Escalating Threats in Central Eurasia: An Opportunity for the CSTO

Relations between Russia and the West have perceptibly cooled over recent months: the United States makes strong statements, which could result in a new confrontation among the former Soviet Union states. . Congress adopted the “Magnitsky Bill,” which was bitterly criticized by Russia. The Syrian conflict is escalating into a full-fledged war against the backdrop of yet another aggravation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. And finally, NATO forces’ withdrawal from Afghanistan will take longer than was initially declared by Alliance Command and the United States.

In Russian article was published on December 18, 2012

A regular summit of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member states will be held in Moscow on December 19, 2012. This meeting will take place in a troubled international climate for Russia. Relations between Russia and the West have perceptibly cooled over recent months: the United States makes strong statements, which could result in a new confrontation among the former Soviet Union states [1]. Congress adopted the “Magnitsky Bill,” which was bitterly criticized by Russia. The Syrian conflict is escalating into a full-fledged war against the backdrop of yet another aggravation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. And finally, NATO forces’ withdrawal from Afghanistan will take longer than was initially declared by Alliance Command and the United States. These are all bound to add to the long-planned agenda.

The summit is expected to finalize all the formalities concerning Uzbekistan’s suspension of its CSTO membership. The allies will in all probability confine themselves to a lenient resolution, leaving the door to the organization open for Uzbekistan further down the road.

The Moscow summit will focus on a discussion of how to enhance the organization’s international status. Regardless of the ongoing absence of a direct dialogue with NATO, the CSTO can claim a certain progress in its contacts with the UN given the recently-signed memorandum on peacekeeping [2]. But the main emphasis is supposed to be on positioning the organization as a key structure responsible for the military aspect of the Eurasian Union’s future security. In this respect, considerable effort will be focused on aligning and refining the strategic and operational command and control structure for the combined forces and military technology.

It should be noted that in the second half of 2012, the CSTO made further advances, conducting three military exercises of considerable scope in quite a short space of time: Border-Line 2012, Coordination 2012 and Indestructible Brotherhood 2012 [3]. Taking into account the relatively broad territory, participants and range of missions specified for these exercises, the CSTO’s recent activities seem aimed at giving new momentum to the organization, and at mending its international image. This was somewhat shaken by Uzbekistan’s recent decision to suspend its membership of the CSTO, which provoked a wave of pessimistic sentiment as to the future of regional military and political integration.

At the same time, considerable progress has been made towards the build-up of a consolidated AA/anti-missile system, as which was officially made public by Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia in early December. This effort, once successful, would do a great deal for the CSTO as a whole, and for Russia in particular. The idea of integrated anti-aircraft systems has been under consideration for some time, and its implementation has been boosted by the split between Moscow and Washington over the deployment of AA systems in Eastern Europe and the implementation of the first stage of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) for missile defense in Europe.

Photo: vsr.mil.by
CSTO military exercise "Vzaimodeystivie - 2012"
in Armenia

Back in July 2012, Nurzhan Mukanov, Chief of Air Defense of Kazakhstan announced that by the end of the year Russia and Kazakhstan would sign an agreement on the creation of a consolidated Anti Aircraft Defense System. Initially the CSTO AA/anti-missile system was supposed to comprise the East European zone to be covered by Air Defense Forces of Russia and Belarus, and the Caucasus and Central Asian zones of Air Defense. Corresponding agreements with Belarus and Armenia on consolidated air defense were signed quite a while ago, and hitherto outstanding issues with Central Asian allies have been addressed over recent months. The remarkable fact is that even the representatives of Uzbekistan endorsed the initiative launched by Moscow. In July 2012, Elmurad Machrapov, Commander-In-Chief of Uzbekistan’s Air Defense and Air Forces told a meeting of the CIS Air Defense Coordinating Council, held in Kyrgyzstan, that his country had no intention of withdrawing from the integrated CIS air defense system. Hence, by strengthening the CSTO AA/anti-missile system, Russia is not only signaling to Washington as to its reciprocal measures to counter Missile Defense in Europe, but is also increasing the value, from the United States’ and NATO’s viewpoint, of Russian participation in the European Missile Defense System, should this decision ever be made.

However, this progress does not provide a comprehensive answer to the issue of the CSTO’s long-term evolution. A number of problems that have a bearing on the prospects and conditions for the creation of a unified security environment for former Soviet states cannot be solved by military exercises alone. What are the chances of this kind of unified environment coming to pass, given the new threats and challenges? And under what conditions would the CSTO be in a position to fulfill this function? How can the CSTO be upgraded to meet the new realities of regional security while avoiding ideological traps? The solutions to many questions closely related to the CSTO’s efficiency should be identified in discussions, not by army maneuvers.

Regional Threats and the Respective Alert Level

The nature and thrust of regional threats in Central Asia are evolving at a sweeping pace. They also carry a great many uncertainties. Despite expectations, discussions of the Coalition Forces’ withdrawal from Afghanistan did anything but consolidate the CSTO allies’ efforts to prepare for the possible spread of unrest across Afghanistan’s borders into Central Asia. Quite to the contrary, it resulted in a fragmentation of these efforts and, in the long run, in Uzbekistan’s defiant move. It should be noted that the “Afghanization” of Central Asia, meaning the export of radical religious ideas, an upsurge in drug traffic and an escalated threat to statehood in the region, is certainly not the only possible scenario. Various ongoing processes in the Middle East are already affecting the region, or will do so in the nearest future.

In other words, the agenda pertaining to security across the whole South Caucasus-Central Asia area, in Russia’s view, shows a clear tendency towards deterioration over coming years, and could pose a serious challenge for regional states. This consideration accounts for the CSTO’s increased activity. Indeed, it is imperative that the allies employ all the available tools to be able to meet these new regional threats and challenges. This is how the signals sent by Moscow should be interpreted. This does not mean that the CSTO aspires to supply all-purpose solutions to any and all possible challenges. However, given a certain degree of accord, the organization could gain ample opportunities to enhance its status, which is to some extent supported by the signing of the Memorandum with the UN.

In this context, the issue at hand is not just upgrading defense mechanisms to counter possible threats and ensuring operational compatibility, but also boosting efforts to generate a new strategic concept of the CSTO. In this respect Moscow could take the initiative in drawing up such a document, agreeing it with the allies and, ultimately, strengthening the CSTO’s political component (which has recently been impaired) [4]. The new conditions imposed by the regional agenda are well suited to a doctrinal shift.

Security Space: Consolidated Or Segmented?

Photo: RIA Novosti
Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces
of Russia Valery Gerasimov announced a joint
consolidated AA/anti-missile system

Despite an extended period of teamwork, and contrary to what authorized representatives claim, the spirit of relations between member-states and their relative perception of how to form a security space vary enormously. There are several reasons for this. First, there is no absolute trust among the participants when it comes to issues that have a bearing on national security. Second, the states have different motivations for joining the CSTO. And third, the range of anticipated threats varies region to region.

A number of experts propose segmenting the security space covered by the CSTO into independent programs for the European, the South-Caucasus and the Central-Asian sectors, since each has unique regional features, processes and approach to unfolding events. There is something to this reasoning, but the CSTO allies all count on Russian participation to combat the threats faced. This is true of Belarus, Central Asia, and also Armenia. Russia, on the other hand, while not limiting the CSTO to a mere pretext for tackling current and future security issues, can hardly be expected to assent to segmenting the security space into individual sectors. Accepting this approach would put an end to the years-long efforts to shape the CSTO into a politico-military structure. The issue at stake is not Moscow’s regional or international reputation, far from it. All the existing disagreements notwithstanding, a consolidated structure and unified control system would help align CSTO countries as they work to attain future common objectives, while independent security programs tailored to different regions or sectors would, in all probability, augment the processes of fragmentation and polarization.

It would be futile to deny the difference in the nature of threats that the member-states are facing, or, for that matter, their reluctance to address their neighbors’ problems at their own expense. This is the reality that considerably diminishes the organization’s functional capabilities. Unity is easily demonstrated in maneuvers and special forces raids designed to cut short drug turnover or illegal migration, while serious disagreements arise as soon as issues of national stability and different ideological approaches to sensitive foreign policy objectives are involved. This argument may be exemplified by developments in Kyrgyzstan, the Belarusian administration’s standpoint on matters of cooperation, a number of existing territorial and political disputes between some Central Asian states and so on. All of the above, even given an adequate law enforcement practice (the lack of which is often mentioned by the member states) create grave obstacles to the CSTO attaining its objectives. Without a rapprochement between member-states (or common challenges arising that force these countries to shelve their disagreements) the CSTO’s performance would remain questionable, despite all the efforts invested by Moscow.

Pragmatism or Neo-Imperialism

Photo: TopTJ.com
Minister of Economic Development and Trade of
Tajikistan Rahimzoda Sh. On September 26,
2012. Tajikistan officially announced its
willingness to join the Customs Union.

Numerous Western and some domestic studies interpret Russia’s intention to implement the unified security space project in Central Asia, based on the CSTO, as an attempt to reinforce its stronghold in traditional zones Russian influence lost as a result of the collapse of the USSR. This is the alleged reason for Russia’s endeavor to win over former Soviet republics by offering them lucrative arms contracts, and set up Russian military facilities in neighboring states, thus re-establishing its former status. There is no doubt that a certain portion of Russia’s political establishment entertains these, or similar, ideas. However, closer scrutiny reveals that Russia’s policy is based on pragmatism, rather than on a wild goose chase. Improving cooperation among former Soviet republics has a well-defined economic aspect, although it is worth noting that, having shifted its focus to economic integration, the CSTO in its current configuration is lagging behind as a politico-military project [5].

In other words, the goal is to incorporate the military and political aspects into this new setup of economic integration. With regard to the fact that a number of countries’ commitment to economic cohesion (the Customs Union, the Common Free Market Zone) presupposes a solid security basis at the economic association’s boundary, and this goal is attainable under the CSTO framework. A window of opportunity to this end, at least, exists. Adverse events in neighboring regions will automatically trigger unwelcome processes in Russia, from refugee inflow from bordering countries to the dissemination of radical religious ideas. From this standpoint, Russia’s efforts do not appear at all neo-imperialistic, as they are aimed at accomplishing realistic objectives, namely, promoting internal security and politico-military stability in the region. This should serve the interests of both the West and China in equal measure. Large-scale projects in infrastructure, the economy and power sectors could help attain this goal. Moscow has already started to pursue some of the possibilities [6]. Indeed, economic projects rigidly tied-in with Russian interests in the region are gaining importance. Furthermore, major infrastructure facilities such as pipelines, arterial roads, power plants or trade routes would require safeguarding, which could be undertaken by CSTO joint forces. For example, on September 26, 2012 Tajikistan officially announced its willingness to join the Customs Union. This move would require much greater efforts to protect the boundary with Afghanistan, especially given the resilience of illegal drug trafficking and unrest along the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border, and this would offer further new opportunities for the CSTO.

Besides, modernization and sharing programs for northbound transportation and logistics infrastructure could become attractive projects for the economies of both Russia and Central Asian states. The implementation of these programs would promote an increase in regional trade volume, while also strengthening trade and economic relations with Russia. Safeguarding trade and transportation routes would also add a practical item on the CSTO’s agenda. To some extent such projects can be considered an addendum or alternative to the “New Silk Route,” program promoted by the United States.

Development Prospects and the CSTO’s Future

Current conditions are eminently suited for Moscow to step up political activities within the CSTO. Aligning basic principles and visions for security promotion in joint responsibility zones would help all parties ensure they have common ground, enabling them to share expertise and harmonize their approaches as developments in Afghanistan and the Middle East seem set to usher in a new period of turbulence.

But in practical terms this coordination all too often proves elusive for a number of reasons. To this end, paradoxical though it may sound, closer cooperation between Russia and the United States would be greatly beneficial. According to research conducted by Kazakhstan’s Institute of Political Solutions in 2012 the security situation in Central Asia displayed a tendency toward deterioration, while conflicts between regional states [7] became more frequent. This fact may be related to mounting competition between Russia and the United States in the military sphere. The United States is interested in establishing military and logistical infrastructure in the region that would provide monitoring capabilities and serve as a security cordon to curb transborder raids by al-Qaeda militants and other radical religious groups. It is common knowledge that Russia has traditionally been suspicious of American efforts to enhance their military infrastructure in the region. In answer to Washington’s political moves, Moscow is striving to keep up with its activities, escalating tensions further.

It will be easier to determine a new CSTO agenda after a wide range of issues with NATO and the United States is settled, paying due regard to Moscow’s regional interests. President Obama’s Administration would prefer to start the new presidential term with positive action plans for the Russia and Afghanistan tracks. In this regard, Russia has a good opportunity to offer a new direction in the promotion of regional security. For example, the United States could focus their efforts on technical and operational support for the Afghan National Security Forces, having limited their presence in the region to this mission alone. Meanwhile, Russia and its CSTO allies would concentrate on promoting military stability and security in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. This specialization would help clarify the CSTO’s strategic goals, and could be incorporated into a new NATO concept.

Arrangements with the United States on the demarcation of areas of responsibility could reduce uncertainty regarding the withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan and blunt the Central Asian states’ tendency to play on differences between Moscow and Washington which, in the long run, hinders military cooperation between CSTO member-states. Resolving this situation would send clear signals to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and a number of other former Soviet republics. Under the circumstances, Moscow would find it easier to set out new political and strategic initiatives under a CSTO umbrella. The odds of such initiatives being favorably received by the allies would appreciably rise.

1. Charles Clover Clinton vows to thwart new Soviet Union Financial Times. December 6, 2012

2. The CSTO and the UN signed the Memorandum on Peacekeeping on 28.09.2012

3. Briefing on military exercises conducted by the CSTO members in 2012

4. “The CSTO as a Military Alliance is Nonexistent” by Alexei Arbatov, Head, Center for International Security at the World Economy and International Relations Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences. Novye Izvestia. 18.07.2012

5. Alexander Karavaev. Make the CSTO Attractive. Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 25.09.2012

6. On September, 2012, following the results of the official visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Kyrgyzstan, six documents on cooperation between Russia and Kyrgyzstan were signed, including: Agreement on construction and operation of Verkhnenarynsky cascade of hydropower plants and on the construction and operation of Kambarata-1 HPP; Agreement on the status and terms of stay of the Russian integrated military base in the territory of Kyrgyzstan and the Protocol on cooperation in the military sphere prior to the bi-lateral Agreement on the status and terms of stay of the Russian integrated military base in Kyrgyzstan coming into force.

7. Project “Security Index of Central Asia”