The February 11, 2016 visit of the Russian High Governmental Delegation to the Republic of Iraq is a remarkable event. It definitely stands out among all the bilateral meetings and negotiations to have taken place between the two countries. What makes the visit so significant is the fact that it is largely a breakthrough event: for the first time in many years, it was conducted in the best traditions of the long-lost USSR–Iraq friendship and it significantly boosted hopes for a new chapter to be started in the modern history of Russia–Iraq relations.
The February 11, 2016 visit of the Russian High Governmental Delegation to the Republic of Iraq is a remarkable event. It definitely stands out among all the bilateral meetings and negotiations to have taken place between the two countries. What makes the visit so significant is the fact that it is largely a breakthrough event: for the first time in many years, it was conducted in the best traditions of the long-lost USSR–Iraq friendship and it significantly boosted hopes for a new chapter to be started in the modern history of Russia–Iraq relations.
Undoubtedly, the bulk of the credit must go to Russian diplomacy, which attaches great importance to the process of rapprochement with Iraq and seeks to restore, as much as possible, Russia–Iraq relations to their former level in various fields, from military-technical cooperation to cultural exchange. Moscow’s intentions are most earnest. This is much is clear from the delegation itself, which included around 100 government representatives and business leaders.
It is significant that the delegation was headed by Dmitry Rogozin, Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation. Rogozin, who has held the position of Chairperson of the Intergovernmental Russia-Iraq Committee since autumn 2014, essentially oversees the Iraqi direction of Russia’s foreign policy. The Deputy Prime Minister took to the task with gusto and intelligence, achieving significant results in a short period of time. It is under his supervision that bilateral contacts have been intensified at different levels. Trade volume between the two countries increased tenfold over the span of two years, reaching $2 billion in 2015. Great strides have been made in military-technical cooperation, with Russia and Iraq signing a large number of arms contracts totalling about $4.2 billion. Both the visit to Baghdad itself and the preparations for it are Rogozin’s great diplomatic debut in Iraq.
The agenda of the two-day visit was very extensive. It included bilateral negotiations on an extremely broad range of issues, as well as the first meeting of the Russia–Iraq Intergovernmental Commission for eight years, which resulted in the development of a roadmap for bilateral relations in the near future. Four topics dominated the negotiations in Baghdad: the participation of Russian companies in developing Iraq’s electric power industry; interaction in the oil and gas sector; intensifying trade in animal products; and searching for new areas of, and opportunities for, military-technical cooperation. It should be emphasized that, compared to the previous years, such a broad range of promising areas of Russia–Iraq relations is indeed an impressive breakthrough for Russia, and it should open up a qualitatively new stage in Russia–Iraq relations.
However, given the current complicated situation, the question is whether Moscow will be able to build on this success and implement the agreements achieved in full.
It is important to notice in this respect that, unfortunately, despite all the pomp of the visit and the overloaded agenda, a serious problem exists between Russia and Iraq and that will be difficult to overcome – namely, the current lack of real possibilities and objective conditions for developing full-scale comprehensive cooperation between the two countries. The reality of international relations in the Middle East today is such that Russia and Iraq have trouble finding common ground. Iraq, which is virtually a failed state, with a ruined economy and industry, is not able to offer Russia economic benefits or the high-quality products that Russia needs. Russia, by contrast, has much to offer Iraq, but has so far been unable to gain free access to the Iraq market, which is a special U.S. economic zone dominated largely by western companies. We could recall that the Americans did not allow Russian oil companies into Iraq for several years.
Why does Russia need Iraq?
Clearly, Russia’s current policy with regard to Iraq is largely linked to solving its own domestic problems, which have arisen as a result of economic sanctions and crisis conditions. Conceptually, this policy is derived from the new Russian strategy of overcoming the crisis, a strategy developed by Rogozin. The essence of his policy is that the military-industrial complex can and must become the driving force of Russia’s economy. Rogozin, who is also Vice-Chair of the Military-Industrial Commission of the Russian Federation, is deeply convinced that the military-industrial complex will be the driving force that help Russia overcome the crisis.
Military-technical cooperation with Iraq has thus taken on strategic and vital significance for Russia. Iraq is one of Russia’s largest partners in military-technical cooperation. Currently, Iraq is the second-largest buyer of Russian arms. In 2014, Russia’s arms exports exceeded $15 billion, with Iraq accounting for $1.7 billion of this sum, or 11 per cent of all arms exports.
In 2015, the final shipment of Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air and anti-aircraft artillery weapon systems was delivered to Iraq from Russia. Naturally, the question of new military contracts with Iraq moved to the forefront. And that appears to be the principal goal for the Russian delegation’s visit to Iraq. Obviously, it was necessary to test the waters at the highest level for the possibilities of further military-technical cooperation in the context of the U.S. sanctions. The problem is that Rostec State Corporation companies that export Russian arms were included in the sanctions list. In 2015, when Russia’s arms exports to Iraq peaked, several other Russian defence companies were included in the revised sanctions list. This complicates Russia’s task significantly, and casts serious doubt on the possibility of cooperation between Russia and Iraq developing at the same pace.
Therefore, Rogozin has repeatedly voiced Moscow’s principal argument, which could influence the Iraqi government’s stance on the issue. Speaking both in Baghdad and in Moscow, he has frequently stated that it was thanks to Russian-made weapons that the Iraqi army has been able to push Islamic State back. But will that argument work? In fact, most of the Iraq territories that were liberated in 2015 were done so largely by the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution of the Republic of Iran, led by General Qasem Soleimani and supported by the international coalition led by the United States and Iran. Iraq’s puppet army, largely financed by the Pentagon, is incapable of conducting major warfare, its principal function being to suppress domestic riots and unrest. Its ineptitude is evident, as dozens of towns and villages have surrendered to the jihadists without a fight.
Why does Iraq need Russia?
General diplomatic courtesy aside, it must be stated frankly that the current Iraqi government is guarded in its attitude towards Russia’s desire for rapprochement. The Iraqi media is a case in point. The scale and level of the Russian delegation notwithstanding, most Iraqi newspapers, unlike their Russian counterparts, ran only short pieces and comments on the signing of the Russia–Iraq agreement on increasing trade volume. Ibrahim al-Jaafari, Iraq’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, notified the Iraqi public that an agreement on economic and electric power industry cooperation had been signed with Russia, without being particularly emphatic or gushing about it.
It should be noted that this attitude on the part of the Iraqi authorities is quite logical. Iraq is not the same state it had been prior to 2003. Firstly, Iraq is now headed by those political forces which had been cruelly repressed by the previous regime, which Russia had actively supported. Secondly, Iraq is going through a deep political, financial and economic crisis. It is a bankrupt state which is utterly dependent on investments and loans from the United States and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Thirdly, all of Iraq’s state property has been privatized by American companies.
It should not come as a surprise, therefore, that, despite many months of preparations, consultations and extensive coordination, the results of the Russian delegation’s visit to Iraq are in fact fairly modest: a roadmap, a few agreements on cooperation in the electric power industry and on relatively small exports of meat from Russia. On the other hand, there is no need to be excessively disappointed. Though small, it is a true victory for Russia’s economic diplomacy. In order to act on this success and to develop it further, Russian diplomats should, in the nearest future, persevere and work hard on overcoming all the hurdles on that harsh and difficult path to true rapprochement with Iraq.