit passage, in this case in regard to the NSR, into account. There are reasons to believe that Russia will only listen to the legal arguments of the United States concerning the NSR if Washington ratifies the 1982 Convention. Meanwhile, the arguments of the United States are purely speculative at this given moment in time.

Limitations of the American Stance

The United States also believes that the right of transit passage should apply to Russian Arctic straits because geographically, they meet the conventional requirements of linking a part of the high seas/EEZ with another part of the high seas/EEZ and, consequently, are international. The United States does not take the Soviet point of view based on the so-called functional approach which states that these straits have never been used for international navigation into account. Washington insists that the potential for being used for international navigation results in the change in their legal status.

The stance of the United States does have a certain logic to it, but it also suffers from a simplification of sorts. First, the phrasing of Article 37 of Part III “Straits Used for International Navigation” of the 1982 Convention (“This section applies to straits which are used for international navigation”) means that it treats exclusively current, and not potential, use of the strait. And even though, second, today’s legal doctrine does not give us an answer to the question of what scale of navigation through a strait is required to consider a strait international, clearly, sporadic use of a strait rather signifies that its being qualified as “international” is highly dubious. To assign “international” status, it appears extremely important to carry out a large-scale assessment of such criteria as the total number of vessels passing through the strait, their total tonnage, the value of cargo on board, the size of ships and vessels, and the states whose flag they fly. In addition, other countries should declare their full interest in the given strait being qualified as “international.”

Today, therefore, while the transit potential of the NSR is extremely underdeveloped, speaking about its international status appears premature. We cannot rule out, however, that, as the volume of transit freight grows, particularly if transit dominates the overall freight carriage in the NSR, the arguments of the United States will look far more convincing.

The Environmental and Climate Factors

One of the key arguments of the legal stance taken by the USSR, and now by Russia, concerning the NSR is the provisions of Article 234 of the 1982 Convention, which reads: “Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance.”

This article is justly called the “Arctic exception,” since it talks about taking special environmental interests the Arctic states have in regulating navigation into account. In essence, coastal states are granted the right to introduce national rules in fighting pollution, and these rules can be tougher than international standards. Such powers significantly exceed the usual competence of a coastal state in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). A coastal state can regulate the design, construction, crew designation and equipment of vessels, which the state cannot do under normal conditions, even in the territorial sea.

The United States does not contest the powers of coastal states under Article 234, but argues that, in accordance with the spirit of the 1982 Convention and international practice, any measures to control navigation should be mandatorily coordinated with the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Russia’s (and Canada’s) stance on the matter is the direct opposite: since the wording of Article 234 does not even hint at the American variant being mandatory or desirable, Russia (and Canada) may take additional measures at the level of their national legislation without taking the stance of the IMO and, consequently, of the entire international community into account.

In principle, the United States is most probably ready to assent to the national level of regulating navigation in waters under Russia’s sovereignty and jurisdiction, but only in regard to civil commercial ships flying the U.S. flag. The United States, however, insists that any restrictions introduced under Article 234 (for instance, the authorization procedure for passage through the NSR with compulsory use of icebreaker services/pilotage) cannot be applied to warships and U.S. ships on government service under Article 236 of the 1982 Convention, which reads: “The provisions of this Convention regarding the protection and preservation of the marine environment do not apply to any warship, naval auxiliary, other vessels or aircraft owned or operated by a State and used, for the time being, only on government non-commercial service.

We admit that, regarding the NSR, the contradiction between Article 234 and Article 236 is one of the most significant in the dispute between Russia and the United States. Russia’s stance here is also not straightforward, but it is based on Article 234 taking priority over Article 236 as applied to polar regions, even by virtue of its location in the text of the Convention. Additionally, the priority of Article 234 is based on the consistent state practice and norms of national legislation introduced long before the adoption of the 1982 Convention, by both the USSR and Canada, the latter – in regard to regulating navigation in the NWP.

Another “problematic” point is global warming and the decrease of the ice cover. The process may raise the question of to what extent the wording of Article 234 concerning “the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year” will be adequate to the current situation in the region. Russia’s EEZ waters becoming free of ice may undoubtedly result in other countries considering Russia’s current powers of control over navigation in the NSR as less and less legitimate.

Russia’s stance here is based on the fact that none of the international experts who drafted the text of the 1982 Convention could have envisioned the new millennium being marked by such major climatic shifts, much less could they have imagined the legal consequences that such shifts could entail. Given that the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (1973–1982) did not specifically focus on the Arctic, we may assume that the very notion of “ice-covered areas” on the one hand, and the notion of the Arctic Ocean on the other, were, for many decades before and after the 1982 Convention was adopted, treated as synonyms. The notion itself needed to be introduced only in order to legalize the USSR and Canada’s national legislation norms regulating Arctic navigation.

Theoretically, the shrinking of Arctic ice could result in the traditional NSR pathway that currently runs through Russia’s internal waters and the EEZ shifting to higher latitudes. If that happens, the NSR entirely will go through the high seas, that is, beyond the areas of Russia’s sovereignty and jurisdiction. In that case, Russia will have no legal powers to control navigation, and the NSR will be transformed from a national transportation corridor controlled by Russia into an international navigational route. There will be no more need for compulsory icebreaker services and pilotage by Russia, as navigation will be regulated by the IMO under the appropriate international conventions. This scenario is unlikely at present, since climate changes are most likely cyclical, but it cannot be entirely ignored either.

***

To recap, we should state that Russia’s stance regarding the NSR is based on a comprehensive approach that relies on an entire range of legal arguments. Taken separately, none of the arguments are key, and they can certainly be doubted or disputed; however, when taken together, they make this model particularly stable and unshakeable from the legal point of view.

At the same time, it should be understood that Moscow will never be able to abolish the national level of regulating navigation on the NSR: it is largely a matter of ensuring its own national security. It is in this vein that we should understand the steps taken by Moscow to centralize navigation management in the NSR, from establishing the NSR Administration in 2013 to the possible consolidation of managerial functions in Rosatom. The introduction of the requirement of the exclusive use of ships flying the Russian flag to transport energy resources is a step that is intended not to discriminate against foreign carriers, but to get rid of the so-called “flags of convenience,” return ships to Russian jurisdiction and, consequently, to guarantee new budget revenues.

The United States is also highly unlikely to abandon its stance, which is based on assessing Russia’s legal claims as illegitimate and not correlating with the norms and provisions of the 1982 Convention. We could also suppose that the ramped-up sanctions could result in spearheading new steps under the American FON programme in the Arctic. In practice, it will mean the immediate transformation of the region from an area of peace and stability, which is a favourite mantra at various international forums, into an area of maximum destabilization of bilateral relations. A reasonable question arises here: How far is the United States prepared to go in a conflict with Russia?

It appears that Washington should apply the phrase is uses to characterize its differences with Ottawa to Moscow: “Let’s agree to disagree.” This phrase implies that both countries adhere to their opinion on the legal status of Arctic spaces, but at least exhibit perfunctory respect for national regulatory norms introduced by the other country. In such a situation, Washington would not “lose face” and also would avoid creating an extremely inconvenient precedent that could be used by other coastal countries that claim stronger control in waters under their sovereignty or jurisdiction, including several states adjacent to straits.

In order to achieve maximum de-escalation of U.S.–Russia tensions in the Arctic, consideration could be given to ways of improving the model of bilateral interaction that was shaped back during the Cold War. We are talking two agreements: “On the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas” (1972) and “On the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities” (1989). It would seem that the need for further improvement of these bilateral agreements is long overdue.

Moreover, it may be wise to consider developing and adopting a “Code of Conduct” for the Arctic that would enshrine the joint understanding of what types of naval and military activities in the region (including in various sea areas) the parties can consider admissible or, on the contrary, threaten security. Such a Code would be conducive to the Arctic remaining an area of peace and stability, which would undoubtedly be in the best interests of the entire global community.

Recent and increasingly frequent statements indicate China’s growing ambitions in the Arctic. China is also interested in internationalizing polar spaces as much as possible and advocates the principle of freedom of navigation in the region. For many foreign experts, this is, on the one hand, a certain new “challenge” and, on the other hand, another example of that fact that even Russia’s strategic partners will act more harshly in the future in disputing Russia’s norms of regulating navigation in the NSR. Some people even go so far as to say that Beijing is ready to give support (thus far, only moral support) to the United States’ FON programme events in the Arctic.

We believe that these opinions largely belong with inflated expectations. China would, indeed, not mind a flat-out liberalization of the navigation system in the Arctic on the whole, and in the NSR in particular. It should be remembered, however, that China remains the key state in regard to which the United States annually takes various steps under the FON programme in the South China Sea. Given that China has a very broad interpretation of some conventional norms and provisions (it restricts the right of innocent passage for warships through the territorial sea, prohibits naval activities from being held within the EEZ, does not recognize the air space over the EEZ as international in order to restrict flights of foreign military aviation, etc.), any form of support on the part of China for the United States’ FON programme in the Arctic will be considered as a virtual discrediting of China’s own legal claims to contiguous waters. Therefore, even if Beijing wants to, it is hardly likely to get involved in such an adventure. We hope that common sense will keep Washington from such provocations.

1. Resolution No. 331-112 of the Council of Ministers of the USSR “On the Procedure of Navigation in the Vilkitsky, Shokalsky, Laptev and Sannikov Straits” dated April 27, 1965.

2. Notification to Mariners, published by the Department of Navigation and Oceanography of the Ministry of Defence of the USSR. January 1, 1973, issue 1 (20).

3. Roach J. A., Smith W. R. 2012. Excessive Maritime Claims. 3rd ed. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp. 312–313; 316–317.


Rate this article
(votes: 2, rating: 5)
 (2 votes)
Share this article

Poll conducted

  1. In your opinion, what are the US long-term goals for Russia?
    U.S. wants to establish partnership relations with Russia on condition that it meets the U.S. requirements  
     33 (31%)
    U.S. wants to deter Russia’s military and political activity  
     30 (28%)
    U.S. wants to dissolve Russia  
     24 (22%)
    U.S. wants to establish alliance relations with Russia under the US conditions to rival China  
     21 (19%)
 
For business
For researchers
For students