In August 2011 independent Moldova turned twenty. During 20 years it has been painfully choosing the strategic trend for its development: what companion would be most suitable for the further road – Western or Eastern Europe? But Moldova is still where it was 20 years ago – far from the West and close to the East. Though it would be improper to say that it didn’t manage to maintain the young democracy, it would be an exaggeration to state that soon is shall make a successful example of Russian-European neighborhood.
In August 2011 independent Moldova turned twenty. During 20 years it has been painfully choosing the strategic trend for its development: what companion would be most suitable for the further road – Western or Eastern Europe? But Moldova is still where it was 20 years ago – far from the West and close to the East. Though it would be improper to say that it didn’t manage to maintain the young democracy, it would be an exaggeration to state that soon is shall make a successful example of Russian-European neighborhood.
After the USSR disintegration Russia significantly influenced the social and political life in Moldova. And this influence was not always favorable, particularity in the political domain. In all fairness it should be mentioned that Russia is not the only one to blame for the failures of the young Moldavian state. Nevertheless many believe that Russia was a stumbling block on the path of rapprochement between the postmodern Europe and Moldova that is a part thereto.
Natural divorce with the Centre
A period from 1989 till 1991 became really revolutionary for Moldova. The Soviet Center lost its power under the elimination of the nomenclature and creation of independent republican centers on the democratic basis. The imperial center was splat into conservative and liberal nationalists and Kishinev made no exception. One of the reasons that pushed Moldova to declare independence was the fight for power. Communists-reformists had to flop over to the outnumbering nationalists. Moreover a significant part of Moldavian elite was already soaked with the flavor of the “parade of nations” that filled the air in the USSR. A liberalization of the Soviet regime gave a new impetus for the rise of a civil society, mainly presented by intellectual elite, driven and inspired by ideas of nationalism.
Second best present
For the first time in history Moldova republic was marked on a political map in 1991. The struggle of great states that lasted two centuries and creation of nations in XIX and XX formed a geopolitical DNA and predefined the future of Moldova. It had three options – independence, integration with Russia or unification with Romania. None of these variants was final. The situation rolled up so quickly that no one could definitely said which way will be selected by a young country. Today Moldova is again on the intersection of three roads, but the political weight of each road has changed.
Moldavian state doesn’t face the independence issue any more. After the USSR disintegration the embarrassment felt by all politically active groups – from nostalgic for the USSR up to Russian speakers and proponents of unification with Romania – questioned the historical legality of Moldova. And the bright example of this questioning is Transdniestria. While the legality of Moldavian state is still debated, there is already a generation of young citizens (a fourth of Moldova population) that know no other country, but Moldova Republic. This fact creates a strong social and institutional foundation for the further existence of the country. The citizens have got a stable political conscientiousness allowing forming the identity. If this tendency continues the country shall have even more chances for an independent life.
The second option underwent the changes. Today the integration course is aimed at the West and not at the East with the centre in Russia. In 1992 the economic, human and even spiritual ties between Moldova and ex-USSR republics were so strong, that it was difficult to choose any other geopolitical vector for the development. On the one hand – it was a society with a broken identity, on the other hand – the former center had enough tools (e.g. unsettled conflicts and economic dependence) to keep Moldova within the range of influence. Movement of EU boundaries closer to Moldova established a framework for the formation of common interests for various groups in the society – from pro-Romanian to those oriented to the independent development, as was clearly demonstrated by the Alliance for European integration in the Parliament of the country.
The third variant – unification with Romania has nearly lost its previous significance. Moldavians, or to be exact – inhabitants of Bessarabia, missed the historical moment of national-ethnic modernization, that was successfully employed by their neighbors on the right bank of the Prut river who formed the Romanian identity. Political elites of both states, divided only by a narrow stream of water, took a long time to realize what was the impact of this step on the demographic situation in Moldova and strategic identity of elites. If Bessarabia had not joint the Romanian kingdom between the wars (1918–1940), Moldova today, from the identity viewpoint would resemble enlarged “Transdniestria”. Luckily it didn’t happen.
Currently Moldova undergoes gradual re-Romanization, so the chances to be united with Romania go down, particularity because only 10-15% of people speaking Rumanian consider themselves Romanians. It’s understood by Romania as well, and the latter actively promotes the integration of Moldova to Europe and its incorporation into the most successful projects of stable and peaceful existence.
After the USSR disintegration Moldova had to start from zero. It lost the economic and social stability typical for post-Stalin decades. But it got the opportunity to become a member of a large European family and outrush into a democratic and successful future. Nevertheless false tales of “Soviet stability” still cause problems for Moldova in Transdniestria.
At the beginning of the road Moldova has to overcome a lot of obstacles, not always successfully. It is splat politically, it doesn’t have the past to rely on for the creation of a strong identity. Creation of a new state proved to be a difficult task. The country is still divided into three parts: Rumanian-speaking, Russian-speaking and “Moldavian”-speaking nostalgic for Soviet times. At the present stage those three groups successfully restrain and balance the course for the further rapprochement with Europe. The current situation differs from August 1991 by the fact that numerous citizens of Moldova speaking Rumanian (whether they call themselves Moldavians or Romanians) show the ever growing readiness to find a consensus in respect of the strategic course of the country. They make about two thirds of electorate and the one who will rule the country should remember about these fine changes in mindsets. Unfortunately the political class is not always able to read the pulse of a sullen tacit majority.
Still in danger
The attitude of Moldova towards Russia is controversial and not because Moldova exists as a legacy from Russian imperial past. Only under the condition of a strong mutual dependence the Russian course and its plans to control the post-Soviet space shall directly impact Moldova. But Moldavians several times demonstrated that political forces aimed at the integration with Europe will prevail. Moldova declined the “Kozak Memorandum” of 2003 that suggested settling the Transdniestria conflict via the federalization of the country and neutralization of separatism. Even neo-communists, typically exploiting the nostalgia of some people for Soviet Moldova, in 2005 to win the elections based their campaign on the ideas of rapprochement with Europe. And when in 2008-2009 the conservative neo-communists turned away from Europe and tried to restore the authoritarian regime and impose a reactionary political agenda they met a public protest.
In this context, the attitude of Moldova towards Russia shall depend on the Russian support to the pro-European course of the country. Taking into account the plans to establish a Eurasian union, the all-permeating CSTO and authoritarian political model, it seems that Russia took a defensive position, or at least, it’s perceived like that by proponents of pro-European course. Not everyone in Moscow has put up with the lost of former glory and its well understood by Moldova.
Flirtingempire
Obviously, Russia hasn’t overcome the “complex of the former mother country”. First of all, it didn’t see Moldova as a country able to define the strategic vector of its own development. Russia has supported a number of actions hindering the consolidation of Moldavian state. Hidden or explicit support of Transdniestria makes a good example. This why Russia is the cause of Moldova’s inability to resolve territorial problems. Unsanctioned presence of Russian troops in Moldova poses a threat to the territorial integrity of the country. Russia ensures the economic survival of Transdniestria and if this situation persists it’s difficult to believe that Russia does no longer pursue a neo-imperial agenda
It’s high time to let go
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn once said that Russia lost the XX century, the same is true for Moldova who went side by side with Russia. During two centuries when Moldova was subject to the center of the mother country it was not able to take independent decisions. Now it can. Sooner or later it will reach its European ideal, but it largely depends on whether Russia shall let the country go.
Moldova can not afford to be revengeful; it simply wants to define its own future freely. It didn’t manage to do so until recently, as this wish contracted to Russian plans for the geopolitical arrangement of post-Soviet space. About two thirds of Moldova citizens are European-minded and do not support Russian plans. Russia may try to slow this process down, but can not stop it. There still are forces in Moldova opposed to European integration, but in view of the general trend and mindsets, they shall not enjoy a popularly.
