UN-doing Sanctions: The Significance of Russia’s Mali Veto
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English-language Publications Editor at the Russian International Affairs Council
On August 30, 2023, the UN Security Council (UNSC) voted on extending its sanctions regime against Mali. These measures aimed to renew a travel ban and asset freeze imposed by Resolution 2374 against eight individuals who had been found to “obstruct or threaten” Mali’s 2015 Peace Agreement. Originally, there were two proposed draft resolutions: one, prepared by France and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and another proposed by Russia. In the end, Russia’s resolution fell through as it was the only country that voted in favor of it, while Japan voted against, and the remaining 13 members abstained. As for the France-UAE resolution, thirteen Security Council members voted in favor, while China abstained, and Russia cast an attention-grabbing veto. On September 11, the General Assembly, adhering to Resolution 76/262, convened to discuss the veto and failed resolution. Quickly, a wave of criticism and finger pointing soon swept through the UN, with Russia being accused of snubbing diplomatic efforts, while Russia, in turn, expressed its disappointment in the UN’s lack of “pragmatism” and “political will” in arriving at a representative resolution in Mali.
The failure to reach consensus not only reflects the serious dissonance between Russia and other key Security Council members, but also revitalized critiques over permanent security council member veto privileges. Such debate, however, overshadows the more concerning question of why Russia felt the need to utilize its veto privileges in the Mali case and what this could mean in terms of Russia’s role in the UN. What were the reasons that led the UN to impose sanctions against Mali, and how did it become a point of contention in today’s Security Council? What might Russia’s veto mean in its approach to implementing and expressing its foreign policy within the UNSC?
Understanding the dangers that Mali faces, sanction renewal was high on the UNSC agenda. The Council’s three African members (A3)—Gabon, Ghana, and Mozambique—contended that from a regional perspective, when there has been a resurgence in conflict inter-party clashes, “the Council should not end a mechanism that provides a safeguard for the peace agreement”. There was no country, other than Mali itself, who wanted the immediate removal of all sanctions – a fact many have seemed to disregard in leu of Russia’s veto. Council members were keen to renew the sanctions regime, considering that this will be the Council’s main tool to monitor the 2015 Peace Agreement and exercise pressure on the parties to implement the peace accord, since MINUSMA is to withdraw from Mali by the end of the year. As further proof: Russia’s draft resolution only hinted at removing the sanctions in a years’ time. France and the UAE’s proposal, on the other hand, focused on quickly renewing sanctions, as well as the mandate of the Mali Panel of Experts, disregarding Mali’s pleas to disband body altogether. Hence, debate ensued among UNSC members not over whether sanctions should be implemented, but the conditions regarding their implementation.
Being an open advocate of pragmatic realist diplomacy, Russia’s recent Foreign Policy Concept, clearly outlines its priorities in maintaining state sovereignty and protecting individual state interests, both of its allies and its own. Thus, it should come as no surprise that Russia uses its veto privileges when it finds that its core national principles, or those of its allies, are being threatened or questioned in the UNSC. Russia has long advocated for state’s to be free to choose the way in which their country runs, and now the UNSC has become a key platform in realizing these ambitions.
In many ways, this was a core issue in the Mali sanctions debate. During talks on draft resolutions, Russia, along with China, stressed the importance of listening to Mali when arriving at a resolution, finding ways to gain its support, which would allow the sanctions regime to serve as an effective tool for rebuilding the country, rather than blindly punishing it. Mali’s positions on renewing sanctions were openly known, and yet refused to be seriously considered within the French-UAE resolution. Rather than being some “hail Mary” to ruin Western diplomatic efforts to establish peace in Mali, Russia decided to side with what it saw as an ignored, if not bullied colleague and demanded that Council Members seriously include Mali’s interests in the final draft or have no resolution at all. In this light, Russia’s revisions to the mandate of the sanction’s regime could have successfully represented a middle ground reflecting Mali’s concern, however given political tensions within the UNSC following the Ukraine Crisis, any suggestions that were tied to Russia were simply ignored. Russia, in turn, was blamed for abusing its veto privileges and the matter of Mali was laid to rest.
On August 30, 2023, the UN Security Council (UNSC) voted on extending its sanctions regime against Mali. These measures aimed to renew a travel ban and asset freeze imposed by Resolution 2374 against eight individuals who had been found to “obstruct or threaten” Mali’s 2015 Peace Agreement. Originally, there were two proposed draft resolutions: one, prepared by France and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and another proposed by Russia. In the end, Russia’s resolution fell through as it was the only country that voted in favor of it, while Japan voted against, and the remaining 13 members abstained. As for the France-UAE resolution, thirteen Security Council members voted in favor, while China abstained, and Russia cast an attention-grabbing veto. On September 11, the General Assembly, adhering to Resolution 76/262, convened to discuss the veto and failed resolution. Quickly, a wave of criticism and finger pointing soon swept through the UN, with Russia being accused of snubbing diplomatic efforts, while Russia, in turn, expressed its disappointment in the UN’s lack of “pragmatism” and “political will” in arriving at a representative resolution in Mali.
The failure to reach consensus not only reflects the serious dissonance between Russia and other key Security Council members, but also revitalized critiques over permanent security council member veto privileges. Such debate, however, overshadows the more concerning question of why Russia felt the need to utilize its veto privileges in the Mali case and what this could mean in terms of Russia’s role in the UN. What were the reasons that led the UN to impose sanctions against Mali, and how did it become a point of contention in today’s Security Council? What might Russia’s veto mean in its approach to implementing and expressing its foreign policy within the UNSC?
Understanding UN Sanctions
Dis-United Nations and Conceptual Mazes of the New World Order
Since its founding in 1945, the United Nations has amassed a renowned reputation for its mind-blowing humanitarian achievements, as well as its blatant political failures. Though at times successful in providing material assistance and defending human rights, [1] the UN often finds itself riddled in ridicule given its limitations in establishing enforcement mechanisms, [2] overt Western dominance in UN institutions, [3] and the inability for members to arrive at a consensus, resulting in inaction and stalemate – a particularly daunting problem in the UNSC. [4] While “the United Nations was designed to cope with interstate war”, it is often seen as “ill-equipped to cope with civil conflict”, amassing great dissatisfaction and negative remarks, especially visible after cases like Cambodia, Somalia and Rwanda. [5]
Under Article 41, Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council “may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions”. This means that peaceful means – such as economic sanctions – have been a vital instrument used in the UNSC’s toolbelt. Since 1966, the Security Council has established 31 sanctions regimes, in Angola, Eritrea/Ethiopia, Rwanda, Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Sudan, South Sudan, Iran, Sierra Leone, Lebanon, DPRK, Yemen, Somalia/Eritrea, ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida, Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, Guinea-Bissau, CAR, Libya (2), the Former Yugoslavia (2), Haiti (2), Liberia (3), Iraq (2), the Taliban, and Mali.[6]
Today, there are fifteen ongoing sanctions regimes which aim to support political settlements, promote nuclear non-proliferation, and counter terrorism. Each sanction regime is administered by a sanctions committee that is chaired by a non-permanent member of the Security Council. There are a total of 11 monitoring groups, teams and panels that aid 12 of the 15 sanctions committees. Mali is no stranger to such groups and panels: an independent monitoring group, the Mali Panel of Experts, had previously reported to the Council twice a year on how the situation in Mali has changed and, if need be, establish new designations. However, following Russia’s recent veto, sanctions were suddenly lifted, and the highly contested Panel of Experts immediately dissolved.
Mali’s Turning Point
Beginning in 2012, groups like Amnesty International reported that Mali was experiencing a human rights crisis stemming from protests against the Malian government’s use of power, alarming number of protester deaths, rise in terrorism, and continuous fighting between Tuareg rebels and the Malian military. There were also allegations of arbitrary civilian detentions, sexual violence, and extrajudicial executions. Tuareg rebels alleged that the Malian government committed war crimes during the conflict and the situation in Mali was getting out of hand.
Soon after, on September 5, 2017, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2374, aiming to pressure involved parties to implement the 2015 Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali. Particularly, the Agreement sought to restore peace in the warring nation by reintegrating women and young people by a handful of initiatives, upgrading existent education systems, establishing territorial police, and supporting other humanitarian efforts throughout Mali. [7] In many respects, Resolution 2374 was a feat for the Security Council: action was taken against gross human right violations and consensus was reached on the need to destabilize security threats budding in the region. Sanctions were designated against individuals or entities that engaged in hostilities violating the peace agreement, obstructed or that threaten the agreement, or that somehow supported those violating the agreement. Attacks against the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), humanitarian assistance deliveries, or violations against international human rights and international humanitarian law were also factors that lead to designation. [8]
For better or for worse, the actual scope of Mali-related sanctions has been rather limited in the UN; the last designations were only in December 2019. However, that is not to say that this is because violence or instability has been absent from the country. According to the Panel of Experts Final Report of 2023, the “fragility of the 2015 Peace Agreement amid intensified tensions between signatory armed groups and the Malian government” was profound. The report stated that the impasse in the Agreement’s implementation is weakening the signatory armed groups to the benefit of Al-Qaeda*-affiliated Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), with the former positioning itself as the sole actor capable of protecting communities in the north from sustained ISGS violence against civilians. Additionally, the report suggested that the Malian government knowingly refrained from intervening against the ISGS – which has nearly doubled the area that it holds in Ménaka and Gao regions, displacing tens of thousands of civilians — believing that the fighting between rival groups benefited the government. [9] These conditions risked reverting Mali into a situation where terrorist groups could regain control of northern cities, which they once held in 2012.
The Sanctions Debate
Understanding the dangers that Mali faces, sanction renewal was high on the UNSC agenda. The Council’s three African members (A3)—Gabon, Ghana, and Mozambique—contended that from a regional perspective, when there has been a resurgence in conflict inter-party clashes, “the Council should not end a mechanism that provides a safeguard for the peace agreement”. There was no country, other than Mali itself, who wanted the immediate removal of all sanctions – a fact many have seemed to disregard in leu of Russia’s veto. Council members were keen to renew the sanctions regime, considering that this will be the Council’s main tool to monitor the 2015 Peace Agreement and exercise pressure on the parties to implement the peace accord, since MINUSMA is to withdraw from Mali by the end of the year. As further proof: Russia’s draft resolution only hinted at removing the sanctions in a years’ time. France and the UAE’s proposal, on the other hand, focused on quickly renewing sanctions, as well as the mandate of the Mali Panel of Experts, disregarding Mali’s pleas to disband body altogether. Hence, debate ensued among UNSC members not over whether sanctions should be implemented, but the conditions regarding their implementation.
Panel Scandal
More controversial in the UNSC was the topic of whether to keep Mali’s Panel of Experts. Mali accused the Panel of “non-compliance with the mandate” and “hostile, biased reports”. In a statement later made to the General Assembly, Mali and Russia claimed the Panel of Experts were an extension of Western neo-colonialist efforts to control Mali’s domestic affairs. For this reason, its disbandment was critical for any successful resolution. According to Mali, the Panel demanded detailed information on military and security cooperation between the Russian Federation and Mali, a matter it considered was a violation of Bamako’s sovereignty in choosing with whom to conduct affairs and how. Further, the Panel supposedly addressed political or economic questions without any link to its original mandate, including the question of human rights violations.
Mali’s entire position regarding the independent monitoring group was reflected earlier in an letter from August 15, 2023, which requested immediate sanction removal, recalling that the Malian government had first suggested created a sanctions regime to target those blocking the peace agreement’s implementation, justified at the time by the resumed hostilities between signatory armed groups. According to Mali’s current government, the reasons for creating the regime no longer exist, given that the situation in Mali itself has changed. Back in 2020 and 2021, Mali's junta had successfully seized power via coups, thus creating new rules for a new game in the region. Regardless of French and UAE efforts to convince Mali to bend its knee regarding the Panel, Mali opposed any resolution that had mention of them – a point that the Russian Federation had try to point out within the contents of its draft.
Realism Reflected in the UNSC
Though the United Nations is openly supportive of “democratic governments, economic interdependence” and “collective security alliances” “as means to overcome the security dilemma of the international system”, [10] it is rare to see liberalism trump realism within Security Council practices. This is particularly true thanks to Article 27(3) of the UN charter, which grants the five permanent members of the UNSC (P5) veto power, posing endless obstacles in arriving at consensus. The veto also affects the work of the Council in ways that transcend its actual use during voting. It is not unusual for a draft resolution not to be formally tabled because of the threat of a veto by one or more permanent members. On some occasions, however, the sponsor of a draft resolution may put it to the vote, fully knowing that it will be vetoed. Of course, this is to demonstrate symbolic support for an issue and to create a historical record of positions within the Council. Such was the case with the Mali vote.
Undoubtedly, all P5 nations (Russia, China, US, UK, France) have used or threatened to use their P5 privileges to advance their individual state interests. Such a realist approach to the liberal-based concept of the UNSC should not come as a shock; after all, US efforts to try to convince the UN of the legality of invading Iraq proves that the body often reflect state attempts to use the organization to either validate or pursue individual national interests. True, the UN is the epitome of liberalist traditions like multilateralism and institution building, [11] political confrontations and clashes within the Security Council ultimately reveal member state realist-leaning tendencies within the organization. Realism and its constituent sub-theories view international relations and world politics as a constant struggle for, and conflict over power and security. [12] Seeing that the UNSC consists of the world’s most powerful players, it’s no wonder that states in Council meetings look a lot like gladiators in a colosseum, fighting for the survival of their values and positions.
Disagreements over the mere scope of the United Nations and its policies have become more drastic and common over the years, revealing that the organization has become less about “We, the people”, and more about government interests and seeking ways to balance them out. [13] This claim, realist in its nature, is also backed up by the fact that key countries like India, Indonesia, Nigeria, South Africa and Brazil which “are important middle and regional powers”, yet have not been seriously considered for a place in the Security Council, regardless of the loyalty shown towards the organization [14] This is partially why notions of reforming the UNSC and UN in general have gained traction over recent years. [15]
Russian Realism and Veto
Being an open advocate of pragmatic realist diplomacy, Russia’s recent Foreign Policy Concept, clearly outlines its priorities in maintaining state sovereignty and protecting individual state interests, both of its allies and its own. Thus, it should come as no surprise that Russia uses its veto privileges when it finds that its core national principles, or those of its allies, are being threatened or questioned in the UNSC. Russia has long advocated for state’s to be free to choose the way in which their country runs, and now the UNSC has become a key platform in realizing these ambitions.
In many ways, this was a core issue in the Mali sanctions debate. During talks on draft resolutions, Russia, along with China, stressed the importance of listening to Mali when arriving at a resolution, finding ways to gain its support, which would allow the sanctions regime to serve as an effective tool for rebuilding the country, rather than blindly punishing it. Mali’s positions on renewing sanctions were openly known, and yet refused to be seriously considered within the French-UAE resolution. Rather than being some “hail Mary” to ruin Western diplomatic efforts to establish peace in Mali, Russia decided to side with what it saw as an ignored, if not bullied colleague and demanded that Council Members seriously include Mali’s interests in the final draft or have no resolution at all. In this light, Russia’s revisions to the mandate of the sanction’s regime could have successfully represented a middle ground reflecting Mali’s concern, however given political tensions within the UNSC following the Ukraine Crisis, any suggestions that were tied to Russia were simply ignored. Russia, in turn, was blamed for abusing its veto privileges and the matter of Mali was laid to rest.
Abusing Veto or Abusing Sanctions?
Unfortunately, debates over Russia abusing veto privileges overshadowed the purpose of the veto itself. Throughout the last decade, Russia has gone out of its way to solidify its great power status, not only in the eyes of its people, but to the entire world. The Mali veto symbolically positioned Russia to act as what it views as a protector of “individual state interests” – the big permanent Security Council member that is willing to look out for the bullied “small guy” in international politics. In addition to not only failing to incorporate individual states interests, Moscow’s envoy, Vassily Nebenzia, expressed that Russia “consistently advocates against endless automatic extensions of sanctions regimes, which should be targeted, have a limited timeframe and not be used as a means for external pressure”. Addressing the Global South, Nebenzia stressed that any country can find itself in Mali’s position “if we in the Council do not stop attempts by Western countries whose only concern is how to preserve their geopolitical dominance and use their former colonies”. Such was the message Russia tried to send to the UNSC: stop abusing sanctions and ignoring the interests of individual states, and we will stop vetoing incomplete resolutions.
Russia’s veto indisputably forced the entire UN to reflect; reflect on Mali, reflect on the role veto plays in the UNSC, reflect on UN sanctions in general. Rather than simply think that this case was just another time a state abused its veto privileges, perhaps it is worth noting this instance as a critical example of Russia’s growing role as a “bully beater” in the UNSC, a state that is willing to openly question and challenge abusive sanction practices in the UN, an issue that particularly hits home for the state, and protect what it deems as individual state interests, while avoiding implementing skewed practices that might hamper individual state sovereignty. As expressed by UAE representative Ghasaq Yousif Absalla Shaheen, “dialogue is the only path to surmount any difficulties”. Rather that fixating on the structural deficiencies of the UNSC, states should continue to pursue international efforts to incorporate individual state interests in resolutions, keeping in mind principals that are vital to both the party involved, as well as international norms set out within the UN Charter. A failed resolution is not necessarily a failed day in the UNSC – and understanding why that is the case is the first step in coming up with a plan on how to move forward.
*An organization banned in Russia
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4. Afoaku O.G., Ukaga O. United Nations Security Council Reform: A Critical Analysis Enlargement Options // Journal of Third World Studies. 2001. Vol. 18, № 2. P. 149–169; Slaughter A. Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes of UN Reform // The American Journal of International Law. American Society of International Law, 2005. Vol. 99, No 3. P. 619–631.
5. Thakur R. Past Imperfect, Future UNcertain: the United Nations at Fifty. London: Palgrave Macmillan Limited, 1998.
6. United Nations Sanctions // United Nations Security Council. 2015. URL: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/information.
7. Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali Resulting from the Algiers Process // United Nations. 07.24.2014. URL: https://www.un.org/en/pdfs/EN-ML_150620_Accord-pour-la-paix-et-la-reconciliation-au-Mali_Issu-du-Processus-d'Alger.pdf
8. Resolution 2374 // United Nations Security Council. 09.05.2017. URL: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2374.
9. Letter dated 3 August 2023 from the Panel of Experts on Mali established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) addressed to the President of the Security Council// United Nations Security Council. 08.03.2023. URL: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2023_578.pdf.
10. Dunne T., Milja Kurki, Smith S. International Relations Theories: discipline and diversity. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 365 p.
11. Barnett, Michael N. Bringing in the New World Order: Liberalism, Legitimacy, and the United Nations. World Politics. Vol. 49.No. 4.1997. Pp. 526–51.
12. Freyberg-Inan. A. What Moves Man: The Realist Theory of International Relations and Its Judgment of Human Nature. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004. 266 p.
13. Thakur R. Past Imperfect, Future UNcertain: the United Nations at Fifty. London: Palgrave Macmillan Limited, 1998. 293 p.
14. Ibid.
15. Sarwar N. Expansion of the United Nations Security Council // Strategic Studies. 2011. Vol. 31, No. 3. Pp. 257–279.
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