Spain: Regional Elections in the Midst of a Political Dead End

Spain has been without a permanent government since December 2015, when the parliamentary elections failed to produce a consensus among the parties on the formation of a new cabinet — a scenario that was repeated in June following the pre-term general election. The political deadlock demoralizes society and negatively affects the country’s credibility. It is for this reason that the regional parliamentary elections held in Galicia and the Basque Country on September 25 were of particular significance.

Spain has been without a permanent government since December 2015, when the parliamentary elections failed to produce a consensus among the parties on the formation of a new cabinet — a scenario that was repeated in June following the pre-term general election. The political deadlock demoralizes society and negatively affects the country’s credibility. It is for this reason that the regional parliamentary elections held in Galicia and the Basque Country on September 25 were of particular significance.

Many observers believed, and for good reason, that the election results would give an indication of the support that the main parties had at the regional level and have an influence on the situation in the country in general. More than this, they thought that the elections would move the country’s politicians into action, prompting them to finally find a mutually acceptable compromise, one that would ensure a new government is formed, thus avoiding a third general election. To be sure, one of the results of the elections became clear almost immediately: a deep and unprecedented crisis had befallen the country’s second largest party, and the party whose position would largely determine the formation of a new government — the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE).         

Galicia: A Landslide Victory for the People’s Party

The autonomous community of Galicia, a predominantly agricultural and relatively backwards region in comparison with other Spanish territories, has always been a stronghold of the ruling conservative People’s Party (PP). Acting Prime Minister of Spain Mariano Rajoy is from Galicia. The regional office of the People’s Party has been in charge of Galicia since the 1980s (with the exception of 2005–2009, when the government was made up of representatives of the Socialists’ Party of Galicia and the Galician Nationalist Bloc). At the two most recent elections in 2009 and 2012, the conservatives won an absolute majority of seats in parliament and formed a one-party government. Following the regional and municipal elections in 2015, Galicia became the only autonomous community in Spain where the People’s Party enjoyed an absolute majority of deputies in the local parliament.    

The September elections were intriguing because it was unclear whether or not the People’s Party would once again win an absolute majority (38 of the 75 seats). The issue acquired fundamental importance for the leadership of the People’s Party, and for Rajoy personally, becoming a matter of honour. The People’s Party emerged from the June elections to the Congress of Deputies with the highest number of seats (137), followed by the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (85), Unidos Podemos (71) and Ciudadanos (32). With an absolute majority, the People’s Party had a compelling argument to form a government by exerting pressure on the remaining parties, primarily the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party. All the other results could strengthen the positions of those who are in favour of replacing Rajoy: it is widely believed that Rajoy, who is unpopular both among the Spanish people and within the political establishment, is one of the main obstacles to the formation of a new government.      

The elections did not disappoint even the most optimistic expectations of the conservatives. In the end, they beat of the opposition with ease, winning 45.8 per cent of the votes and 41 parliamentary seats. The victory in Galicia strengthened Rajoy’s position on a national scale.

The conservative’s leader in Galicia, Alberto Núñez Feijóo, whose approval rating is higher than that of Rajoy and most other Spanish politicians, played a large role in the success of the People’s Party. According to sociologists, Núñez Feijóo’s team needed to recapture the 5–8 per cent of votes it had lost to Ciudadanos — voters who had grown tired of the People’s Party’s corruption scandals. And this is exactly what they did. During the election campaign, Núñez Feijóo attempted to woo moderate voters and distanced himself from the People’s Party, thus creating an image of himself as an “independent” candidate. He was presented as an “effective manager, untainted by corruption” in the local media. It is widely believed that Núñez Feijóo is Rajoy’s most likely successor.     

The Socialists’ Party of Galicia (the regional office of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party) fell from second to third place, winning 14 seats in parliament (four fewer than in 2012), which is the exact number of seats that the En Marea coalition won. However, En Marea, which is generally considered to be a regional branch of the Podemos party (and which burst onto the political scene in Spain, immediately becoming the main rival of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party on the left), received more total votes (19.1 per cent, compared to 17.9 per cent for the Socialists’ Party of Galicia). The result is the worst in the history of the Socialists’ Party of Galicia. 

The Basque Country: The Nationalists Cannot Form a Government by Themselves

REUTERS/Susana Vera
A supporter of Spain's Socialist party (PSOE)
leader Pedro Sanchez

The balance of forces in the Basque Country is different from that in Galicia, and in Spain in general. Until recently, this autonomous community was considered the most turbulent in the country. There were two different kinds of separatism here: the terrorist organization ETA, which led a bloody armed struggle for the independence of the Basque Country for over 50 years; and the politically dominant Basque Nationalist Party, which came out in 2003 with its so-called Ibarretxe Plan (the Political statute of the Community of the Basque Country, named after the former President of the Basque Government Juan Jose Ibarretxe) proposing a free association of the Basque Country with Spain. The situation has become much calmer, however, since ETA declared a permanent ceasefire in October 2011 (although its members did not lay down their weapons or even disband) and the Ibarretxe Plan failed. Ibarretxe was replaced as President of the Basque Government by Iñigo Urkullu, the most popular of the Basque politicians. Urkullu won the respect of a great majority of the Basque people when he refused to stir the pot of radical nationalist and confrontational sentiments and instead followed a moderate policy of compromise. Since the Basque Country transitioned to democracy, the number of people in the region who are in favour of independence has fallen to an all-time low. As of 2016, only 24 per cent of Basque people yearn for independence in one way or another (the number was as high of 40 per cent in the 1990s). Today, they are far more concerned with creating new jobs and economic growth than they are with ideas about independence.      

The two regional nationalist parties emerged victorious in the Basque parliamentary election. The Basque Nationalist Party won the most seats in parliament (with 29). Its success is indivisible from the activities of Iñigo Urkullu. Second place was taken by the left-wing Basque nationalist EH Bildu coalition (17 seats), part of the Basque National Liberation Movement, a semi-legal network structure that includes a number of parties, civil society organizations and groups. The national parties (the People’s Party and the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party) won nine seats each, fewer than in the previous elections. However, while the People’s Party lost only one seat, the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party’s mandate was cut almost in half (from 16 seats). What is more, the socialists were overtaken by another leftist party — Podemos won 11 seats, good enough for third place.     

The Basque Parliament has traditionally been extremely fragmented, and this will not change following the elections. The Basque Nationalist Party did not win an absolute majority and must therefore form a coalition government. The most likely candidate, according to observers, is the local office of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party. Although the possibility of the Basque Nationalist Party and the People’s Party forming a coalition cannot be ruled out. If this does happen, the Basque Nationalist Party and the ruling People’s Party in Madrid could come to an agreement on mutual support whereby the People’s Party would receive the five votes it needs from the Basque Nationalist Party in the Congress of Deputies for Mariano Rajoy to be confirmed Prime Minister of Spain. However, the signing of an agreement is complicated by the fact that, in its pre-election programme, the Basque Nationalist Party called for a referendum to be held on the recognition of the Basque Country as an independent state and for self-determination. This idea runs counter to the tenets of the People’s Party, which are in favour of keeping the status quo.    

Crisis in the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party and the Possibility of Avoiding a Third Election

The question of whether the results of the regional elections will help the country overcome the political dead end in which it currently finds itself remains open. The Spanish Constitution states that a candidate can be confirmed Prime Minister within two months of a first election — the election took place on August 31. A second election was held two days later, in which Mariano Rajoy received the support of 170 deputies from the People’s Party, Ciudadanos and the Canarian Coalition. On both occasions, 180 deputies voted against Rajoy, with no abstentions. Nevertheless, the issue remains unresolved. The parties have around one month, until October 31, to confirm a candidate for the post of Prime Minister. If none of the candidates receives a vote of confidence in the Congress of Deputies, the King will dissolve both chambers of parliament and call new elections with the consent of the Speaker.

In this situation, the position of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party acquires crucial significance for the vote of confidence in the new head of the council of ministers. The stance of the party’s leadership, led by Secretary-General Pedro Sánchez (who resigned his post on October 1), was determined by the resolution of the party’s Federal Committee adopted on December 28, 2015, which talks about the inadmissibility of supporting the Rajoy government, or indeed any other government led by the People’s Party. The Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party has a number of arguments explaining this “no”: the refusal of the government led by the People’s Party in 2011–2015 to carry out long-needed reforms (primarily political and constitutional reforms), as well as its lack of initiative and the increasing number of corruption scandals.   

It is obvious that competition with Podemos influences the position of the leaders of the socialist party. Back in 2015, the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party lost a large number of its voters to Podemos. Younger voters in particular are casting their votes for Podemos, seeing in general very little difference between the two traditional parties (the People’s Party and the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party). In this context, a firm “no” to Mariano Rajoy is intended to show real and potential voters that the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party is not the same thing as the People;s Party. Many people in the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party are afraid that any concessions that Rajoy might make could be used by Podemos to accuse him of “capitulating to the demands of the right” and will lead to an even bigger exodus of voters to that party.   

REUTERS/Marcelo del Pozo
Sergei Khenkin:
New Uncertainty in Spain

For a long time, the position of Pedro Sánchez was unclear. He was against the election of Rajoy, and was also not in favour of a third election, while at the same time not putting forward any viable alternatives of his own. Accused of not having a constructive position, Sánchez began to voice the idea of forming a pact with Podemos and Ciudadanos (the Socialist Workers’ Party has experience working with Ciudadanos). However, actually putting this proposal into practice was always going to be difficult, primarily because of the declared “incompatibility” of the two parties. What is more, there are a number of determined opponents to Podemos within the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party itself, people who disagree with certain key points of the party’s programme (for example, the demand that a referendum be held on the self-determination of Catalonia, which is simply unacceptable for the Socialist Workers’ Party) and its constant political zigzagging. The proposal put forward by Sánchez on cooperation with the nationalist parties in Catalonia that are represented in parliament is also completely unrealistic. The proposal received harsh criticism from a number of socialists, as these parties support the idea of secession, which is unacceptable to the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party. We can thus say that the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party has been unsuccessful in presenting a real alternative to the People’s Party.          

The question arises: what would be preferable for Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party — to give the “green light” to the formation of a minority government lead by Mariano Rajoy that would be under the strict control of Parliament, or to push for a third election, which, according to many forecasts, would strengthen the position of the People’s Party and would further weaken its own positions?   

Not everyone in the “big family” of Spanish socialists, where a number of generations are represented, agrees with Sánchez. Former leaders of the party Felipe González and José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, both of whom have served as Prime Minister of Spain, have proposed organizing an internal party discussion to determine the political line that the party should take — to join the opposition and abstain from the vote that is necessary for Rajoy to form a government, or to move for a third election. This view is shared by several regional party leaders. Those in favour of abstaining from the vote argue that this in no way implies support for Rajor, but is rather dictated by national interests and a feeling of responsibility towards the country, which is in a very difficult situation. With no alternative in sight, they believe that the ruling party should be the one that received the greatest number of votes, no matter what their relationship with that party may be.     

Meanwhile, the regional elections in Galicia and the Basque Country confirmed a trend that has manifested itself at every parliamentary election since 2011, that is, a steady decline in votes for the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party. The party has lost around five million voters since 2011. The poor showing at the regional elections has turned long-standing disagreements and feuds within the party into something qualitatively different, namely, a serious party crisis. Various groups within the party have called for Sánchez’s resignation and the creation, in accordance with the party statute, of an executive commission that would act as the primary organ of the party until its Congress is held. Sánchez’s proposal to hold elections for the position of Secretary-General on October 23, and then an Extraordinary Congress of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party on November 12–14 has only added fuel to the fire. These dates have not been chosen by chance: October 23 would be just before the possible dissolution of the Congress of Deputies ahead of a third general election; while November 12–14 would be a few days before the election itself, the result of which may not favour the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party. By calling for elections to be held for the position of Secretary-General, Sánchez is pinning his hopes on the votes of grassroots party organizations, where he enjoys significant support. It is possible that all 180,000 or so party members could take part in the vote. This is precisely how Sánchez was elected Secretary-General of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party to begin with — following a direct vote held in July 2014, the first of its kind in the party’s history. Sánchez’s critics have accused him of trying to keep hold of the positon of Secretary-General, neglecting national interests and ensuring that he will be in a position of unchallenged power when the party loses the election (which is the most likely outcome).        

Two opposing movements have developed within the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party — those who support Sánchez, and those who are against him. And it is a party-wide phenomenon, as it can be felt even within regional and local party organizations. It has come down to this: 17 of the 35 members of the Federal Executive Committee of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party handed in their collective resignations, demanding that the Committee be disbanded and Sánchez’s powers be removed. However, the fact that the Executive Committee lost half its members did not deter the remaining supporters of Sánchez, who continued to consider themselves the party’s leadership. However, on the eve of the October 1 meeting of the Federal Executive Committee, Sánchez announced that he would resign his post if his plan of action were rejected.       

That is precisely what happened. During the wild and electrifying 12-hour meeting, Sánchez’s proposal to hold an extraordinary party congress in November and, of course, the election to the post of Secretary-General, was rejected (132 votes to 107). The victorious “critics” formed an executive committee that will take control of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party’s activities until the party congress, the date of which has not yet been decided. The President of the Principality of Asturias and leader of the local Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party branch Javier Fernández has been charged with leading the committee. In his most recent speeches, Fernández has talked about the need for a permanent government to be formed in Spain, rejecting the possibility of blocking such attempts in collaboration with Podemos or separatist parties seeking to split the country.

Sánchez’s resignation and the transition of supreme power in the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party to the executive committee changes the political situation. The possibility that a third general election might be avoided has increased. However, it should be stressed that, while a number of socialists have been critical of Pedro Sánchez’s actions, this does not mean that they are revising their positions with regard to Mariano Rajoy. What concerns Sánchez’s “critics” most are the numerous defeats suffered by the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party with Sánchez at the helm and the steady decline of the party’s influence that have turned it into a second-tier political force in Spain. They recognize the fact that the party needs a new leader and new ideas. There is disagreement among these same critics about whether or not to render a vote of no confidence in Rajoy. The alignment of forces between those for and against abstaining in the vote for the People’s Party candidate will soon become clear. And much depends on what decision the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party makes — for the party itself, and for the whole of Spain.