In this special interview for the RIAC Mark Katz (former Soviet Affairs Analyst at the U.S. Department of State) analyzes the state of the Syrian opposition, argues that the USA is not likely to intervene in Syria, discusses what the West can do to ensure the secure transition in Syria and talks about the political future of Syria’s defector Gen. Manaf Tlass.
Foreign opinion
Interviewee: Mark Katz, professor of government and politics at George Mason University
Interviewer: Maria Prosviryakova, RIAC
July 27, 2012
Mark Katz is a former Soviet Affairs Analyst at the U.S. Department of State, professor of government and politics at George Mason University, visiting Senior Fellow at the Middle East Policy Council and respected author of many articles and a number of books on Russia and the Middle East.
In this special interview for the Russian International Affairs Council Mark Katz analyzes the state of the Syrian opposition, argues that the USA is not likely to intervene in Syria, discusses what the West can do to ensure the secure transition in Syria and talks about the political future of Syria’s defector Gen. Manaf Tlass.
Transcript
Professor Katz, my first question is about the state of the Syrian opposition. After having killed three high-ranking officials in Damascus the opposition seems to be more inspired than ever. They claimed to defeat Assad till the end of Ramadan. Rebel forces seem to be growing stronger and somewhat more united. Do you believe that at this point international intervention in Syria is necessary? Or Syrian people will be able to handle the situation on their own?
Well, I am not sure. The trend is that the regime is getting weaker and the rebels are getting stronger. I think that the real key in any situation like this is high-level defections. In other words, the regime’s top people start to abandon this regime. That is what I think will determine the outcome. Part of the calculations is: can they get a good job with a new regime?Or if they stick with the old regime, will they lose everything? And I think that what we are seeing now is that the rebels have a lot more momentum. Of course, these things are never done in a vacuum. Obviously, the rebels are getting a certain amount of external assistance, as it is, from Saudi Arabia, from Qatar, from Turkey, from whomever. And, of course, the government is getting assistance, mainly from Iran, more than anyone else. So, it is not that we can say that they are doing this on their own. They are getting help. The real question is: do they need more help in order to actually topple the regime?
What form this help should take?
Well, it depends on what we want to do. In other words, part of the calculation is whether the regime is going to survive. And if it is not going to survive, then it is better to get rid of it sooner rather than later.
One of the Russian concerns is that there is no concrete plan of the humanitarian intervention.
Yes, there is no concrete plan. The intervention is not that humanitarian. I think, what the Russians understand is that the Obama administration is not serious about intervening. Moscow has a lot of experience with the United States, as we do with Moscow. We both know, that when we are serious, we don’t bother with the Security Council, we act outside the Security Council, and the fact the USA hasn’t done so, I think it shows Moscow that in fact the US isn’t that serious so far. Whether that changes or not is not certain, but I don’t think that the Obama administration or the Europeans right now want to get that much involved.
Say, the USA is going to bypass the Security Council and try to act through NATO or Friends of Syria Conference? How legitimate is it going to be in the Arab world, in the international society and in the United States?
Well, it is the question of who considers legitimacy. If we get to that in the Arab countries, the Arab public is demanding some kind of intervention now. The part of the calculation has to be here: how does this affect our relations with the Arab world? In other words, does helping the rebels help one’s relations with the Arab world? Does helping the Assad regime help one’s relations with the Arab world? I don’t think that is being very successful. So, it is partly a political issue. And, of course, last year Russia was really upset with NATO about what happened in Libya. But I think the lesson that the Obama Administration drew with regard to Libya is that it was much harder than they thought. They thought that it was going to be very simple, that they declare no-fly zone and the Libyan air force would defect and it would be all over. And it wasn’t. I think it is not just Russia doesn’t want to see another Libya. Obama doesn’t either. They didn’t like it. It shouldn’t have taken that long. But it did. And in Syria it will be much more difficult. I think it is not going to be easy. There are things that can be done. But it is a question of who wants to do this and at what cost.
As for the United States, the Obama Administration doesn’t look good for not intervening. In other words, here is the vicious dictatorship, it is killing its own people. Aren’t you going to do something about that? And if you don’t - that looks bad. The Romney camp is criticizing Obama, but would they actually do anything? They can criticize Obama for that now.
Will it become the domestic issue? In the Arab world, obviously, public opinion is quite volatile, but as for Sunni Arabs, they see the Assad regime as a minority Alawite dictatorship, allied to the Iranians and killing good Sunni Arabs and therefore they want someone to come and save these Sunni Arabs. So, the balance at the moment is that we would all do better by being seen to help them.
Of course, if intervention began and somehow things didn’t go well, Arab public opinion could turn very quickly as can Western public opinion. If things don’t go well, everyone hates you. I think that the calculation is not straightforward. In other words, right now no one likes us for not intervening, we don’t get any credit for that.
What should be done to ensure the secure transition in Syria?
I think it is going to be very messy. The Syrian opposition is very divided. I was talking to someone that there are about 300 groups or even more. So, it is a very fractious society. And what the opposition groups can agree on is to get rid of the old regime. And that unites them, but once that is gone, then the division will all come out. So, that is the real problem.
Now you can hear people talking about the need to plan for a day after. The West can do something, but not much. If they want to fight each other, they will fight each other. And we can’t stop them. I do not think that any candidate chosen by the West is going to be seen as legitimate in Syria. Just like in Egypt. Once we saw Mubarak was falling, who was the western candidate? This fellow Mohamad ElBaradei. Oh, yes, he knew everyone in the West, so they liked him. One problem – he just didn’t know anyone in Egypt. So, this was not such a clever thing. We can make these little plans. But, yes, it is going to be messy. The situations has been building up for a very long time. Minority regimes never last forever. And so what is happening in Syria, it was going to happen sooner or later. It is just happening now.
Last week the Obama administration and officials of some Arab and western nations were discussing ways to place Syria’s highest-ranking military defector Gen. Manaf Tlass at the center of political transition. What are the chances that this plan is going to succeed? Unlike Mohamed ElBaradei he actually does know people in his country.
He does. Yes, but unfortunately he knows the wrong people and people know him. I think he is just too tied to the old regime. He would not be acceptable to the Syrian public. Not to the Sunni Arabs.
But he is the Sunni…
Yes, he may be, but he was with the old regime. In other words, he was a traitor, just the fact that he is a Sunni is not going to cut it. He has to explain. “Oh, you are with us now, where were you all these years? What have you done to your fellow Sunnis.” In many respects, he is likely to be hated even more than the Alawites by the Sunnis. And what I am drawing upon is the Irish rebellion. The Irish fought the British, but the ones they hated the most were the Irish who collaborated with the British. Those were the ones, who the rebels targeted, those were the ones who had to be punished. And doing so was very popular, so I would think that most Sunni Syrians would see Tlass in the same category, as someone never to be trusted at all!
But let us go back to Russia-US relationship, what consequences these disagreements over Syria might have for other sensitive issues between the two countries?
We are used to disagreeing on things, aren't we? We had lots of experience with that. I think the nicest thing about Russian- American relationship is that we have all these mechanisms to talk about things. Moscow and Washington keep things contained. We do not have a similar relationship with Iran, for example. And that is part of the problem. So, I think that for Moscow what they have to decide is whether this regime is going to last or not. And if this regime is not going to last, then what are Russia’s interests? Moscow should do something, because it presumably wants to have good relationship with the new regime as well. It will be silly not to. Can they do something now to - as we say – “pull the rabbit out of the hat”? And I think one of the things that Russia could do that America can’t is to help arrange a suitable escape route for the Assad family.
