The Syrian Zugzwang
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Ph.D. in History, Research Fellow at the Plekhanov Russian University of Economics, Valdai Discussion Club Expert, RIAC Expert
The Syrian conflict has been underway for over four years. Numerous terrorist organizations together form a disparate and splintered but significant proportion of the key forces in the conflict. Regional and Western powers have contributed to this process as well. On the other hand, the developments in Syria that followed the Arab Spring had their own domestic roots. In order to achieve a successful resolution of the Syrian crisis we not only need the destruction of radical underground forces but also a keen insight into its social and political roots.
The Syrian conflict has been underway for over four years. Numerous terrorist organizations together form a disparate and splintered but significant proportion of the key forces in the conflict. Regional and Western powers have contributed to this process as well. On the other hand, the developments in Syria that followed the Arab Spring had their own domestic roots. In order to achieve a successful resolution of the Syrian crisis we not only need the destruction of radical underground forces but also a keen insight into its social and political roots.
The Syrian state
The Syrian people are justly proud of their history. The Syrian state traces its roots back to the ancient Eastern powers and the empires of the past, namely Assyria, the Hittite Empire, and Babylon.
The Arab conquests of the 7th century, when the territory of Syria and then of Greater Syria [1] became part of the Arab Caliphate, exerted a fundamental influence on the Syrian people’s fate. Syria was so highly developed in economic, social and cultural terms that the country soon became the center of this great pan-Arab state. When the Arabs came to Syria, the region was a rich and prosperous province of the Roman Empire. Damascus became a cultural, financial, and political center of the Arab Caliphate. Then came the Crusades and the invasion of Tamerlane’s hordes, leading to the disintegration of the common state system in Syria. In the 16th century the Ottoman Empire conquered Syria and made it its province for the next four centuries.
At the turn of the 19th to 20th centuries the Ottoman Empire faced decline, and its Arab part (apart from others) tried to take an historic chance and free itself of the hated Ottoman yoke. The historical experience of the Turks’ and Arabs’ mutual coexistence within a single state, as well as the Turkish leadership’s policy at that time showed both sides that continuing to maintain the status quo was not entirely possible. The outcome of the First World War and the defeat of the Ottoman Empire sparked a national liberation movement of the Arabs. The European colonial powers, particularly Britain and France, hurried to take advantage of this. As a result, under the secret Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 on the post-war division of the Ottoman Empire, Syria found itself in the French zone of influence. Later, French control was formalized by the League of Nations’ mandate system, and France was assigned the League of Nations’ mandate for Syria. Syria won complete independence and sovereignty only after World War II.
The Ba'ath Party: The core of the Syrian state
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The Arab Socialist Ba'ath (which means Renaissance in Arabic) Party was established in Syria in 1947 by Michel Aflaq, an Orthodox Christian, and Salah al-Din al-Bitar, a Sunni. The Ba'ath Party came to power in Syria in March 1963, after which the country de jure and partly de facto adopted a socialist development path. From its very beginnings, the Ba'ath Party was a temporal power, proclaiming secularism, Arab nationalism and socialism as its main principles. Its policy documents were devoid of any reference to religion. On February 23, 1966 there was another coup in Syria, launched by the military from the Alawite community led by Salah Jadid and Hafez al-Assad. Syria’s former leadership was overthrown, but the Ba’ath party’s leading role remained unaffected. In November 1970, another military overthrow installed Hafez al-Assad as the strongman of the government in Syria. Hafez al-Assad’s ascent to power became a turning point in Syria’s history.
Before the 1970s, Syria had been an internally unstable state without a clearly shaped political trajectory. Syria experienced continuous political upheavals; society struggled to form a domestic political elite. Hafez al-Assad’s personal qualities and the geopolitical situation in the Middle East in general allowed him to create a rigidly centralized state system, which enjoyed significant support from the Syrian army and in particular, its generals. Hafez al-Assad’s rule was characterized by stability: the President relied on his inner circle, controlled the situation, and pursued a policy that was extremely tough (even by regional standards) but also balanced. In the 1970s-1980s, Hafez al-Assad launched a process of social and economic reforms, which had a broadly positive impact on the modernization of Syrian society and the industrialization of the state.
The Syrian state was the main driving force behind these reforms. It did not just oversee economic reforms, it took an active role in them. So, in order to intensify the process of redistribution of capital toward the public sector, the state’s role in Syrian industry was gradually increased. In the 1980s, about 75 percent of the Syrian economy was in the government, or public, sector [2]. These economic reforms transformed Syria from being a predominantly agricultural country into an agrarian-industrial one. However, despite this obvious success at tackling some of the most pressing economic problems, the country continued to face socio-economic problems.
The coming to power of the Ba'ath Party and of Hafez al-Assad in particular seriously damaged the prosperous Sunnis in Halab (Aleppo), a traditionally strong community in Syria. Damascus was largely dependent on foreign economic aid, particularly from the Arab world, which was sporadic and based upon political expediency. Falling oil prices in the mid-1980s combined with an economic downturn and social stagnation further exacerbated Syria's economic problems. Budget revenues from the sale of ‘black gold’ fell, and financial assistance from the rich Arab Gulf countries was also reduced. In addition to this worsening economic climate, the country was confronted with mounting social problems as well.
The Ba'ath Party or Ikhwan members
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The renaissance of religious sentiments in Islamic countries at the turn of the 20th to 21st centuries, sometimes called the Islamic Renaissance [3], posed another problem for Syria as a secular state. Radical pan-Arab organization the Society of Muslim Brothers (al-Ikhwan al-musilmun in Arabic) [4] has played the main role in this since the 1980s. However, the Ikhwan began its activity in Syria even earlier, in the 1940s-1960s.
The Muslim Brotherhood claims that Syria became the first country to which it extended its influence from Egypt. The first Ikhwan association in Syria was established in Aleppo in 1937. By then, various religious associations had already been functioning in Syria on a semi-legal basis. Ikhwan members managed to unite all unofficial religious groups. Mustafa al-Siba'i, a brother-in-arms of Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna, became the first leader of the Syrian Ikhwan members, their General inspector (al-murakab al-'aam). The Syrian branch noted continuity between the organization and the Egyptian “center.”
The 1940s-1960s was characterized by an intensification of the Muslim Brotherhood’s activity in Syria. Ikhwan members attempted to participate in the political process, openly or semi-openly created paramilitary camps to train their militants. In part due to their inability, in part due to the system created by the Ba'ath Party, they failed to participate legally in the political process in Syria. In March 1963, Ikhwan members declared a holy war on the government of Syria in the Grand Mosque of Damascus (Umayyad Mosque).
The rise to power of the secular Ba'ath Party changed the Ikhwan’s policy in critical ways. Hafez al-Assad’s efforts to steamroller the opposition provoked the gradual radicalization of Ikhwan activities. Searching for new forms of activity, the Muslim Brotherhood increasingly resorted to radical political struggle, characterized by extremism and violence. As a result, on July 7, 1980 the Syrian parliament passed a law under which affiliation to the Muslim Brotherhood was punishable by the death penalty.
The intensification of the Ikhwan’s activity in terms of advocacy became another characteristic feature of its members. They started to link their opposition to the Syrian government with the struggle against the “infidel,” “Alawite” and (sometimes) Christian government. They deliberately placed a particular focus on the fact that the President and some members of Syria’s supreme authority came from the Alawite community. They also emphasized that the Ba'ath Party was founded by Michel Aflaq, an Orthodox Arab. Syria’s political system was presented as a struggle of the 80% of the Syrian people against the 20% of Alawites who seized power and oppressed the Sunnis.
The Ikhwan, among other things, referred to the famous dictum of Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), a renowned Syrian scholar of the Sunni Hanbali Madhhab School, who declared a fatwa calling the Alawites “heretics” and “apostates,” and permitting their killing. The scholar had a noticeable impact on the development of radical ideas and trends in the Middle East and his legacy includes about 500 [5] works that are cited by radicals to this day.
Historically, unrest on religious grounds has ignited in Syria on a fairly regular basis. The sectarian conflicts that undoubtedly existed in Syrian society have largely hypertrophied, as is clear from the fact that, before Alawite Hafez al-Assad came to power, the Ikhwan had actively used the same propaganda techniques, which were later supplemented with an increased emphasis on the Alawite origin of the head of the Syrian state. All the other “claims” and “demands” on the Syrian government were the same.
The Ikhwan carried out terrorist attacks, taking the lives of Ba'ath Party officials, trade union representatives, religious leaders supporting the regime, but most frequently of regular people in offices, cafes, and shops. One of the worst incidents organized by the Ikhwan took place in June 1979 at the Aleppo artillery school, when 32 cadets were murdered [6]. Later, 400 army officers, suspected of sympathizing with the Muslim Brotherhood, were dismissed from service [7].
The Muslim Brotherhood’s terrorist activities came to a boil in Hama in 1982. Here, I would like to quote Alexander Ignatenko, an expert in Arab studies, who scrutinized these events using a wide range of sources. “At about three o’clock in the morning of February 3, residents of the city of Hama were awakened by loudspeakers installed on mosques’ minarets. People were surprised and confused to hear of the reported uprising across the country against the regime. They were urged to join in the fight, and were invited to a nearby mosque for weapons. Two hours before, a total of about 500 gunmen armed with machine guns, mortars and grenade launchers, spread out around the city and took up their positions.” [8]
However, people did not support the provocateurs. “The Syrian state had no choice but to save the city from the terrorists,” said President al-Assad.
The social situation in Syria and the army’s support
Amidst these developments, Hafez al-Assad had only one option: to rely on the armed forces. In the 1980s to 1990s the Syrian army and security services became a major political and economic center in the country. Following the suppression of the Ikhwan rebellion that threatened Syria’s territorial integrity and the statehood, these trends have intensified. The fact that Hafez al-Assad came from the armed forces also contributed to the strengthening of the army’s position.
The president’s closest associates included Mustafa Abdul Qadir Tlass (a Sunni), who served as Syria’s Defense Minister from 1972 to 2004, and Hikmat al-Shehabi (a Sunni), who served as chief of staff of the Syrian Army between 1974 and 1998. The only state body under the Alawites’ exclusive control has been (and remains) military intelligence. Alawite Ali Duba headed Syria’s Military Intelligence for a long time (1974-2000).
Members of the military and intelligence held prominent positions in the Ba’ath Party’s upper echelons. When making appointments to key posts in the army and security services in the first decades of his rule, Hafez al-Assad gave preference to candidates of Alawite descent. Over time, especially after the suppression of the Ikhwan coup attempt, this trend began to gradually lose momentum.
According to Oriental scholar V. Akhmedov, in the 1980s-1990s the proportion of Alawites in senior government positions did not exceed 30% [9]. However, the corresponding figure for the army was 60% [10]. It is worth noting that, despite the Alawites’ somewhat privileged position in certain government bodies, ordinary members of the community were among Syria’s poorest people. And more broadly the country enjoyed a more balanced representation of all ethnic and religious communities in Syria.
Furthermore, over time, the trend to appoint Alawites to key positions in the army and civil service gradually died out, especially after the suppression of the Ikhwan revolt. The only exception to this has been military intelligence. For a long time (1984-2005) Abdel Halim Khaddam (a Sunni), a loyalist of Hafez al-Assad, was Vice President of Syria. Prior to that, A. Khaddam served as Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1970 to 1984. Farouk al-Sharaa (a Sunni), another close associate of Syria’s head of state, served as foreign minister from 1984 until 2006 when he became (and still is) the country’s Vice President.
Bashar al-Assad and the status quo
After Hafez al-Assad’s demise in June 2000 the Syrian state was faced with a number of urgent issues. Just a few hours after the death of the president, the parliament unanimously changed an article of the constitution, reducing the minimum age for presidential candidates from 40 to 34 years to ensure Bashar was eligible for office. The Ba'ath Party nominated Bashar as-Assad, Hafez al-Assad’s youngest son as a candidate for the country’s presidency. In a public referendum a few weeks later he received more than 97.29% of the vote [11].
On the face of it, the transfer of power to Bashar al-Assad seemed simple enough, but in reality it was accompanied by an intense internal political struggle in the higher echelons of power. Senior party functionaries and the army leadership had three options in terms of whom to nominate: Bashar al-Assad; Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam; Defense Minister Mustafa Abdul Qadir Tlass. Since representatives of the “old guard” were all somewhat advanced in years, Hafez al-Assad’s son was chosen. It was assumed that the old elite would retain their privileges under Bashar al-Assad. Tlass and Khaddam were also fierce adversaries, making the choice in favor of Hafez al-Assad’s relatively apolitical son seem the best option.
The generals and the Ba'athist elite hoped that Bashar al-Assad would be able to maintain the status quo and that the privileged position of the army and of the “old guard” would remain untouched. However, Bashar al-Assad’s rise to power in Syria was met with a mixed reception both in the West and in the region. Indeed, against the backdrop of his strong-willed and charismatic father, young Bashar was rather different from the traditional image of the type of person to lead a Middle Eastern country facing a heavy burden of problems to be solved.
Bashar al-Assad had not intended to occupy such an important post. Bassel al-Assad, the eldest son of former President Hafez al-Assad, was widely expected to succeed his father had it not been for his death in a car accident in 1994. Then it became clear that Bashar al-Assad would have little choice but to go into politics.
***
The political configuration created by the Ba'ath Party led by Hafez al-Assad did not allow any opposition activity, and the opposition was therefore automatically illegal and in a radical religious realm. There were no other ways to participate in Syria’s political process. After Bashar al-Assad came to power this system underwent scant (if any) change. By supporting the opposition, the West pursues the same policy, if more aggressively, as it did (not so openly) in the 1970s-1980s when the Ikhwan was the main opponent to the Ba'ath Party. There have never been political forces in Syria’s history apart from either the Baathists or the Ikhwan, and the latter’s supposed successors that we see today. Then, Ikhwan members opposed vehemently the country’s socialist orientation and, accordingly, were anti-Soviet. This explains the West’s cautious support for them.
Given the economic and political development of regional powers, primarily, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey, indirect support (e.g., via social and religious foundations) for certain radical structures built on political and religious grounds, became their prerogative.
The Ikhwan skillfully manipulated the Syrian leader’s affiliation with the Alawite community to their political ends. They also exploited the fact that the Ba'ath Party was established by Orthodox Arab Michel Aflaq. As a result, Syria’s political configuration seemed trapped in a zugzwang: either the Ba'ath Party or the Ikhwan. Despite the mistakes and failures of the political leadership as represented by the party, the Syrian people, having supported the Ba'ath Party, made the only “right” choice in this situation.
***
In March 2011, the Arab Spring sparked armed conflict in Syria, which gradually escalated into civil war. According to the UN, by fall 2015 the war had taken the lives of over 220,000 people [12]. According to UN statistics, in summer 2014 the number of killed stood at 200,000 people, a quarter of whom were women and children [13].
The on-going conflict in Syria has many underlying causes. First, some segments of the population are expressing social and socio-economic discontent with Syria’s economic stagnation. Academician V. Naumkin rightly notes that, among other things, “The protest movement against the Syrian government was generated by social unrest after a five-year drought that pushed many impoverished rural people to the cities.” [14] Second, the conflict has intensified due to the influence of external actors, namely regional powers and Western states. That external interference seems to be the main reason for the almost five-year-long civil war in Syria. On September 30, 2015, Bashar al-Assad sent a letter to Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, asking the Russian military for support [15]. From September 30, 2015, the Russian Aerospace Forces have been conducting pinpoint airstrikes on ISIL and other terrorist organization targets in Syria.
1. Author’s note: Greater Syria (Bilad al-Sham in Arabic) is a term used in the historiography of the peoples of the East, which denotes the territory of the present Syrian state and some part of the neighboring countries.
2. V. Ahmedov. Modern Syria: History, Politics, Economy. Moscow, Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. 2010, p. 9 [in Russian]
3. S. Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations. Moscow, AST Publishers. 2014, pp. 161-163 [in Russian]
4. Author’s note: In 2003 Russia’s Supreme Court recognized the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization.
5. A. Vasiliev. Puritans of Islam? Wahhabism and the First Saudi State in Arabia (1744/1745-1818). Moscow, Nauka Publishers; Oriental Literature Chief Editorial Board, 1967, p. 93 [in Russian]
6. A. Ignatenko. Caliphs without a Caliphate. Islamic Non-Governmental, Religious and Political Organizations in the Middle East: History, Ideology, Activities. Moscow, Nauka Publishers, 1988. pp. 28-30 [in Russian]
7. E. Pir-Budagova. History of Syria. XX Century. Moscow, Institute of Oriental Studies. 2015, p. 243 [in Russian]
8. A. Ignatenko. Caliphs without a Caliphate. Islamic Non-Governmental, Religious and Political Organizations in the Middle East: History, Ideology, Activities. Moscow, Nauka Publishers, 1988. p. 31 [in Russian]
9. V. Ahmedov. Modern Syria: History, Politics, Economy. Moscow, Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. 2010, p. 42 [in Russian]
10. Ibid. p. 46
11. President Bashar Hafez Al-Assad declared the winner in Syria's recent multi-Candidate Elections. // The Syrian Times. Damascus. 4 June 2014
12. Russian organizations gathered in the past month 15 tons of humanitarian aid to Syria // RIA Novosti. October 14, 2015. http://ria.ru/syria_peace/20151014/1301689992.html [in Russian]
13. Study: Quarter of civilians killed in Syrian War are children, women. 29 September 2015 // Al Jazeera. http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/9/29/25-percent-of-syrian-war-deaths-women-children.html
14. Conflicts and wars of the 21st century (Middle East and North Africa) / Ed. V.V. Naumkin, D.B. Malysheva. Moscow, Institute of Oriental Studies, 2015, p. 29 [in Russian]
15. Ivanov: Assad asked Russia for military aid // The Vzgliad paper. September 30, 2015.
http://vz.ru/news/2015/9/30/769605.html [in Russian]
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