State of the Region 2012-2013


Год издания: 2012

Подготовлено Советом тихоокеанского экономического сотрудничества (Pacific Economiic Cooperation Council)

Growth in the Asia-Pacific this year is expected to increase slightly to 3.7 percent from last year’s 3.5 percent. Looking ahead to 2013, growth will be much the same at 3.9 percent. However, these forecasts, based on the IMF’s World Economic Outlook are based on some assumptions: that financial conditions on the Eurozone will ease; expansionary policies in emerging markets will gain traction; and the United States will find a solution to the fiscal dilemma it faces at the end of the year. In short, the downside risks to the forecast are enormous and uncertainty remains abundant.

Problems in the Eurozone weigh heavily on the outlook for the region. Europe imports around a fifth of all of the region’s exports and European investors hold around a third of the region’s financial assets. Exports from the region to Europe have already been slowing in the first of this year, although the fall off in demand does not look as deep as it was in the 2009.

How developed economies respond to events is of critical interest to policy-makers in emerging markets. A new round of quantitative easing poses a number of challenges the region’s central bankers and monetary authorities. While the hope is that quantitative easing would boost growth in developed economies, there are some specific policy risks for emerging markets: hot money flows into the region may lead to asset bubbles and inflation.

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Прошедший опрос

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