“Lightning” Strikes in Korea

Aviation plays the key role in modern warfare, and every air force needs to have at its core multi-purpose fighters capable of carrying out such combat missions as achieving air superiority above land operations and delivering strikes at enemy ground targets. At the moment, the leading international powers facea challenge in these areas since they need to replace Cold War fighters with more modern machinery.

Aviation plays the key role in modern warfare, and every air force needs to have at its core multi-purpose fighters capable of carrying out such combat missions as achieving air superiority above land operations and delivering strikes at enemy ground targets. At the moment, the leading international powers facea challenge in these areas since they need to replace Cold War fighters with more modern machinery.

The South Korean Air Force has been recognized among the top ten air forces in the world, both in terms of the total number of aircraft [1] and in combat capabilities. It has at its disposal fourth-generation US F-15K Slam Eagle fighters (60 aircraft and one of the most recent modifications of the F-15E Strike Eagle) and F-16C/D Fighting Falcon (169 aircraft, of which 134 were assembled under licence by the South Korean KAI corporation). Not only are these considerably better than the obsolete North Korean Air Force aircraft, but theoretically they are believed to be capable of countering more modern Chinese J-10s and replicas of the Sukhoi-27 family of aircraft. South Korea is currently implementing a national program aimed at designing a fifth-generation KF-X jet fighter, which Indonesia joined in 2010 [2]. However, this is still at an early stage, and it is still to be decided whether the future jet fighter will have one or two engines [3]. This fighter is not expected to become operational before the mid-2020s.

In addition, the South Korean Air Force possesses obsolescent third-generation F-4E Phantom II (68 aircraft, mostly handed down from the US Air Force) and F-5E/F Tiger II (170 aircraft, of which 68 were manufactured under licence by Korean Aerospace Industries (KAI)). These ageing planes have so far accounted for the lion’s share of accidents and aircraft losses [4], and they cannot be kept in operation beyond the period of 2018 to 2020.

The South Koreans have resolved the issue of replacing the F-5E light combat aircraft and F-5F jet trainer: since 2005 [5], the air force has been supplied with the T-50 Golden Eagle family of aircraft, developed jointly with Lockheed Martin and manufactured by KAI; T-50 trainers (60 aircraft); TA-50 operational trainers (22 aircraft) and FA-50 light fighters (20 aircraft ordered for delivery in 2013-14, to be followed by another 60-100 aircraft [6]).

Photo: www.aviationweek.com
KF-X Timeline

As a result, the key challenge for the South Korean Air Force at the moment is looking for a proper replacement for its F-4E. This aircraft, first produced over four decades ago, is not only close to the end of its useful life but has largely been rendered obsolete. In contrast to Israel or Turkey, for instance, South Korea has never conducted a full-scale upgrading of its Phantom II [7]. However, they cannot be fully ignored in view of a possible armed conflict with North Korea. North Korea’s air force is considerably weaker in performance than that of South Korea since its most modern combat aircraft include the MiG-29 (35 aircraft of the 9-13 modification [8]) and Sukhoi-25К (34 aircraft). However, it has a large number of Chinese copies of Soviet MiG-17, MiG-19, MiG-21 and Il-28. Under the hypothetical scenario of a full-scale standoff with North Korea, given the absence or insufficiency of US military support, South Korea mostly likely will be forced to deploy its most modern aircraft on the more sophisticated offensive missions. while its air defense will have to be trusted to the F-4E. At the same time, replacing F-4E fighters with such relatively cheaper aircraft, such as the license-produced F-16C/D, is hardly the best solution. Given the re-focusing of US geopolitical interests towards Asia Pacific and the resulting higher threat of future confrontation with China, as key US allies in the region Japan and South Korea need to maintain their armed forces in perfect condition. In December [9], Japan opted to let the fifth-generation US F-35A Lightning II be replaced by its F-4EJ by 2018 [10]. In contrast, in South Korea, the selection of the successor to the Phantom II has proven to be a more troublesome process.

F-X Program

The F-X programme is central to the phased upgrading of the South Korean Air Force. During the first phase (2002), when the heavy fighter was to be selected among France’s Rafale, European consortium’s Eurofighter Typhoon, and Russian Sukhoi-35, the bid went to US Boeing’s F-15K Slam Eagle. Apart from the undoubted high-performance of this currently most advanced version of the F-15E Strike Eagle, it was further proof that purchase plans favoured the US. During the F-X second phase (2007), the decision was made to buy more F-15Ks. With their long range and combat load complete with high-precision cruise missiles, the F-15K is a powerful means of delivering strikes at ground and sea targets, while also being capable of successful engagement with enemy aircraft.

The third phase was launched in 2012, and initially South Korea seemed to be interested in acquiring the US fifth-generation F-22A Raptor [11], but for political reasons [12] this most advanced fighter in the US was never offered for export, even to the closest of allies. So, instead, other options available on the market were explored. The purchase plans were made for 60 fighters for a total budget of under $7.3 billion. Invitations for bids were sent to Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Eurofighter, Saab and Russia’s Sukhoi Holding. Russia was asked to offer its fifth-generation PAC-FA fighter, but the invitation was basically ignored [13]. In the absence of official comments, one is left guessing as to the reasons for such behaviour, one of the most likely being lack of any hope of success in the US-dominated market, and an unwillingness to disclose technical details of one of the country’s key defence programme to a US ally. Following negotiations, Saab, with its JAS 39 Gripen light fighter, also pulled out of the bidding. Although such technical details are always confidential, it has been known that the Swedish fighter is not consistent with a number of the requirements: most probably, it failed to fully implement stealth technology, while the South Korean air force had from the outset insisted that their ideal aircraft should contain at least some stealth capabilities.

The tender kicked off officially in June 2012 with three bidders: the Boeing F-15SE Silent Eagle, Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II, and Eurofighter Typhoon.

Contenders

Despite the attractive financial bid from the European consortium, in particular an offer of local production under license [14], it was nevertheless clear that the competition was largely between the two US contenders. The actual reasons are not only political, since the Typhoon objectively is not devoid of technical drawbacks. In particular, it does not provide for internal weapon bays, which in realistic combat situations are supposed to improve RCS significantly, the radar cross-section which defines the aircraft’s level of stealth from enemy’s radars.

Boeing offered its most recent modification of F-15, the F-15SE Silent Eagle, which has already been such a success on the Korean as well as global markets. This version is undoubtedly the most revolutionary in the family since appearance of the F-15E Strike Eagle almost 25 years ago. It is distinguished by the highest degree of stealth possible in a fourth-generation aircraft. Apart from almost ubiquitous radar absorbent materials in it shell, the airframe has been significantly redesigned, with weapons bays on the side of air inlets (for missions that do not require much stealth, they can be replaced with large conformal fuel tanks), and tail fins mounted at 15 degrees. This is all new to any fourth-generation aircraft: for comparison, Boeing’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornet modernization plans will be limited to the introduction of strap-on weapons units. According to Boeing [15], this is supposed to bring Silent Eagle up almost on par with fifth-generation aircraft in terms of its frontal plane stealth.

Photo: community.warplanes.com
F-15K Slam Eagles from the Republic of Korea
Air Force's 122nd Fighter Squadron

There are, however, counterclaims from Boeing’s competition, Lockheed Martin. It argues that cosmetic facelifts cannot remove such stealth-defeating structural units as engine fan blades [16]. In addition, the radar absorbent treatment is limited to critical zones only. Low radar signature reduction has been claimed to be the chief drawback of the F-15SE. As to its other parameters, the aircraft is at least as good as, or even better than the competition. Boeing’s bid must be superior from an economic standpoint: their aircraft is not only the cheapest of the three bids [17], but will also face no problems with implementation since it is technically similar to the current F-15K Slam Eagle.

Lockheed Martin’s bid is well known: the F-35A Lightning II. The programme aimed at designing a single fifth-generation strike fighter for the air force as well as carrier aviation has been an uncontested leader among any other current defence programmes not only in costs, mobilized funds, and extent of international cooperation, but also in front-page scandals and media coverage. South Korea favours the F-35A Lightning largely because it was originally designed with all stealth technologies in mind, and has been, to date, the only genuinely low radar signature aircraft on the market which can be purchased, albeit with delivery only by the end of this decade. In addition, the F-35A has become a favourite due to a number of other factors unrelated to the F-X-III tender. Lockheed Martin is a key partner of South Korean KAI aerospace corporation: their jointly designed operational trainers T-50 have been promoted on global markets and they have jointly bid for the US T-X tender for the future US Air Force advanced trainer. Lockheed Martin has been very prominent in the country’s national KF-X fifth-generation fighter plans.

The F-35, in particular, has good chances in Korea in the light of the recently announced plans for aircraft carriers. According to Chung Hee-soo, a member of the National Assembly’s Defense Committee [18], the second ship of the Dokdo-class landing platform helicopter ship (LPH) will be equipped with a ski ramp to operate short-range or vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) before 2019. Later, there are plans to build an amphibious assault ship, similar to the Spanish Navy’s Juan Carlos. By 2028-2036, the service aims to build light aircraft carriers supporting about 30 aircraft. They will start with purchasing plans for second-hand Harrier II aircraft, most likely from the US Marines, but they will have to later buy the F-35B, a VTOL modification of F-35, which, no matter how cliché it sounds, knows no equal. There are no similar aeroplanes either in production or design. Should they purchase the F-35B, the fact that the air force already has the F-35A makes it easier to ensure maintenance as well pilot and personnel training. On the downside, the F-35 is quite expensive and is still in testing, which is bound to cause significant delays in delivery.

Bidding

Photo: The Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II
is presented for the first time at the Lockheed
Martin plant in Fort Worth, Texas, July 7, 2006

Bidding was resumed in late June 2013, only to be suspended again two weeks later, in the aftermath of shocking results: the three bidders made in total 55 different offers but none were in compliance with the requirements.

It was originally planned not to delay the tender award and announce the winner by October 2012 [19]. But the bidding was ill-fated from the start: the Koreans did not like the terms and conditions of technology transfer and pricing as bid by Lockheed Martin and EADS. There were some funny moments too: the bidders failed to have all the required documentation translated in Korean as was required under the tender [20]. The short time allowed for the bidding in this largest defence tender in the history of the country also led to suspicions of corruption, implicating the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA), the Ministry of Defence and the President of South Korea, Lee Myung-bak, with allegations of conspiracy with Lockheed Martin [21]. Due to the scandals, the bidding was postponed until later in 2013, after the presidential elections in South Korea were over [22].

Bidding was resumed in late June 2013, only to be suspended again two weeks later, in the aftermath of shocking results: the three bidders made in total 55 different offers but none were in compliance with the requirements [23]. DAPA faced a dilemma: either reduce the number of aircraft to be purchased or increase the budget. However, in August 2013 the tender was launched again, under the same terms and conditions, and the F-35A again failed to be accepted at the bid price. Typhoon’s price was cleared but the documentation showed it was achieved through some modifications that had not been cleared with the Koreans: in particular, offering fewer more expensive two-seaters that were then replaced by cheaper single-seat aircraft [24]. As a result, the only bid left fully in compliance with the terms of reference was the F-15SE. The formal award was expected to follow at the joint meeting of the Defence Ministry, DAPA and the Air Force on 24 September 2013, but the choice of F-15SE was severely criticized by the military in Korea. Their chief criticism was against its low level of stealthiness [25]. Since allegations that the F-15SE was not sufficiently stealthy to North Korean radars seemed rather weak, it is more likely that the South Korean army wanted to acquire aircraft capable of facing future fifth-generation machines currently being designed in China. One should also remember that Japan has selected the F-35A for its Air Self-Defence Forces, and while both countries share an ally, the US, they continue to have a few important differences.

At the meeting on 24 September 2013, the military succeeded in persuading the defence minister of the need to cancel the results of the tender contrary to DAPA’s recommendations. It was then expected that the bidding would be launched yet another time in early 2014, with the tender award later in the autumn. However, soon there were even more developments.

A Surprise Ending

It is more likely that the South Korean army wanted to acquire aircraft capable of facing future fifth-generation machines currently being designed in China.

Russia—Republic of Korea Relations: Revising
the Bilateral Agenda

After the September events, it became obvious that the F-35A had defeated the competition. The South Korean Air Force was not willing to compromise and has been quite determined in their preference, something that was obvious to Boeing. At the ADEX 2013 airspace exhibition on 29 October - 3 November, Boeing decided against demonstrating even the mockup of the F-15SE, although there were no official announcements that it was to be scrapped. Instead, they pitched a model of “advanced F-15” [26]. It must have been something like the F-15SA, the latest modification for Saudi Arabia which is soon to be rolled off. It does not provide for any change in the airframe or offer significant radar signature reduction, while the modernization is limited to major upgrading of airborne avionics. Boeing must have hoped that South Korea would divide the purchase between the F-35 and a few cheaper fighters. Should this be the case, the F-15 will be the obvious choice, with all the aircraft of this family already used by the South Korean Air Force. Then, purchasing even a small number of Eurofighter Typhoons would have been completely illogical, from the point of view of convenience and future maintenance costs.

However, the Koreans chose another option. On 22 November 2013, following a top command meeting, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Choi Yun-hee announced the decision to purchase the F-35A without any more tenders. South Korea will buy 40 aircraft between 2018 and 2022, and then, in 2022-2023, they may exercise an option on another 20 aircraft [27]. The decision must have been made due to cost considerations since a third of the purchase plan was placed under an option. Also, should the national KF-X fifth-generation aircraft programme become very successful, this option will not be exercised.

One can argue that the best way would have been to split the purchase and buy 20 F-35A and 40 F-15KA (under the heading, Korea Advanced, similar to Saudi Advanced F-15SA). This would have allowed costs to be kept at a reasonable level while still purchasing the required number of aircraft. Then the Air Force could begin acquiring new aircraft to replace the phased-out F-4E, there will be no delays due to migration, and the Phantom II could be decommissioned quickly and without reducing their defence capabilities. Going forward, as the F-35A is rolled off into mass production (2019) [28], South Korea could start purchasing it. For complex missions this plan could make do for the time being, with just one wing of stealthy strike fighters. In the 2020s, South Koreans will need to address replacing the F-16C/D, and in the event that the KF-X national programme should run into trouble, F-35A will in any eventuality become the obvious choice for the core fighter.

The decision South Koreans have made has clear advantages, as the country will be getting 40-60 state-of-the-art stealth aircraft and strengthening the position of its air force in the region. Deliveries of the F-35A will be almost parallel in time and number with Japan’s purchase, and Japan and South Korea, significantly, enjoy a rather stormy relationship. This is a way of achieving a total supremacy over North Korea in the quality of armaments, while China, actively pursuing own plans to build a fifth-generation fighter and to purchase Sukhoi-35С [29], will be held at parity. At the same time, the experience gained in maintenance and transferred technologies, albeit limited, will be of assistance in designing the KF-X.

There are downsides too, and one of them is time, as the key purpose of having the F-X-III programme was to avoid the pains of replacing the F-4 with a new fighter. It is, however, obvious now that the F-35A wings in South Korea will not achieve combat readiness before 2020, given all the time needed to manufacture and deliver the aircraft, and train the pilots and personnel. Nor will they be replacing all of their old fighters with new ones, at least not in the foreseeable future. True, given that the North Korean fleet will be dwindling due to age, and that South Koreans will be gaining in quality, this may not be a grave challenge. Of more importance are matters of finance. Apart from purchasing the F-35A, which is to be the largest ever foreign arms deal for the South Koreans, the country is to fund its own national programme of fifth-generation fighters. The KF-X budget for 2015-2019 (even before the fighter takes off for the first time) has been set at about $8 bln. The purchase of the F-35A (in 2018-2022, or 2024-2025 with an option) will coincide with the considerable additional expense of test flights and the start of production. It is not clear at the moment whether South Korea will have to tackle the dilemma of terminating either the acquisition of the F-35A or KF-X.

New fighters purchased by South Korea or likewise other plans of strengthening its armed forces pose no immediate threat to Russia. We have no territorial disputes, our economic cooperation has been steadily growing, and both countries will be introducing a visa-free regime in 2014 [30]. It may, however, send yet another signal of Asia Pacific arming itself. Russia appears to be fully aware of this, as suggested by the fact that the Sukhoi-30CM and Sukhoi-35C, the latest among domestic mass-produced fighters, will be acquired first for the Eastern Defence District [31]. It is quite probable that it is there that the first Russian fifth-generation fighters will go there too. One only hopes that their engagement with neighboring aircraft will remain exclusively peaceful.

1. Here and henceforth the statistics on the number of aircraft rely on the Flight global Report `World Air Forces 2013'. http://www.flightglobal.com/airspace/media/reports_pdf/world-air-forces-2013-101015.aspx

2. http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/73621/ri-sending-kfx-jet-fighter-production-team-to-south-korea

3. http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/pictures-kai-shows-off-two-designs-for-kfx-fighter-392262/

4. http://www.janes.com/article/28541/south-korea-reveals-extent-of-aircraft-losses

5. http://news.thomasnet.com/companystory/First-T-50-Golden-Eagles-Delivered-to-Korean-Air-Force-Only-Supersonic-Trainer-in-Production-Today-478296

6. http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/kai-wins-w11tn-contract-for-fa-50-fighters-385524/

7. F. Kharuk. MiG Killer. F-4 Fighter, Phantom II, P.117 (in Russian)

8. http://www.airwar.ru/enc/fighter/mig29-13.html

9. http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/news/press-releases/2011/december/1219-japan-f-35.html

10. http://www.airforce-technology.com/news/newsjapan-awards-first-contracts-local-companies-f-35-jsf-production

11. http://www.f-16.net/news_article2299.html

12. For fear of losing their technological edge, the US authorities in 1997 introduced legislation banning F-22A exports ( http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d105:HZ00295:).

13. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2012/01/113_103661.html

14. http://www.oananews.org/content/photo/general/eads-offers-manufacture-48-eurofighters-s-korea

15. http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/the-dewline/2009/03/f-15-silent-eagle-media-briefi/

16. http://www.airforcemag.com/DRArchive/Pages/2009/March%202009/March%2019%202009/NotKeepingSilent.aspx

17. Although details of commercial bids are confidential, there is one simple reason: it was the only bid in August 2013 to fully comply with the maximum price requirement.

18. http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131026/DEFREG03/310260005/S-Korea-Envisions-Light-Aircraft-Carrier

19. “Korea wants to purchase 60 high-end aircraft with stealth capability in October this year.” http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2012/01/113_103661.html

20. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20120621000974

21. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2012/06/116_113632.html

22. http://lenta.ru/news/2012/12/18/fx3/

23. http://www.airforce-technology.com/news/newssouth-korea-defers-bidding-for-f-x-fighter-programme-over-cost-issues

24. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2013/09/116_142829.html

25. http://www.militaryparitet.com/ttp/data/ic_ttp/6046/

26. http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/rivals-still-seeking-clarity-on-seoul-f-x-iii-contest-392348/

27. http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/11/22/28/0301000000AEN20131122005651315F.html

28. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-28/pentagon-approves-lockheed-f-35-for-continued-development.html

29. http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20130907/961478852.html

30. http://www.rg.ru/2013/11/13/itogi-site.html

31. http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20130531/940529120.html