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Actors
The main opposition forces that have risen to prominence during anti-governmental demonstrations in Egypt were mainly represented by young jobless people (either fresh graduates or students of universities). They were immediately joint by two opposition parties: Al-Gadd and the Democratic Front. Several days after the beginning of the revolution the protest movement was supported by representatives of the oldest Muslim association “Muslim Brothers”. A somewhat delayed involvement of “Muslim Brothers” into the anti-governmental fight can be explained by the fear of a negative outcome of this conflict, which was unpredictable, and the following repressions by Mubarak and secondly – by some concerns that the revolution can be regarded as “green colored”. The fact that Islamists are the leaders of Egyptian revolution could have scared representatives of secular opposition and create the negative perception in the West.
Because of the young age and relative inexperience many opposition parties of the liberal-democratic fraction were unable to implement their revolutionary ideas independently. At least twice the decisive role in the success of anti-governmental demonstrations was played by “Muslim Brothers” in organizing the “Friday of Anger” and defense of At-Tahrir square on February 2, 2011 against the Mubarak supporters.
Riots of February 2 served as indicators of deep intra-elite contradictions in the Arab Republic of Egypt. The “old guard” represented by top militaries obviously disliking young supporters of Gamal Mubarak and himself personally, took a neutral position. And it became clear that President H. Mubarak didn’t manage to offset the conflict between the Army generals and his son Gamal, who, should he win the Presidential elections in autumn 2001, would have become the first Egyptian president without military background.
It’s important to note that events in Egypt in early 2011 can not be attributed to the fight between elites, at least because there is no any counter-elite in the country. First of all the Egyptian opposition didn’t have a single leader. Secondly, the participants of the anti-governmental rallies didn’t have a common detailed program to resolve the problems faced by Egypt. Slogans of Mubarak’s opponents were mainly expressed by populist demands “People shall destroy the system” and “Mubarak – go out” etc.
Implications
After the transfer of power to the High Council of Egypt Military Forces headed by H.Mubarak’s confederate Marshal Hussein At-Tantawi, Egyptian political system fell into dependence from a number of competitive circumstances. The transition military government was not willing to take any commitments on the number of key agenda issues. At the same time potential candidates to presidency were trying to delay Parliamentary and presidential elections as much as possible to force the current transition government take the responsibility.
Currently the most controversial issues on the Egypt’s political agenda causing the upmost public dissonance are the fate of ex-President Mubarak and his sons Gamal and Alaa together with the Minister of Foreign Affairs Habib Al-Adli and the Peace Treaty with Israel singed by President Anvar as-Sadat in Camp-David in 1979.
The number of supporters and opponents of legal claims against Mubarak is nearly equal. Nobody wants to take the responsibility for this obviously unpopular decision. That’s why the Army is attempting to conduct the elections as soon as possible to put the responsibility on the newly elected president. And, as stated above, potential candidates make their best to force the transition military government to make decisions on the mentioned issues before the announcement of Parliamentary and Presidential elections results.
The similar situation is observed in relations with Israel. Despite a common hatred towards the Eastern neighbor, nearly a half of Egyptian population is supporting the peace in the region.
The current situation in Egypt reminds of a pendulum – the initiative passes from the Army into the hands of the opposition and backwards. This is evidenced by the postponing of elections to the Lower House of the Parliament planned at the end of September to November 21, 2011. (“Muslim Brothers” and the Army were eager the conduct elections at this particular time). The shifting of elections forwards can be regarded as a small victory of opposition secular parties. But all the above complicates the development of a normal political process and hinders the creation of a stable political system in the key country of the region.
1. Issaev L.M. A Democratic Winter in Northern Africa //Emergency reserves. 2011.#№ 3.