Sweden’s Arctic Strategy

Sweden does not have direct access to the Arctic Ocean. However, due to its geographical location, it shows significant activity in Arctic affairs. Sweden announced its first Arctic strategy in early 2011. This strategy is in line with Russia’s vision of the situation in the Arctic, which may serve as a favorable political background to increase bilateral cooperation between the two countries. At the same time, some provisions of the document show differences between Russia and Sweden in approaches to specific problems in the Arctic.

Sweden does not have direct access to the Arctic Ocean. However, due to its geographical location, it shows significant activity in Arctic affairs. Sweden announced its first Arctic strategy in early 2011. This strategy is, on a number of aspects, in line with Russia’s vision of the situation in the Arctic, which may serve as a favorable political background to increase bilateral cooperation between the two countries. At the same time, some provisions of the document show differences between Russia and Sweden in approaches to specific problems in the Arctic.

Sweden’s Arctic Strategy

On the eve of its chairmanship of the Arctic Council (May 2011), Sweden announced its first Arctic strategy, which is regarded as a “starting point” for further cooperation in the Arctic. The document entitled “Sweden’s Strategy for the Arctic Region 2011-2013” outlines the key national priorities, objectives and ways to achieve them.

The document specified the following as the main objectives of cooperation in the Arctic:

• ensuring that the Arctic remains an area of low political tension;
• strengthening the Arctic Council (AC) in its role as the central multilateral forum for Arctic-related issues and the Barents Euro-Arctic Region cooperation body;
• promoting the development of an EU Arctic policy and promoting the EU as a relevant cooperation partner in Arctic issues;
• strengthening interaction between the AC and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), as well as EU’s cooperation programs and funds;
• sharpening the attention of the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM) to Arctic-related project activities that supplement the activities of the AC;
• implementing cooperation projects in the Arctic in accordance with the rules of international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and other international treaties.

Photo: Wikimedia.org
Swedish Arctic

Climate and the environment, economic development, and human dimension were named as Sweden’s priorities in the Arctic.

The proposed set of mechanisms for achieving the objectives, which are traditional for northern European countries, includes promotion of positions in international organizations (AC, BEAC, EU, UN, International Maritime Organization), active interaction with neighboring states (including within NCM), implementation of plans and programs on promoting economic and social development of the country’s northern regions.

A number of priorities – environmental protection against climate change, human dimension and the issues of indigenous peoples of the North, and strengthening of the AC – make up the foundation of Sweden’s Chairmanship Program for the Arctic Council 2011-2013.

Sweden’s priorities and Russia’s interests in the Arctic

From the point of view of Russian interests in the Arctic, the Swedish strategy contains a number of positive elements.

Against the background of continuing apocalyptic predictions and concerns about potential conflicts in the Arctic due to the establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf and exploitation of natural resources, a unique statement in the Swedish strategy that the Arctic is a region with a low level of tension and that the popular term “Arctic gold rush” does not have any objective basis is important.

The desire declared by Sweden to, in every way possible, promote the strengthening of the AC as the head political structure on issues of cooperation in the Arctic is equally important. Expanding the jurisdiction of the AC, turning it into a fully-fledged international organization with its secretariat and project budget, which is capable of not only coordinating the priority areas of cooperation, but also implementing applied and practical projects, developing international agreements that are mandatory for all member states, are certainly beneficial to all the Arctic Council members.

Photo: Flickr / Lene Espersen
Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting Nuuk 2011,
Greenland, 2011

However, it should be noted that reducing the need for the Arctic coastal states to drive forward issues within the “Arctic Five” (Russia, USA, Canada, Denmark and Norway) is seen by Sweden as one of the arguments in favor of strengthening the Arctic Council. According to the Swedish side, this will allow the status of the Arctic Council to be maintained and for Sweden, Finland and Iceland to be able to participate in political decision-making on Arctic topics with their legitimate interests being taken into consideration

The matter is that Sweden, Finland and Iceland feel wounded because they have twice not been invited to the meeting of foreign ministers of the five Arctic coastal states – in May 2008 in Ilulissat (Greenland) and in March 2010 in Chelsea (Canada). These meetings reached principally important agreements, in particular, the fact that any overlapping claims in the Arctic will be governed solely by the rules of international law, primarily, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982. Sweden, Finland and Iceland have repeatedly expressed concerns that events in an “Arctic Five” format may weaken the Arctic Council.

From the Russian point of view, the five coastal states have a special responsibility for the situation in the area of the Arctic Ocean, and the “Arctic Five” format possesses an independent value. It is this group of five countries that initiated the modernization and strengthening of the AC, increase in its status as a central organization for multilateral cooperation in the Arctic, and establishment of new areas of cooperation.

In the strategy, attention should be drawn to one other point – Sweden’s intention to actively promote the involvement of the EU in the discussion of Arctic affairs. At the Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting that took place in Nuuk in May 2011, the Swedes persistently spoke out in favor of granting an observer status to the EU, warning that by doing otherwise, the Ministerial Meeting would fail and the Arctic Council would discredit itself in the eyes of the world community.

Russia’s position on this issue is more balanced: given the large number of candidates (among the contenders are also Italy, China, South Korea, Japan and Singapore), it is necessary to first establish clear criteria for granting the observer status and its parameters, and then take a decision at the Ministerial Meeting in 2013. However, the introduction of such criteria and parameters (approved at the AC Ministerial Meeting in Nuuk in 2011) does not mean that the AC is slamming the door to applicant countries. The purpose of the procedure for consideration of applications for the observer status is to not be isolated in the Arctic from the rest of the world, but to create, under new historical conditions, guarantees that the observers will respect the sovereignty, rights and jurisdiction of the Arctic states, that the “rules of the game” in the Arctic will be articulated by the Arctic states themselves, and that only them based on a consensus will determine the basic parameters of the development of situations in the region without outside interference.

The prospects of Russian-Swedish cooperation on Arctic issues

Photo: Flickr / MeoplesMagazine

Although the Swedish strategy designates Russia as one of the main “players in the Arctic field”, it does not mention the country as a possible partner for cooperation in bilateral contexts (though the strategy does not refer to other Arctic states as such, either, with the exception of Northern-European countries). In most cases, Russia appears in the context of assessment of the prospects for improving the activities of the AC and BEAC.

Sweden’s lack of direct access to the Arctic Ocean, on the one hand, completely eliminates the possibility of the issue of division and use of maritime areas and the continental shelf in bilateral relations, and on the other hand – limits the prospects for cooperation on relevant issues such as ensuring the safety of maritime navigation (protection of the marine environment, search and rescue), exploration and exploitation of natural resources, especially hydrocarbon resources.

As the authors of the strategy note, due to the lack of the Arctic coast Sweden has no direct energy interests in the region and, therefore, does not participate in cooperation on energy issues. At the same time, there is a possibility of hiring Swedish enterprises as subcontractors, especially in gas and oil production in the Arctic.

Given the priorities defined in the strategy, joint activities on environmental protection, development of mineral (ore) resources, and protection of the interests of indigenous peoples of the Arctic are more promising in terms of expanding cooperation in bilateral and multilateral contexts.

In the environmental field, elimination of “hot spots” in the North-West of Russia can be included in the number of promising areas of cooperation. The efforts shown by Sweden in this sector under its chairmanship of BEAC in 2009-2011 deserve support. These efforts include the design of financing schemes for the Barents Window environmental projects through the creation of a fund of SEK 12 million. Elimination of “hot spots” in Russia will be a significant contribution to the implementation of the initiative of the Russian leadership on carrying out a “general cleaning” in the Arctic.

Photo: www.davajtrekking.com
Dog sledding in Northern Sweden

There is a serious cooperation potential in the field of mining ore resources. Sweden’s desire to expand sales markets for mineral raw materials deserves support, but with certain reservations. In Swedish initiatives, this subject is dominated by the idea of developing mining as a source of supplying EU countries with strategically important raw materials. The Russian point of view is as follows: expansion of cooperation with the EU should not lead to the transformation of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region into “Brussels’ raw materials basket”, but should rather have a broader scope, with a focus on high technology and innovation.

Strengthening the role of the Arctic as a supplier of minerals has another component for cooperation – development of transport links, particularly, to the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. In this context, the good prospects of joint usage of the Northern Sea Route as the shortest water route joining the north of Europe and the Asia-Pacific Region are becoming visible.

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An analysis of Sweden’s arctic strategy shows that opportunities for expanding bilateral Russian-Swedish cooperation in the Arctic are quite limited. They come down mainly to environmental protection, minimization of the negative impacts of climate change, research, preservation of the culture, traditions, and languages of the indigenous peoples of the North, and transport development. In this regard, cooperation between Russia and Sweden in the Arctic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council is the most promising area, capable of giving the greatest practical effect. Despite some differences in political approaches, Sweden can become Russia’s powerful partner in the development and implementation of projects that meet Russia’s priority interests and focus on the Russian territory.