Mother country without a “critical mass”

Current Russian-Ukrainian relations are not based on the value system or a mobilization project common for the two countries and often remind of a dialogue between a mute and a deaf. Nevertheless a full-fledged existence of Ukraine with the preservation of its specific social features may contribute to the systemic transformation of Russian development model – from the current mobilization pattern to the innovative one.

Current Russian-Ukrainian relations are not based on the value system or a mobilization project common for the two countries and often remind of a dialogue between a mute and a deaf. Nevertheless a full-fledged existence of Ukraine with the preservation of its specific social features may contribute to the systemic transformation of Russian development model – from the current mobilization pattern to the innovative one.

The Soviet political system tried to organize the life in all 15 soviet socialist republics according to one and the same pattern, based on the union-wide model. Of course, local problems were present everywhere. Estonia, Georgia or Turkmenia differ quite a lot in view of public relations, but the model of Soviet ideocracy in this or that way was supported everywhere – from Riga and Chisinau and from Frunze to Alma-Ata.

A talk between a mute and a deaf

Disintegration of the USSR caused the emergence of political regimes that were historically appropriate for particular nations and political systems. In the majority of cases post-soviet countries came back to the pre-soviet past and original organic model of existence. Some countries got an oriental tyranny with “president-the-Sun”, others – a corporate state without extremely reach and extremely poor, still others – an authoritarian regime built around a super-charismatic leader, in other places we can see a parliamentary republics with the president – marshal of ceremonies. It is interesting, that Russia got a super-presidential republic (“presidential monarchy”) while Ukraine received a peculiar semi-anarchic “Makhnovism”. Attempts to establish a “strong power” every time were and are met with an active resistance – either by opposition, or by “humiliated and insulted” ripsnorters, or Maidan is shuffling all political deals and forces to recollect popular assemblies of Kievan Rus and Cossack Rada in Zaporozhian Host.

Different understanding of the origin and goal of the supreme power in Russia and Ukraine, differences in political cultures and systems resulted in gross misunderstanding between Russians and Ukrainians– both at the level of political elites and regular citizens and impacted a routine mutual perception.

In general, Russian-Ukrainian relations often remind a dialogue between a mute and a deaf.

It’s rather difficult to explain to an average Ukrainian why Russia needs Caucuses and Tatarstan, why fighting in Chechnya and spending lots of money to reconstruct this country, why trying to make a pale copy of an empire, why organize winter Olympics in subtropics and why Russians wish to have Sevastopol. Is Russia short of lands, seas and towns? It is so huge and vast! Why having a State Duma if “it is not a place for discussions” and all political issues are resolved elsewhere?

At the same time many Russians do not understand how one can live without a “stronghand”, without Russian being an official language, why “all these Maidans”, why in Ukraine the name of the presidential elections’ winner becomes known only after the voting is over and sometimes even later. And why in Verkhovna Rada the deputies not only beat the faces to each other but sometimes break crowns?

It’s better together

The same is true for the Russian miscomprehension why Ukraine “seceded” and now doesn’t want to joint the Customs union, or EurAsEC, or “renewed union”, but is striving to get into EU? It’s obvious that it’s better together, were “nearly one and the same nation”.

«Ukrainian” issue for Russian nationhood during three and a half centuries has had an extraordinary meaning: “Ukrainian” factor was a kind of “critical mass” for any Russian mega-project, because only together with Ukraine Russia turned into the empire – first Russian, then Soviet. At Khrushchev times the Soviet propaganda even named Ukraine “the second among equals” of Soviet republics.

A skeptic smile of a layman addressed to several republics of the former USSR is partially justified: yes, it was us, Russia, who built everything for you – factories, power plants, opera houses, theaters, universities and cinema studios. This position is irrelevant towards Ukraine – first in Russian empire and later in the USSR Ukraine was the initiator and not the recipient of modernization processes. Now, without Ukraine, Russia is again – either Moscovia, or Moscow kingdom or “the Island of Russia” (as named by Vadim Cymbursky) (http://www.archipelag.ru/ru_mir/ostrov-rus/cymbur/island_russia/). . And it’s not the matter of smaller territory or population – without Ukraine Russia loses the imperial universality and diversity. The key identifying and imperializing vector becomes ‘Moscow-Kazan’ or ‘Moscow-Northern Caucasus’ instead of ‘Moscow-Kiev’. Instead on Pan-Slavism and Feast of Orthodoxy some Eurasian option becomes a basis for ideology, while discussions about a historic coexistence of Christianity and Islam turn into a mandatory ritual of powers.

Did Ukraine bury the USSR?

Actually twenty years ago the end to the USSR was put by two factors –diarchy of Gorbachev-Eltsin in Moscow and a hard “no” from Kiev to any projects of a “renewed union”.

On December 1, 1991 Ukrainian SSR conducted a referendum where 90.32 % of population voted for independence. In fact it was a legitimization of Verkhovna Rada resolution adopted on August 24 and proclaiming the state independence.

It’s remarkable that this choice was defined by two causes, two different understandings of the Ukrainian future with independence and sovereignty. For some, for ‘romantic people’ the independence was an existential choice – the right of Ukraine and its people for self-fulfillment in the world history. For the others, ‘pragmatic people’ the independence first of all meant a social and economic optimization of living , they believed that without the Union center development of the effective state and economy will be simpler.

In the last two decades degradation tendencies prevailed over modernization both in Ukraine and in Russia. Nevertheless, some specific nostalgia for the Soviet Union or at least for a “renovated common state” is mainly typical for elder people whose youth and meridian of capacities passed coincided with the Soviet era. But for the overwhelming majority of Ukrainian citizen the sovereignty and independence are real values. The poll conducted by Kiev International Institute of Sociology in summer (http://zn.ua/SOCIETY/suverenitet__zavisimost_ot_sebya-84523.html, showed that 76.4 % of respondents consider the sovereignty of Ukraine as an absolute value.

“Ukraine is not Russia”

The Ukrainian community during last twenty years has developed a clear opinion about modern Russia, though some stereotypes are still present. Russian political values and realities are not attractive for Ukrainians. That’ why among the arguments for the “unification” with Russia in whatever form (as a Slavonic Union, Customs union, EurAsEC etc.) prevail the emotional reasoning – “we are a single nation”, “I’m Russian and I’m for the unification of Russia and Ukraine”, “it was perfect in the Soviet Union and now everything is ruined”, “Russia is a reach country and will help us”, “Russia was lucky to get Putin, and we are short of luck” etc.

All attempts to make Russia attractive for the Ukrainian society on the value level have failed. The Ukrainian public consciousness links Russia to the resource-based economy, uncompetitive political process, “uncivil” society, paternalistic expectations and behavior of population, dependent courts, absence of private property, corruption, lack of the freedom of speech, monocentric power, actually one-party political system, such parliamentary and presidential elections where the result is known long before voting etc. While nearly a half of these characteristics are attributable to post-soviet Ukraine as well, they accept them as negative features to be eliminated and see a realistic and reachable alternative to this situation in the European Union.

This feeling of mental and political difference from Russia is present in the title of President Leonid Kuchma book “Ukraine is not Russia”. The attitude of many Russians to Russian-Ukrainian issue can be expressed by the title of another well known book “What to do?” - meaning what to do with Ukraine.

An attempt to influence Ukraine on the level of values was taken even by Patriarch Kirill and ROC: the concept of “Russian world” confronting “western civilization of consumption” was either offered to or imposed on the Ukrainian society. “Common for Russia and Belorussia values” were mentioned but this undertaking was not successful and recently was abandoned.

Some Russian technologists of “soft power” try to build a common with Ukraine and Belorussia “Russian world” by the development of a “common cultural and information space”. But to become a consumer of Russian pop culture – listen to Pugacheva, Zemfira, Kirkorov, Baskov, Russian rock, “Chanson” radio, watch Russian TV-shows and TV series (by the way – many of them were shot in Ukraine) one should live in the same state, or be a member of the customs union or stay within the same information space.

External enemy and internal traitor

A constant need in external enemies and internal traitors is believed to be a specific feature of Russian political culture. The confrontation (or struggle) with the first and exposure of the second strengthens the legitimacy of any political regime – that of Ivan the Terribly, Peter the Great, Stalin or Putin-Medvedev, while the state ideology creates an image of the “last fortress” - refuge of “true faith”, “a bulwark of communism” or “energy super country”. Such a system vitally needs a “Judas the traitor” – former companion-in-power left for immigration: Prince Kurbsky, Hetman Mazepa, Lev Trotsky or Boris Berezovsky.

The independent Ukraine in the context of similar stereotypes and myths often is perceived by Russia as an external enemy (foe, adversary) and as an internal traitor who cunningly “separated” for the mother country. Both negative stereotypes overlap and intensify each other. That’s why in recent years the attitude of Ukrainians to Russians is more amiable that the attitude of Russians to Ukrainians and Ukraine as demonstrated by all polls without exception.

Russia and Ukraine – two poles of social structure

It has to be admitted that Russian-Ukrainian relations at the present time are not based on any profound system of values or any mobilization project common for both of them and the vision of the future is replaced by emotions from the “common past”. These relations strongly depend on the current situation – world prices on oil and gas, backstage agreements of the countries leaders, global geopolitical projects promoted by USA, EU and China etc.

But for the Eastern Europe and post-soviet space Russia and Ukraine act like two poles of social structure: Russian political system is based on the monocentric power, Ukraine is drawn towards polyarchy. Imperial spirits are recovering on different layers of Russian society with the ideas that Ukraine as a state is an unviable “historical mistake”, that soon water finds its own level, that Russia is facing a hard dilemma – empire or death etc.

From the competitiveness viewport Russia, more than anybody else, is interested in the full-fledged existence of Ukraine with the preservation of all specific features of Ukrainian society, rather that in the unification with that country and transformation of its political system into a twin of Russian system (this trend is actively followed by the Victor Yanukovich regime). Only such Ukraine can offer an efficient challenge for the Russian society and state, creating the prerequisite for modernization and internal development of Russia. Just such a Ukraine may contribute to the systemic transformation of Russian development model – from the current mobilization pattern to the innovative one.

This type of Russian-Ukrainian relations can become mutually beneficial and help to transform both Russia and Ukraine into modern well developed and elaborate countries with such a wonderful life that their citizens will not need a daily mindset training on “How great is was in the Soviet Union and how awful it was to lose it”.