Jordan’s Remarkable Resilience

Jordan is oftentimes characterized as a Middle Eastern exception and paradox: an explicitly artificial colonial construct, and yet resilient and durable. Overall, there are strong reasons to believe that despite the war in Syria raging on Jordan’s doorstep, an acute domestic refugee problem, and echoes of the Arab Spring protests still in the air, the collapse of the Jordanian state and regime is highly unlikely.

Jordan is oftentimes characterized as a Middle Eastern exception and paradox: an explicitly artificial colonial construct, and yet resilient and durable. The recent rise of new security challenges, such as the rise of the Islamic State, calls for a thorough analysis an exploration of the factors involved. Overall, there are strong reasons to believe that despite the war in Syria raging on Jordan’s doorstep, an acute domestic refugee problem, and echoes of the Arab Spring protests still in the air, the collapse of the Jordanian state and regime is highly unlikely.

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The regionwide upheavals that shook the Arab world in 2011, as well as the collapse of state structures in Iraq and Syria precipitated by the rise of the Islamic State (IS) invite us to reflect on the current situation in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, which has managed to remain relatively stable amidst the stormy waters of Middle Eastern politics. In the past, the Jordanian state and the ruling Hashemite regime weathered many crises and in many instances demonstrated resilience to both external and domestic pressures, such as coup d’état attempts, diplomatic and military defeats, social unrest, and salient socio-economic cleavages.

Today Jordan is once again facing a multiplicity of internal and external problems: a vast influx of Syrian refugees, lingering discontent with the regime, and tensions between social groups. The most worrying development, however, has been the encroachment of IS, aimed at dismantling national boundaries and identities that the group sees as artificial and imposed by foreign powers. Now that Jordan has entered the fray and joined the US-led coalition against IS following the gruesome execution of a Jordanian fighter pilot, the question is: what has accounted for Jordan’s remarkable resilience to date and will Jordan be able to adapt to the mounting challenges in the future?

The paradox of Jordanian statehood

REUTERS/Carlo Allegri
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry holds
a meeting with King Abdullah II at his palace
in Amman, October 24, 2015

At first glance, it is indeed incredible that the Kingdom has shown such survivability in view of its complicated history and prominent social divisions.

The modern Jordanian state grew out of the emirate of Transjordan, administered by Great Britain as a mandate territory after WWI and given to Abdullah Sharif of Mecca to pacify the local Bedouin tribes and to serve as a check on French influence in the region. Transjordan was thus a pure colonial construct: it had never previously existed as a political entity, lacked a clear power center, a unifying ideology, historical boundaries or even economic means to maintain viable state institutions [1]. Moreover, from the very outset the country’s significant proudly Arab Bedouin population has been ruled by a dynasty with exceptionally strong ties to the West – so strong, in fact, that Abdullah II—the reigning monarch—was born to a British mother.

As a consequence of this dearth of national history, Jordan has always struggled with its identity. In the Kingdom’s post-independence period, the annexation of the West Bank in 1948, the ensuing major influx of refugees, and the extension of citizenship to West Bank Palestinians have fueled discord and division on ethnic and ideological grounds between the Palestinian majority and the East Bank Jordanians of tribal background. Consequently, today “being Jordanian” continues to mean different things to different segments of the population. Recent economic crises and proliferation of calls for political reform have only served to deepen the social fault lines, with East Bank nationalists accusing the Hashemite regime of pandering to the Palestinians and Palestinians claiming to suffer from political discrimination. All of these tensions came to a head in 2011 when 7,000 to 10,000 protesters took to the streets to denounce corruption of state institutions, rising unemployment rates, and to demand political change.

Not just a sand castle

U.S. Department of State
A close-up view of the Za'atri camp in Jordan for
Syrian refugees as seen on July 18, 2013

Despite Jordan’s significant potential for fragility, the state and the regime have remained essentially unchallenged for three main reasons: the loyalty of the tribes, the religious and tribal legitimacy of the Hashemite family, and Jordan’s external rents.

The resilience of the Jordanian state essentially stems from the state formation process dating back to the emirate period. Through inducement and co-optation, through deals, concessions, financial rewards, and marriages, the Jordanian tribes became integrated into the state and eventually transformed into civil servants: they collected taxes, maintained law and order, served in courts, owned land, and distributed state resources [2]. To this day, the tribes form the core of the state apparatus, while its stability and existence depend on their continued participation and consent.

The integration of the tribes certainly benefited the regime as well. The Hashemite rulers—the current King included—effectively positioned themselves as the main arbiters, mediators, and overseers of the delicate balance between powerful tribes and shaykhs. By incorporating the tribes into the state and providing them with a stake in its survival, the Hashemite regime created for itself a large support base to rely on in times of crisis. As part of this logic, the Jordanian armed forces have generally been recruited through tribal channels with tribal authorities holding high military posts. The link between the tribes and the regime is strong, but nevertheless requires work and careful diplomacy, such as that of King Abdullah who rushed to meet with the relatives and tribesmen of pilot Muath Kassasbeh following the pilot’s execution by the Islamic State.

Other crucial resources for regime and state survival are the tribal and religious credentials of the rulers. As descendants of emir Husayn Sharif, the leader of the Arab revolt, the Jordanian rulers have historically spared no effort to project a Bedouin image and ostentatiously uphold the tribal way of life. The main source of the royal family’s legitimacy is, however, thought to be their lineage. Claiming descent from the Banu Hashim – a clan of the Quraysh tribe of the Prophet Muhammad, the monarch is able to invoke his religious credentials when it fits him and thus remain above the political fray.

Lastly, the Hashemite regime has been able to survive due to Jordan’s ability to attract significant external political rents and use them to pacify the population and “purchase” legitimacy and popular consent [3]. A largely agricultural country boasting only an abundance of phosphates, Jordan nevertheless holds a strategic geopolitical location and plays a pivotal role in regional politics. Located between Israel, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Iraq, Jordan has been extremely skillful at attracting financial and military support from Great Britain, the United States (whose annual aid to Jordan exceeded $1 billion in 2014), as well as from Saudi Arabia. These states hold a vested interest in Jordan’s stability for various reasons. For the US, Jordan is a strategic regional ally, one of only two states currently at peace with Israel, as well as an oasis shielding the Jewish state from the instability in Iraq and Syria. The Saudis, in turn, are always eager to support a fellow monarch lest anti-monarchical attitudes spill over to Saudi soil.

Jordan’s refugee situation has been no less important. The sheer number of Syrian refugees on Jordan’s territory (over 629,000, according to UNHCR) has attracted development and humanitarian agencies, as well as large increases in development aid from multilateral donors, such as the EU, the UN, and the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD).

Thus when the protests broke out in 2011, the Jordanian government was able to quench them by increasing public spending by $650 million to raise salaries, create more government jobs, and lower taxes, essentially buying the protests out.

Harnessing the challenges to come

EPA/WAEL HAMZEH
Alexei Sarabyev:
Lebanon in the Crosshairs of Jihadism

Political astuteness of the Hashemite regime, loyalty of the tribes, and extensive external support have all contributed to Jordan’s stability to date, and there are reasons to believe that Jordan will be able to carry on relatively unscathed.

The Syrian civil war has been both a curse and a blessing. While the war added to the refugee burden and visibly transformed the social landscape of the country’s northern areas straining under the influx of Syrians and expansion of the refugee camps, it also weakened the opposition. The movement split along pro- and anti-Assad lines, hindering any attempts at concerted pressure on the Hashemite regime. The protesters’ demands for more political representation, fairer elections, and more power to the parliament have mostly gone unheeded. The largest concession offered by the King has been to consult the parliament in appointing the Prime Minister, but overall King’s powers have not diminished.

Another important factor in weathering the Arab Spring has been the failure of the opposition to agree on their demands. The divisions between the East Bank Jordanians and the Palestinians proved to be crucial, because while both groups advocated for reform, the East Bankers, wary of losing their political privileges, wanted more economic redistribution, while Palestinians demanded more political participation, allowing the regime to pursue controlled liberalization only to backtrack when the pressure to reform eventually decreased.

The domestic and external security challenges, such as the rise of the Islamic State, the development of a homegrown Salafist movement, and departure of some 2,500 Jordanians to join the ranks of IS and Jabhat Al-Nusra, have provided the regime with new opportunities for power consolidation. In this vein, the King continues to use the threat of IS to rally the masses and urge all social groups to support the war effort.

With the steady stream of funds made available to the regime by foreign donors to fight IS, the calls for political reform have been eclipsed by security concerns but have hardly disappeared for good. Thus while the collapse of the state or the regime in Jordan is highly unlikely, its future hinges on bridging the socio-economic gap between the Palestinians and the East Bankers, finding ways of managing the opposition’s demands, and securing legitimacy for the future, seeing that the Crown Prince Hussein—heir apparent to the Jordanian throne—is half-Palestinian, one-quarter British, and only one-quarter Hashemite.

1. Alon, Y. The Making of Jordan: Tribes, Colonialism, and the Modern State, London: I.B. Tauris, 2007, p. 3.

2. Ibid, p. 5.

3. Beck, M., Hüser, S. Jordan and the “Arab Spring”: No Challenge, No Change?, Middle East Critique, 24:1., 83-97, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/19436149.2014.996996