High-Profile Campaign

In the last week of February, Hungary officially launched its campaign for the parliamentary elections. Back in January, President Sujok signed a decree scheduling the elections for April 12, 2026. This provided a certain impetus for the additional mobilization of active citizens and politicians; however, party competition had, in fact, been ongoing since the spring of 2024, when a new figure emerged on the Hungarian political scene—Peter Magyar—and his ultra-populist, EU-oriented TISZA Party (“Respect and Freedom Party”). Within two months, riding a wave of public support, the party managed to gain representation in the European Parliament, becoming Hungary’s second-largest political force. Since then, Europe has begun to speak of the emergence of a serious challenger to Viktor Orban, who has ruled the country for a total of 20 years.

Despite the disparity in political weight between the opponents, the main contest in the upcoming elections is expected to take place between the FIDESZ and TISZA parties. Viktor Orban is distinguished by unparalleled oratory skills and an ability to offer philosophical generalizations delivered in an ironically appealing manner to his audience. Peter Magyar, by contrast, falls short in rhetorical skill, and his speeches are dominated by a narrative condemning the ruling coalition.

The FIDESZ Party faces a challenge from the impact of corruption scandals. At times, close members of Viktor Orbán’s team make careless statements, as was the case with the current Minister of Construction and Transport, Janos Lazar, who deeply offended the Hungarian Roma community. Although he apologized for his remarks, this incident continues to be used by opponents against the party.

The TISZA Party also has many weaknesses, despite never having held power: the leader’s inexperience and complete lack of charisma, often compensated by grandiose promises; the low recognition of candidates representing the party in constituencies; and the open support for Brussels’ plans to provide military assistance to Ukraine, which is backed by only a small segment of the Hungarian population. Above all, the party lacks a clear ideology that distinguishes it from its main competitor.

In their final moments, minor parties—losing the ability to independently secure their candidates in parliament—may influence the outcome of the vote. However, it remains uncertain whom they will ultimately support. The case of Hungary’s classical liberals shows their willingness to back Viktor Orban, highlighting his predictability, authority, and experience. At the same time, his achievements are noted, such as managing illegal migration, preventing the country from being drawn into a military conflict, and similar actions. For this segment of voters, Orban symbolizes stability.

In a climate marked by kompromat, mutual lawsuits, TISZA threats against journalists, attacks against activists and oppositional signs and posters, and relentless propaganda battles, the outcome of the election could ultimately hinge on chance—whether a last-minute protest, provocation, or a striking maneuver by one of the parties in the final pre-election days. It is also possible that a fatigued voter may cast a ballot for TISZA simply because there is no option to vote “against all.” Unsurprisingly, these elections are often described as a referendum on confidence in Viktor Orban. At the same time, voters may opt for the stability and predictability embodied by the incumbent prime minister. In this scenario, Orban is unlikely to secure a constitutional majority but could be satisfied with a simple majority sufficient to form a government. This outcome carries advantages for a more balanced political and social environment, as debates move from the streets into parliamentary chambers. Naturally, Hungarian voters will primarily be guided by considerations regarding improvements in working and living conditions. Nevertheless, elections in Central Europe also carry geopolitical significance, particularly in the current tense international context.

In the last week of February, Hungary officially launched its campaign for the parliamentary elections. Back in January, President Sujok signed a decree scheduling the vote for April 12, 2026. This gave a certain impetus to the additional mobilization of active citizens and politicians; however, party competition had been ongoing since the spring of 2024, when a new figure emerged on the Hungarian political scene—Peter Magyar—and his ultra-populist, EU-oriented TISZA Party (“Respect and Freedom Party”). Within two months, riding a wave of public support, the party secured representation in the European Parliament, becoming Hungary’s second-largest political force. Since then, Europe has begun to speak of the emergence of a serious challenger to Viktor Orban, who has ruled the country for a total of 20 years.

Interest in these elections is immense, as evidenced by an unprecedented volume of analytical publications popping up abroad. It creates the impression that the current campaign involves external actors as well—Kyiv and Brussels, openly supporting the leader of the TISZA Party, and President Donald Trump, personally advocating for Viktor Orban.

As of March 5, thirty parties and associations had been approved to participate in the elections, but only three—the FIDESZ bloc (Alliance of Young Democrats and the Christian Democratic People’s Party), TISZA, and Our Homeland Movement—collected the required number of voter signatures for registration. Nevertheless, both Hungarian voters and international political analysts and journalists remain focused on the most viable candidates. Foremost among these are Viktor Orban’s FIDESZ Party, together with its long-standing coalition partner, the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP), and their main challenger, Peter Magyar’s TISZA Party. The primary contest will unfold between these parties—or more precisely, between their leaders. Many in Hungary view the upcoming elections essentially as a vote of confidence in Viktor Orban, the longest-serving head of state in modern European history. It is likely that the far-right Our Homeland Movement, led by Laszlo Toroczkai, will also secure seats in parliament. The Democratic Coalition of Klara Dobrev has uncertain, though not negligible, chances of crossing the electoral threshold. It is possible, however, that it could be overtaken by the Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Party, which achieved its best historical results in the 2024 European Parliament and local elections, securing a seat on the Budapest City Council. Among other notable political forces that previously held parliamentary seats or actively competed for mandates, several have officially withdrawn from the elections: the former Jobbik leader Gabor Vona’s Second Reform Era Party, Budapest Mayor Gergely Karacsony’s Dialogue party, as well as the Solution and Momentum Movements.

These elections, perhaps for the first time since 1989, are attracting such intense international attention—largely because of Viktor Orban. In recent years, the Fidesz leader has achieved impressive success in pan-European party-building, creating a new, third-largest group in the European Parliament, “Patriots for Europe.” He launched a peaceful initiative to resolve the Russia–Ukraine conflict in 2024, and compared to other European leaders, has developed the most advanced relations with the new U.S. administration. Orban’s name is constantly mentioned in Brussels during discussions on the EU’s eastern borders and in votes on sanctions packages against Russia. Even within Hungary, some have begun to argue that the politician has become too absorbed in international affairs, and that it is time for him to return to his homeland to support the Alliance of Young Democrats, which he founded 38 years ago.

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A Brief History of Elections in Hungary

After Viktor Orban returned to the office as Prime Minister in 2010, with a decisive victory for FIDESZ (securing two-thirds of parliamentary seats), his party continued to consolidate its power, repeating this political milestone in Hungary three more times: in 2014, 2018, and 2022. At the same time, the left-liberal opposition waned, long represented by the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and the new left-liberal Democratic Coalition, founded by Ferenc Gyurcsany. From time to time, these parties formed coalitions, bringing in smaller political forces as partners. However, Gyurcsany’s personal ambition, etched into Hungarian political history by his words, “we lied to the people day and night,” to exact a political revanche against his only equally powerful opponent, Viktor Orban, ultimately failed in the 2022 elections.

At that time, all opposition forces in the country, regardless of political orientation, decided to unite against Viktor Orban using a “smart voting” strategy: rather than splitting the electorate’s votes, they aimed to form a single coalition, select a unified candidate for prime minister, and defeat their opponent through sheer numbers. Ferenc Gyurcsany actively directed the campaign from behind the scenes, ceding the formal leadership role to his wife, Klara Dobrev. However, the opposition once again miscalculated: for the fourth consecutive time, the FIDESZ/KDNP coalition won with a constitutional majority.

The long-standing chapter of political rivalry ended in 2025, when Ferenc Gyurcsany announced his withdrawal from politics, and simultaneously from his family. This created challenges for analysts, as since 2006, it had been relatively easy to predict the defeat of any forces associated with his figure. In the 2024 European Parliament elections, the Democratic Coalition, led by Gyurcsany’s former wife, Klara Dobrev, ran in coalition with three other parties but secured only two seats, which were allocated in its favor.

Currently, the TISZA Party of Peter Magyar—the youngest political figure in the country—is viewed as the second most influential party, having won seven seats in the most recent major elections (30% of Hungary’s allocation in the European Parliament). During that electoral campaign, it became clear that the traditional left-liberal opposition does not recognize the party’s leader and refuses to associate with him, even for the purpose of unseating Viktor Orban. According to the leader of the Democratic Coalition, Magyar “differs in no way from the FIDESZ leader in his attempts to usurp the opposition space and to eliminate competition within the Hungarian political arena, depriving it of diversity.” This was Klara Dobrev’s response last summer to Magyar’s promise to “tip his hat” to politicians who would not participate in the upcoming parliamentary elections. “His rhetoric is not about cooperation, but about exclusion, about total domination,” she stated.

In 2022, the Hungarian opposition united from the grassroots level and, through fair competition based on consensus, selected as their leader Peter Marki-Zay, the mayor of a small Hungarian town, Hodmezovasarhely. Today, few remember him, although two years prior to that election, he drew as much attention as Peter Magyar, organizing large opposition rallies and leading demonstrations. Meanwhile, Peter Magyar is now calling on all opponents of Viktor Orban to surrender and voluntarily hand over their votes to him. Perhaps for this reason, despite their slim chances, the Democratic Coalition is still participating in the 2026 elections.

How Are the Numbers Calculated?

Over the past six months, all eyes have been on public opinion polls. Hungary has more than a dozen foundations and institutes studying public sentiment, though some tend to inflate results in favor of Peter Magyar, and less frequently, in favor of Viktor Orban. Polling figures for the frontrunner vary from 41% to 51%, with the margin between the two main parties ranging from 5 to 12%. At the end of February, one of the oldest polling centers—Median—stood out by putting TISZA 20% ahead of FIDESZ. This “result,” which caused a major scandal, was released just ahead of Peter Magyar’s trip to the Munich Security Conference and was cited by him during meetings with Western politicians. However, journalists later obtained entirely different figures from Median, showing FIDESZ and TISZA running effectively “neck and neck” at 36% each. In this context, an old Soviet joke about election vote counting seems apt: “It doesn’t matter who is leading; what matters is how you count.”

This is not the first instance of discrepancies between opinion polls and exit polls in Central Europe. One need only recall that in 2025, all Polish polls predicted a victory for Warsaw’s mayor, Rafal Trzaskowski. Exit poll results echoed the same expectation. Yet, when Trzaskowski raised his ceremonial glass, the actual voting results told a very different story: Karol Nawrocki emerged as the winner. A similar scenario occurred during Slovakia’s 2024 parliamentary elections. The Progressive Slovakia Party was forced to halt its early celebrations when it became clear that the exit poll results did not match the official figures released by the electoral commission.

Most serious analysts and politicians agree that Hungary could once again see a minimal gap of just one to two percentage points between the leading parties, as occurred in the 2002 and 2006 elections. Overall, the parliament is expected to take the form of a three- or four-party assembly. TISZA will attract votes from FIDESZ opponents inspired by Peter Magyar, although it is possible that some voters with conservative views may instead cast their ballots for Our Homeland, increasing its parliamentary representation compared to the previous elections. The main question may be who secures the fourth spot—the Democratic Coalition or the Two-Tailed Dog Party. A parliament that includes the Two-Tailed Dog Party is no longer the Budapest city council. Arguably, the rise in support for this absurdist party reflects, perhaps better than anything else, certain nuances of the contemporary political campaign in Hungary.

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TISZA’s Prospects

Beyond the previously described confrontation between Peter Magyar and the liberal-socialists, the leader of TISZA has also faced criticism from Hungary’s traditional liberals—formerly members of the Alliance of Free Democrats—Gabor Fodor and Andras Schiffer, the founder of the Politics Can Be Different Party, which succeeded the Alliance. Fodor, comparing Viktor Orban and Peter Magyar, described the incumbent prime minister as a statesman and experienced strategist, well-versed in his country, the region, and the world, while labeling the opposition leader a “micromanager.” Meanwhile, Andras Schiffer drew attention to the political trajectories of the two main figures in the upcoming electoral battles. He recalled that Viktor Orban entered the political arena in 1989, with a speech at the tomb of the executed Prime Minister Imre Nagy and his fellow revolutionaries of 1956, which quickly gained international attention, whereas Peter Magyar became known for publicly releasing a recording of a private conversation with his wife.

It appears that confidence in Peter Magyar is waning, even within the ranks of the European People’s Party led by Manfred Weber, who had strongly supported the TISZA leader in his early European initiatives. In January, two other figures emerged in Magyar’s inner circle and effectively became symbolic of the party—Istvan Kapitany and Anita Orban. In a sense, he has acquired his own “oligarchs,” the very kind he so vigorously criticizes when they support FIDESZ. Against the backdrop of these experienced international managers, TISZA’s founder clearly struggles to compete. Istvan Kapitany is the former vice president of a global division of Shell, whose career spanned service for the British company across continents—from Houston to South Africa and Georgia. He is currently nominated for the post of Minister of Economic Development. Anita Orban once served as ambassador-at-large for the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was nominated for the position of NATO Deputy Secretary, and worked in London for Vodafone. She has already started making statements outlining a new foreign policy strategy for Hungary, which involves a full pivot of Budapest toward the West while severing all ties with the East and Russia: “Hungary must break with the fate of a ferry-state and become a full member of the West.” This gives the impression that both Kapitany and Anita Orban are perceived by TISZA supporters as far more authoritative than Peter Magyar himself, who either invited them or was compelled to rely on them to strengthen his position. Early on, there was even talk of an internal coup within the party. However, with only two months remaining before the elections, changing the party leader is no longer possible due to the rules governing the registration of electoral alliances. Nevertheless, observers predict increasing internal competition within the party after the elections.

On February 7, TISZA published its action program. However, it failed to make an impression, and its presentation evoked memories of the Janos Kadar era. Its domestic policy content largely mirrors what FIDESZ already proposes, meaning that both FIDESZ and TISZA operate within the same political space domestically. The main distinction lies in foreign policy intentions, specifically regarding relations with Brussels and Kyiv. While Viktor Orban continues to pursue a policy of openness to the East combined with deepening transatlantic ties, Peter Magyar seeks to pivot Hungary exclusively toward the West.

While Viktor Orban identifies the conflict in Ukraine—which recently saw its leadership halt oil deliveries to Hungary and Slovakia via the Druzhba pipeline—and the often ill-considered actions of Brussels as the primary sources of security threats, Peter Magyar frames Russia as the main threat. This perspective is reflected in his frequently repeated calls for “reviews.” In the policy statements of TISZA’s leading trio (Peter Magyar, Istvan Kapitany, Anita Orban), these “reviews” include revisiting energy contracts with Russia, auditing agreements, and scrutinizing actions related to the Paks-2 nuclear project. In a broader context, “reviews” also extend to national security domains, including the privatization of the defense industry and government procurement contracts for the military. However, the crisis surrounding Iran that unfolded at the end of February works against TISZA, as it underscores the validity of Viktor Orban’s stance, which does not rule out continued Russian supplies of hydrocarbons and nuclear energy.

At the regional level, TISZA has aligned itself with Poland. Peter Magyar has already announced that the first capital he will visit as prime minister will be Warsaw. At the same time, regarding the Visegrad Group, the party’s approach appears focused primarily on strengthening its defense capabilities above all else.

Three points bring the foreign policy intentions of both leading candidates in the election into alignment: strengthening NATO membership, countering irregular migration, and opposing the accelerated accession of Ukraine to the EU. However, there is a distinction on the last point. While Viktor Orban states “never,” TISZA limits its position to opposing the accelerated accession of the neighboring country: “If, after many years, all accession conditions are met, Hungary will hold a final, legally binding referendum on the matter.” Regarding NATO membership and migration policy, Orban has already taken all necessary steps, whereas TISZA so far offers only vague promises. In this respect, its approach effectively continues the line established by previous FIDESZ governments.

“We prefer the West to the East”—this could serve as a general summary of TISZA’s program. At the same time, it does not align with Hungary’s historical trajectory and geopolitical position, where, alongside the Finno-Ugric orientation, the Turanian direction—including the Balkan dimension—has always been strong.

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Pros and Cons

Thus, despite the disparity in political weight between the opponents, the main contest in the upcoming elections is expected to take place between FIDESZ and TISZA. Viktor Orbán is distinguished by unparalleled oratory skills and an ability to present philosophical generalizations in an ironically appealing manner to his audience. His speeches address both pressing domestic and international issues, with the conflict in Ukraine consistently taking center stage. Peter Magyar, by contrast, falls short in rhetorical skill; his speeches are dominated by a narrative condemning the ruling coalition, and he refers to the prime minister almost exclusively as the “former” leader. The Ukraine issue is largely absent, and one member of his team—a former Chief of the General Staff of Hungary—claims that no conflict exists, accusing the government of creating a climate of military hysteria. A segment of the electorate may find this style appealing.

The impact of corruption scandals, such as the ongoing investigation into the former head of the National Bank, Gyorgy Matolcsy, is working against the FIDESZ Party. Personnel failures during the last term—resignations of President Novak and Justice Minister Judit Varga, the failed nomination for Budapest mayor, and the dismissal of the Chief of the General Staff—remain in the spotlight and are used by Peter Magyar to attack his main rival in the upcoming elections. At times, close members of Viktor Orbán’s team make careless statements, as was the case with the current Minister of Construction and Transport, Janos Lazar, who deeply offended the Hungarian Roma community. Although he apologized for his remarks, this incident continues to be used by opponents against the party.

The TISZA Party also has many weaknesses, despite never having held power: the inexperience of its leader, who rose to political prominence in 2024 amid the public fallout from his estranged wife, and a complete lack of charisma, compensated by grandiose promises; the low recognition of candidates representing the party in constituencies; and the open support for Brussels’ plans to provide military assistance to Ukraine, which is backed by only a small segment of the Hungarian population. Most importantly, the party lacks a clear ideology that distinguishes it from its main competitor. All of TISZA’s leaders were once part of Viktor Orban’s inner circle: Peter Magyar was married to Justice Minister Varga, with whom he has three sons; Anita Orban worked in the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was nominated for a NATO post; Istvan Kapitany was awarded the Cross of the Honorary Order of Hungary in 2023 for his business achievements; and Romulusz Rusin-Sendi is a former Chief of the General Staff under Viktor Orban’s government.

In their final moments, minor parties—losing the ability to independently secure their candidates in parliament—may influence the outcome of the vote. However, it remains uncertain whom they will ultimately support. The case of Hungary’s classical liberals shows their willingness to back Viktor Orban, highlighting his predictability, authority, and experience. At the same time, his achievements are noted, such as managing illegal migration, preventing the country from being drawn into a military conflict, and similar actions. For this segment of voters, Orban symbolizes stability.

Supporters of Peter Magyar accuse Viktor Orban of stoking military hysteria and argue that Ukraine poses no real threat to Hungary. This debate unfolds against the backdrop of Ukraine cutting oil supplies via the Druzhba pipeline to Hungary and Slovakia, and critical remarks—including direct insults—by Volodymyr Zelensky toward the Hungarian leader, one of which was made at the Munich Security Conference in February. TISZA remains an experiment: neither its program nor the speeches of its leaders yet reveal a clear vision for the party’s future course. Is Hungarian society ready for this? Perhaps the segment of potential voters who attend Peter Magyar’s rallies with signs reading “Now or Never!” is indeed willing to take the risk. The election results will ultimately show.

In a climate marked by kompromat, mutual lawsuits, TISZA threats against journalists, attacks against activists and oppositional signs and posters, and relentless propaganda battles, the outcome of the election could ultimately hinge on chance—whether a last-minute protest, provocation, or a striking maneuver by one of the parties in the final pre-election days. It is also possible that a fatigued voter may cast a ballot for TISZA simply because there is no option to vote “against all.” Unsurprisingly, these elections are often described as a referendum on confidence in Viktor Orban. At the same time, voters may opt for the stability and predictability embodied by the incumbent prime minister. In this scenario, Orban is unlikely to secure a constitutional majority but could be satisfied with a simple majority sufficient to form a government. This outcome carries advantages for a more balanced political and social environment, as debates move from the streets into parliamentary chambers. Naturally, Hungarian voters will primarily be guided by considerations regarding improvements in working and living conditions. Nevertheless, elections in Central Europe also carry geopolitical significance, particularly in the current tense international context.